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RUSTIC JUSTICE:
COMMUNITY AND COERCION UNDER THE
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
KATHERINE VAN WEZEL STONE*
Arbitration clauses are appearing in a wide variety of consumer
transactions, including routine product purchase forms,
residential leases, housing association charters, medical consent
forms, banking and credit card applications, and employment
handbooks. In the past fifteen years, the Supreme Court has
reinterpreted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) so as to grant
tremendous deference to private arbitral tribunals. By doing so, it
has altered the landscape of civil litigation, taking many consumer
claims out of the legal system and relegating them to private
tribunals. In this Article, Professor Stone assesses the recent trend
toward the privatization of civil justice in light of the history of the
FAA. The author finds that the FAA, when enacted in 1925,
embodied a vision of voluntarism, delegation, and self-regulation
within the business and commercial communities. Arbitration
under the FAA was conceived as an institution that reflected and
defined membership in a shared normative community. She
criticizes recent judicial interpretations that condone the use of
arbitration to resolve disputes between individuals and entities
who, far from sharing in a common normative community,
occupy vastly different positions of power vis-d-vis each other.
These expansive interpretations facilitate the exercise of invisible
coercion in many facets of contemporary life. To remedy the
abuses of arbitration, the author proposes that courts adopt a two-
tiered approach, in which the degree of deference they grant to
arbitral proceedings varies depending upon whether the dispute is
between insiders to a self-regulating community or between an
outsider and an insider.
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Now we all know, that arbitrators, at the common law,
possess no authority whatsoever, even to administer an
oath, or to compel the attendance of witnesses. They cannot
compel the production of documents ... or insist upon a
discovery of facts from the parties under oath. They are not
ordinarily well enough acquainted with the principles of law
or equity, to administer either effectually, in complicated
cases; and hence it has often been said that the judgment of
arbitrators is but rusticum judicium.'
-Justice William Story (1845)
I. INTRODUCTION
It is likely that someone you know has recently purchased a
Gateway computer. It is not likely that the purchaser has noticed the
surprise inside the box. Like the boxes of Cracker Jack in the olden
days, Gateway computers come with a surprise inside the box. And,
like the Cracker Jack toys, the Gateway surprises often disappoint.
However, unlike the Cracker Jack's surprise, the Gateway surprise
can be a source of long-lasting rather than ephemeral regret.
A Gateway 2000 computer arrives in a box together with
numerous advertising brochures, instruction manuals, and forms
setting out product descriptions, warranties, and other technical
information concerning the purchase. One of these forms, entitled
"Standard Terms and Conditions," states, "[a]ny dispute or
controversy arising out of or relating to this Agreement or its
1. Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 14,065)
(emphasis added).
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interpretation shall be settled exclusively and finally by arbitration."2
Arbitration clauses such as this one are often buried in fine print and
obscure language so that they are, for all practical purposes, invisible
to the average consumer. Even if visible, however, the average
consumer has no reason to suspect that the clause is anything but
innocuous.
Arbitration is an increasingly common feature of modern life.
Once confined to the specialized provinces of international
commercial transactions and labor-management relations, arbitration
clauses now appear in many day-to-day consumer transactions.
Banks frequently include arbitration clauses in their terms for
maintaining bank accounts; health maintenance organizations
("HMOs") routinely have provisions requiring that all disputes
between the health consumer and the HMO be arbitrated;
employment handbooks often state that employees must utilize
arbitration to resolve employment-related disputes; many standard
residential and commercial lease forms say that all disputes between
the tenant and the landlord must be submitted to arbitration;
homeowner associations and residential condominiums frequently
include arbitration clauses in their charter documents.' Before long,
routine consumer products, like Gateway Computers, will come with
product and warranty information that includes a mandatory
arbitration clause.4
The proliferation of private arbitration in consumer transactions
is a new feature of modern life, the legal consequences of which have
not been adequately addressed. A major reason for the surge in
consumer arbitration is widespread dissatisfaction with the civil
justice system, with its problems of delay, expense, technicality, and
judicial gridlock. Arbitration is part of a larger movement toward
alternative dispute resolution ("ADR"), a movement that attempts
to develop substitutes for an increasingly dysfunctional civil justice
system. Advocates of ADR promote many types of mechanisms,
2. Standard Terms and Conditions, contained in GATEWAY GOLD, SERVICE AND
SUPPORT 10 (July 1995) (copy on file with the North Carolina Law Review); see also Hill
v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1997) (discussing product information
for newly purchased Gateway Computer that included an arbitration clause); Brower v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 570 (App. Div. 1998) (discussing arbitration
agreement included in the box of all Gateway computers shipped after July 3, 1995).
3. See Barry Meier, In Fine Print, Customers Lose Ability to Sue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
10, 1997, at Al.
4. See id.




methods, and procedures for resolving conflict, including some well-
known devices, such as arbitration, mediation, conciliation, and some
newer ones, such as settlement conferences, mini-trials, med-arb, and
summary jury trials.6
Arbitration is the most venerable ADR mechanism, long
predating the modem ADR movement. It differs from other ADR
mechanisms because it results not in a consensual resolution of a
dispute, but in an award rendered by a third party and imposed on
the disputants. Because arbitration yields final resolution of disputes,
it is the most potent of the proposed mechanisms, but it is also the
one that poses the greatest dangers for the uninitiated.
Arbitration, like all other forms of ADR, operates outside the
civil justice system but not outside the law. Law polices the
boundaries between arbitration and the legal system, defining the
shape and role of arbitration in our legal order.7 In tandem with the
expanded use of arbitration in consumer transactions has been an
expansion in the scope of arbitration within the legal order. In recent
years, the Supreme Court has reinterpreted the Federal Arbitration
Act ("FAA"),8 the statute that defines the boundary between the
public legal system and arbitration. The FAA provides that
agreements to arbitrate are "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable." 9
Before the 1980s, the FAA was interpreted as applying only to
federal question cases or diversity cases involving commerce that
were in federal court.'0 Further, the FAA applied only to cases that
were in federal court on an independent federal question basis." In
the past fifteen years, however, the Supreme Court has expanded the
reach of the FAA and has adopted a national policy of promoting the
use of arbitration in all relationships that have a contractual
6. For a summary of the primary dispute resolution methods, see STEPHEN B.
GOLDBERG ET AL., DIsPUTE REsOLUTION-NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER
PROCESSES 4-5 (2d ed. 1992).
7. Sometimes ADR techniques are annexed to the courts, as in court-mandated
arbitration or mediation, in which case they become an extension of the public civil
litigation system akin to court-appointed referees or special masters. Usually, however,
the term "alternative dispute resolution" refers to mechanisms that operate in the private
realm and that constitute a regime of private justice. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Beyond
Formalism and False Dichotomies: The Need for Institutionalizing a Flexible Concept of
the Mediator's Role, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 949, 950 (1997) (noting the importance of
distinguishing purely private mediation from semi-public, court-ordered mediation that
occurs pursuant to state statutes).
8. United States Arbitration Act of 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended
at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1- 307 (1994)).
9. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
10. See infra notes 41-57 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
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element.'2
This Article describes the expanding scope of arbitration under
the FAA and explains the trend in light of the history of the statute.
It concludes that the Supreme Court's expansive doctrines, when
applied to consumer transactions, contravene the statute's intent and
undermine many important due process and substantive rights. In
brief, the argument is as follows: The FAA, which made agreements
to arbitrate judicially enforceable, was designed to facilitate
arbitration between members of trade associations. It was enacted to
further a vision of voluntarism, delegation, and self-regulation within
the business and commercial communities. 13 Recently, courts have
applied the FAA in contexts such as consumer transactions and
employment relations that often go far beyond the original
understanding of the legislation. By such interpretations of the FAA,
courts condone and encourage the use of arbitration to resolve
disputes between individuals and entities who, far from sharing in a
common normative community, occupy vastly different positions of
power vis-h-vis each other. These expansive interpretations of the
FAA facilitate the exercise of invisible private coercion in many
facets of contemporary life.
A. An Introductory Hypothetical
An introductory hypothetical will illustrate the current
interpretations of the FAA and some of the pitfalls that such an
approach entails. The hypothetical is a composite of the recent
Seventh Circuit case, Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,"4 the recent New
York Court of Appeals case, Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,5 and of
other cases involving arbitration.
In September 1997, Mr. and Mrs. Harper of Weston,
Massachusetts purchased a special model Odyssey computer for
$4000 through an advertisement in PC World magazine. The
computer system was advertised as containing a state-of-the-art
speaker system, an extra fast CD-ROM drive, an exceptional
graphics accelerator, a multi-gigabyte hard drive, and other superior
features. When the Harpers got the computer home and took it out
12. See infra Part II (discussing the development of a federal policy favoring
arbitration).
13. See S. REP. No. 68-536, at 3 (1925) ("The settlement of disputes by arbitration
appeals to big business and little business alike, to corporate interests as well as to
individuals.").
14. 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
15. 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (App. Div. 1998).
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of its box, they found that it did not live up to their expectations. The
speakers made a hissing and static sound, the CD-ROM drive
jammed, there was no accelerator, the floppy disk drive destroyed
some of their disks, and the keyboard had several keys that stuck.
After a month of trying to cure the defects, the Harpers contacted
Odyssey and asked them to replace the system. Receiving no
satisfaction, the Harpers brought suit in state court alleging breach of
warranty, violations of several state consumer protection laws, fraud,
and violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
("RICO") Act, 6 the federal racketeering statute.
Odyssey responded to the suit by pointing out that inside the
box, along with the computer, was an eight-page brochure setting out
the specifications of the product and the terms of the transaction.
One of the fifty-odd terms was an arbitration clause, stating that all
disputes regarding the product must be arbitrated under the
arbitration rules of the Computer Manufacturers Industry
Association.
The Harpers had never seen the clause before. Upon inquiry,
they learned that the Computer Manufacturers Industry Association
arbitration procedures require arbitrations to be held in Phoenix,
Arizona before a panel of three retired industry executives. The
procedures also state that in order to prevail, a purchaser
complaining of a defect has the burden to show that the defect did
not result from customer actions or damage in shipping or delivery.
In addition, the procedures state that a purchaser cannot recover
punitive damages, pain and suffering, or attorney fees.
Odyssey moved to stay the Harpers' legal action and compel
arbitration. They claimed that under the Federal Arbitration Act,
the Harpers were required to arbitrate. The FAA provides that
when disputes are subject to a contractual arbitration provision, a
court must stay litigation and compel the parties to arbitrate.'7 The
Harpers opposed Odyssey's motion because they believed that the
industry panel would be biased against them, they did not want their
remedies limited, and they did not want to incur the expense of going
to Phoenix to have their case heard. The court held for Odyssey,
stayed the litigation, and ordered the parties to arbitrate."
An arbitration was then held before the panel of retired
16. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968 (1984 & Supp. 1998).
17. See 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1994).
18. This was the result in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., one of the cases on which this
hypothetical is based. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1151 (7th Cir. 1997).
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executives from the computer industry. The arbitrators knew the
company personnel from their long careers in the industry and did
not want to make waves. They believed that all advertisements are
puffery and that consumers should not rely on any representations in
them. The arbitrators also believed that the computer the Harpers
received was perfectly adequate for ordinary "end-users," who use a
computer for household tasks and do not need all the bells and
whistles that were alleged to be lacking. In addition, the arbitrators
believed that customers who are worried about product performance
should purchase maintenance agreements. So they ordered Odyssey
to pay the Harpers thirty dollars for a new keyboard and otherwise
denied the claim.
Can the Harpers challenge this scenario? Probably not. There is
no ground to resist arbitration under the FAA as it has been
interpreted in the last ten years. At the arbitration the Harpers will
probably lose, and they will have no basis for appeal.
One might argue that the Harpers could avoid the arbitration
clause on the ground that the package enclosure was not a contract at
all. They did not receive it until after they purchased the product,
after the contract was made. Unfortunately, courts have held that a
contract can be formed in many ways, not merely by payment of
money.' Many contracts involve payment first and the revelation of
terms later, including contracts to purchase airline tickets and home
insurance. Courts usually treat such after-arriving terms as binding,
at least when the purchaser had an option to decline the term and
cancel the transaction.'
Even if the package enclosure had not mentioned arbitration but
had stated, "[tihis contract embodies the rules and regulations of the
Computer Manufacturers Industry Trade Association," the court
would order arbitration if the incorporated trade association rules
called for arbitration. It is settled that an arbitration agreement that
is incorporated into a contract by reference is enforceable under the
19. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996); see also
U.C.C. § 2-204(1) ("A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to
show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such
a contract.").
20. See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148-49 (holding that an arbitration clause inside a product
box was binding); ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1452 (holding that the license term inside a
computer box was binding); Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 571-72 (holding that an arbitration
clause inside a product box was binding); see also Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499
U.S. 585, 595-96 (1991) (holding that a forum selection provision on the back of a cruise




Some courts do not enforce clauses in form contracts involving
consumers when the clause is oppressive, is not presented in a
prominent manner, or contains terms that parties would not
reasonably anticipate would be present.22 For example, some courts
have held that small print on the back of coat check claims tickets are
not binding contractual terms because the parties believed the stubs
were for identification purposes and did not reasonably believe the
stubs would contain contractual termsP But some courts do enforce
such clauses on the grounds that parties should reasonably anticipate
that there are contractual terms on the tickets.24 In the case of a
ticket containing an arbitration clause, if there was a genuine
question about whether the parties reasonably should have perceived
the ticket to contain contractual terms, then that issue, and the
attendant issue of the enforceability of the arbitration clause, would
be for an arbitrator to decide.' Only if the Harpers could claim that
the arbitration clause itself-as distinct from the contract as a
whole-was unconscionable, would it be an issue for a court to
resolve.26 But here where the arbitration clause is a garden-variety
arbitration clause, they would be unlikely to prevail on this
argument.27
21. See, e.g., R.J. O'Brien & Assoc. v. Pipkin, 64 F.3d 257, 260 (7th Cir. 1995); Hodge
Bros. v. DeLong Co., 942 F. Supp. 412, 415 (W.D. Wis. 1996); see also infra Part IV.B
(discussing incorporation of arbitration by reference).
22. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 9-44
(3d ed. 1987) (citing cases and discussing the modem view on contracts of adhesion); E.
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.26, at 310-15 (2d ed. 1990) (citing cases and
discussing standardized contracts).
23. See generally CALAMARi & PERILLO, supra note 22, § 9-43, at 413 (discussing
cases denying enforcement of terms in parcel room checks and amusement park tickets);
FARNSWORTH, supra note 22, at § 4.26,313-14 & nn.14-16 (same).
24. Courts have gone both ways on documents like steamship, railroad, and airline
tickets. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 22, § 4.26, at 313-14 & n.17 (citing cases enforcing
terms); see also Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 595 (enforcing a choice-of-forum clause
and noting that the parties admitted that they received actual notice of the term);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981) (describing the conditions under
which unknown terms in standardized agreements are enforceable).
25. According to the separability doctrine of Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967), the defense of lack of assent to the terms of a contract does
not defeat the obligation to arbitrate. See id. at 402; see also infra notes 85-91 and
accompanying text (discussing the Court's adoption of the separability doctrine).
26. See Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 574-75 (App. Div. 1998)
(holding that an arbitration clause that compelled parties to utilize the arbitration rules of
the International Chamber of Commerce ("I.C.C.") was unconscionably expensive and
burdensome).
27. Cf. id. (arguing that while arbitration under the rules of the I.C.C. is so
burdensome as to be unconscionable, arbitration under the rules of the American
1999]
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Alternatively, the Harpers might argue that the package
enclosure was a contract of adhesion, that is, a contract that was
presented to them in a take-it-or-leave-it fashion and in which they
were not able to bargain over the terms. Several courts have held
such enclosured arbitration terms were not adhesive because the
purchaser had the option of returning the goods or purchasing them
elsewhere.' But even if the enclosure were found to be a contract of
adhesion, a contract of adhesion will be enforced unless it is
unconscionable, involves undue surprise, or contravenes public
policy.29 Arbitration can hardly be said to violate public policy-
courts repeatedly state that public policy favors arbitration.30 And at
present, it is highly unlikely that any court would say that a standard
arbitration clause like the one in this hypothetical is unconscionable
or unexpected.3'
The Harpers might attack the award on the grounds that the
industry panel was biased. For arbitration, however, bias is the flip
side of expertise. The possibility of arbitral bias is considered the
price one pays in exchange for the putative expertise of the
arbitrators.32 The retired executives were on the panel because they
are experts in the industry, and expertise in arbitration is considered
a good thing, not a bad thing. So the retired executives' connection
with the industry is a plus, not a minus, and it does not provide a
reason for a court to reconsider the Harpers' claim.33
The Harpers might try to vacate the arbitral award on the
ground that the arbitrators did not correctly interpret state warranty
and consumer protection laws. But again, that will not be a reason to
vacate the award-the standard for vacating an award under the
Arbitration Association is not necessarily unconscionable).
28. See Filias v. Gateway 2000, Inc., No. 97 C 2523, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20358, at
*5-*6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15,1998); Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 572-73.
29. See Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 172-73 (Cal. 1990); CALAMARI &
PERILLO, supra note 22, § 9-44, at 418-24.
30. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480-81
(1989); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
31. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30-33 (1991); see
also Webb v. R. Rowland & Co., 800 F.2d 803, 807 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that an
arbitration clause in a brokerage agreement was not inherently unconscionable).
32. See Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 1983) ("The
parties to an arbitration choose their method of dispute resolution, and can ask no more
impartiality than inheres in the methods they have chosen." (citing American Almond
Prods. Co. v. Consolidated Pecan Sales Co., 144 F.2d 448,451 (2d Cir. 1944)); see also infra
Part VI.A (discussing arbitral bias).
33. See Merit Ins. Co., 714 F.2d at 679; see also infra notes 561-68 and accompanying
text (discussing courts' views of the advantages of such business relationships).
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FAA is "manifest disregard of the law."34  This does not mean
incorrect interpretation of the law, nor an interpretation that differs
from one a court would issue. 5 Nor does it mean that an award
should be vacated if an arbitrator is ignorant of the law. "Manifest
disregard" means deliberate or overt refusal to apply the law.
36
There is no evidence here that the arbitrator deliberately disregarded
the law. Indeed, arbitrators are not obligated to write opinions
explaining their awards.37 The arbitrators could have issued an award
that gave the Harpers nothing without a word of explanation.
Furthermore, if the state had a law that said that arbitration
clauses are not enforceable unless they appear in a prominent place,
such as bold print on the face of a contract-a provision that many
states have-the Harpers would still lose. The Supreme Court stated
as recently as 1996 that such state laws are preempted by the FAA.38
Thus, the arbitrators' decision is effectively unassailable in a court.
B. Overview
The foregoing hypothetical demonstrates the extremely broad
scope of private arbitration under the current interpretation of the
FAA. The remainder of this Article will detail the doctrinal
developments that have been summarized thus far, demonstrate that
by extending the scope of the FAA, courts are disregarding the
statute's history, and propose a new approach to arbitration that is
more consistent with the statutory intent.
Part II discusses the major Supreme Court cases of the past
decade that have expanded the scope of the FAA. In these cases, the
34. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez
de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 477.
35. See Willemijn Houdstermmaatschappij, BV v. Standard Microsystems Corp., 103
F.3d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1997); Siegel v. Titan Indus. Corp., 779 F.2d 891, 892-93 (2d Cir. 1985);
see also infra notes 141-43 and accompanying text (discussing how courts have narrowly
interpreted the "manifest disregard of the law" standard).
36. See Standard Microsystems, 103 F.3d at 12 ("Manifest disregard of the law may be
found ... if the arbitrator 'understood and correctly stated the law but proceeded to
ignore it.'" (quoting Bell Aerospace Co. v. Local 516, 356 F. Supp. 354, 356 (W.D.N.Y
1973), rev'd on other grounds, 500 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1974))); Kanuth v. Prescott, Ball &
Turben, Inc., 949 F.2d 1175, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (" '[M]anifest disregard' means much
more than failure to apply the correct law. 'Manifest disregard' may be found, for
example, if the panel understood and correctly stated the law but then proceeded to ignore
it."); Siegel, 779 F.2d at 892-93 (citing BellAerospace Co., 356 F. Supp. at 356).
37. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598
(1960).
38. See Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996); see also Perry v.
Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489-90 (1987) (discussing state laws specifically aimed at arbitration
that are preempted by the FAA).
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Court has reinterpreted the FAA and redefined the boundary
between the courts and the world of private justice.
Part III addresses the two reasons most frequently offered to
explain the courts' newly expansive approach toward arbitration: (1)
that courts are attempting to clear crowded dockets; and (2) that
courts are merely enforcing the parties' contractual intent. It is
argued that neither explanation can adequately explain the recent
legal developments concerning arbitration under the FAA.
Part IV examines the legal and social thought of the 1920s and
the historical circumstances that led to the enactment of the FAA in
1925. This historical inquiry demonstrates that the FAA was
intended to facilitate self-regulation within commercial communities,
not to regulate relationships between consumers and large
corporations in arm's length, anonymous transactions.
Part V applies the historical insights to the interpretation of the
FAA since 1925. It examines the interpretative developments in the
FAA that arose in two areas of law in which there is a long history of
judicially approved collective self-regulation-securities regulation
and labor-management relations. It also traces the relationship
between the theory of self-regulation and the use of arbitration in
each of these areas.
Part VI demonstrates that the notion of self-regulation as it
arose in the securities and labor relations cases has served as a
template that courts use in interpreting the FAA. The self-regulatory
framework derived from securities and labor regulation has been
utilized to compel arbitration, sustain arbitral awards, and deny
judicial review in medical malpractice cases, consumer cases,
employment relations cases, and any number of other settings that
have little in common with those situations in which the self-
regulation notion originated. To demonstrate the power of the self-
regulation template to shape judicial decision-making, Part VI
examines the influence of self-regulation ideology on two especially
troublesome issues: (1) arbitral bias as a ground for vacating an
award; and (2) compelling arbitration when an arbitration clause is
incorporated by reference.
Part VII argues that the courts' current approach to arbitration
is inappropriate when applied to consumer transactions. By using the
rationale of self-regulation to justify ever greater deference and
delegation to institutions of private justice, courts permit private
power to substitute for fairness and due process. To remedy these
trends, it is proposed that courts adopt a two-tiered approach toward
arbitration, in which the degree of deference courts grant to arbitral
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proceedings varies depending upon whether the dispute is between
two insiders to a self-regulating community or between an outsider
and an insider.
Part VIII addresses two further issues: First, while Part VII
proposed that courts play a larger role in policing arbitrations
between insiders and outsiders to a self-regulating community, there
is still the possibility of coercion and abuse of power within self-
regulating organizations. It is therefore further proposed thatjudicial
doctrines delineating the degree of autonomy for voluntary
associations be applied to define the appropriate degree of deference
to insider arbitrations. Second, Part VIII addresses the question of
whether arbitration, by reducing court congestion and conserving
scarce public resources, is efficient for society as a whole. It is argued
that an arbitration system that prevents individuals from vindicating
their legal rights is not efficient, and that concerns about lengthy and
wasteful litigation are better addressed by reforming judicial
procedures and making more use of expedited processes such as
small claims courts and special masters. Part VIII concludes that it is
necessary to rethink the courts' deferential approach to arbitration
under the FAA. It is urged that in some instances it is necessary for
courts to go beyond the proposals advanced in Part VII and override
arbitration awards even for disputes between members of a self-
regulating community. It is argued that certain common norms
transcend the boundaries of self-regulation and should be applied to
the community as a whole.
II. THE EXPANDING SCOPE OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
Section 2 of the FAA provides that promises to arbitrate
contained in contracts involving maritime transactions or commerce
are "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."39 The
remainder of the FAA delineates the procedures and remedies
available for enforcing such "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable"
promises to arbitrate.' In the 1980s, over fifty years since its
enactment, the FAA was virtually rewritten by the Supreme Court,
ushering in a new era in arbitration law.
A. The Federalization of Arbitration Law
In the 1920s, the supporters and drafters of the FAA (then called
39. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
40. See id. §§ 3-307 (1994).
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the United States Arbitration Law) contended that it was enacted
pursuant to Congress's Article III power to establish procedures for
the federal courts.4' On this basis, it was long believed that the FAA
applied only to cases in admiralty or involving commerce that were
brought in federal court on the basis of federal question or diversity
jurisdiction.42 Indeed, there was a serious question about the FAA's
applicability in diversity cases.43
In 1956, in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc., 44 the
Supreme Court declared that arbitration was substantive, not
procedural, for purposes of the Erie doctrine.45 In Bernhardt, a
diversity case, an employee who lived in Vermont sued his New York
employer to enforce an employment contract.46  The defendant
moved under § 3 of the FAA for a stay of the litigation on the basis
of an arbitration clause in the parties' written agreement. 47  The
Court refused to apply the FAA to the action because there was no
showing that the plaintiff was working in interstate commerce, a
prerequisite to application of the FAA.48 Because the FAA did not
apply, the Court then considered whether arbitration is substantive
or procedural for purposes of Erie.49  It applied an outcome-
determinative test, reasoning that the use of arbitration rather than
litigation could determine the outcome of the case.5" The Court thus
concluded that arbitration was substantive, so state law rather than
federal law applied.51 Having decided that state law must be applied
to resolve the arbitration issue, the Court remanded the case to the
district court to determine which state's arbitration law, New York's
41. See Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12
VA. L. REV. 265, 275 (1926).
42. See Linda R. Hirschman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of
Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305, 1318-19 (1985).
43. See id. at 1316-17.
44. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
45. See id. at 202-03.
46. See id. at 199.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 200-01.
49. See id. at 202.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 202-04. Bernhardt was the Supreme Court's last application of its
outcome-determinative test under Erie. It was also its most extreme application in the
sense that the Court held that the very procedure for hearing the dispute was substantive
for Erie purposes. See id. at 202-05. As Bernhardt graphically illustrated, the outcome-
determinative test allowed seemingly unfettered intrusion into the workings of the federal
courts. Two years later, in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, 356 U.S. 525
(1958), the Supreme Court abandoned the outcome-determinative test and shifted to an




or Vermont's, should apply.52
Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, agreed that the
FAA was substantive, but he further argued that, under Erie, the
FAA was not applicable at all in diversity cases.53 Justice Douglas's
majority opinion did not address this troubling point, which he
acknowledged might present "a constitutional question."'54
In 1967, in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,55 the
Supreme Court resolved the latent Erie problem by holding that the
FAA applies in diversity cases.56 In Prima Paint, the Court declared
that the FAA was enacted pursuant to Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause to enact substantive rules to govern interstate
commerce, and thus it could be applied in suits involving commerce
or maritime transactions that were brought in a federal court.57
Unlike most other substantive regulations of commerce, however, the
Court in Prima Paint stated that the FAA did not create its own
federal subject matter jurisdiction, but rather applies only in cases
that independently satisfy federal jurisdictional requirements.58
Once the Court grounded the FAA squarely on the Commerce
Clause, questions arose about the degree to which it preempted state
laws that affected arbitration. In 1984, in Southland Corp. v.
Keating,9 the Supreme Court resolved these questions by giving the
FAA a broad preemptive scope. In Southland, a group of California
franchisees sued Southland, their franchisor, in California state court
for fraud, breach of contract, and violation of California's Franchise
Investment Act.6" The franchise agreement contained a promise to
arbitrate "any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this
52. See Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 205. In Bernhardt, the choice-of-law issue was
dispositive because Vermont's then-existing common law provided that agreements to
arbitrate were revocable, while New York's arbitration law made agreements to arbitrate
irrevocable and enforceable. See id. at 204-05.
53. See id. at 208 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
54. l at 202.
55. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
56. See id. at 404-07.
57. See id. at 405. Previously, courts and commentators had maintained that the FAA
was enacted pursuant to Congress's power under Article III to create and establish
procedures for the federal courts. See, e.g., Cohen & Dayton, supra note 41, at 265.
58. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 404-05; see also id. at 416-18 (Black, J., dissenting)
(discussing the jurisdictional dilemmas of Bernhardt and Erie). See generally Hirschman,
supra note 42, at 1324-25 (noting the incongruity of Prima Paint's conclusion that the FAA
created a federal substantive right to arbitration but did not support federal question
jurisdiction).
59. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
60. See iL at 3-4.
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Agreement."'6 The California Supreme Court ordered the state
common law claims to be arbitrated, but it held that there was no
duty to arbitrate the California Franchise Investment Act claims
because that Act prohibited waivers of its provisions.6' The United
States Supreme Court reversed. In the majority opinion, the
Southland Court reiterated its holding in Prima Paint that the FAA is
based on the Commerce Clause.63 From this fact it drew the
conclusion that the FAA applies in state as well as federal courts.
64
Thus, the majority declared that the FAA overrides state law that
conflicts with its purposes.65 It held that the California franchise law
conflicted with the FAA and therefore was preempted.66  The
Southland majority further disabled state courts and state law in the
arbitration area by holding that § 3 of the FAA-a provision that is
expressly limited to federal courts and requires them to stay litigation
and to grant motions to compel arbitration-also applies in state
courts.67
Southland gave the FAA an extraordinarily expansive
preemptive reach. On several subsequent occasions, the Supreme
Court has reiterated that states may not legislate to protect their
citizens from arbitration obligations.68 For example, three years after
Southland, the Supreme Court decided Perry v. Thomas,69 a case in
which an employee sued for unpaid commissions under the California
Labor Code.7" The Labor Code had a provision stating that actions
for the collection of wages could be maintained "'without regard to
the existence of any private agreement to arbitrate.' "71 The Supreme
Court ruled that the Labor Code provision, which was specifically
designed to protect an individual from an agreement to arbitrate, was
preempted by the FAA.72 It also ruled that state statutory and
common law defenses to the enforcement of an arbitration clause
61. Id. at 4.
62. See Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1198, 1203 (Cal. 1982), rev'd sub
nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
63. See Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 11.
64. See id at 10.
65. See id at 12-13.
66. See id. at 13-15.
67. See id. at 15-16.
68. See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); Allied-Bruce
Terminex Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,270-73 (1995).
69. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
70. See id. at 484-85.
71. Id at 495 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 229 (West
1971)).
72. See id at 490-91.
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would be effective in resisting arbitration only if they apply to the
validity and enforceability of contracts generally. The Court stated:
"A state-law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact
that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with this
requirement. .... "
Recently, the Supreme Court has reiterated its broad approach
to preemption under the FAA.74 In 1995, in Allied-Bruce Terminex
Cos. v. Dobson,75 the Court held that the preemptive force of the
FAA extends to the full extent of federal commerce power.76 Allied-
Bruce involved a dispute between a homeowner, a subsequent
purchaser, and an exterminating company that had given the
homeowner a lifetime guarantee against termites.77 The agreement
contained an arbitration clause.78 When termites later infested the
premises, the homeowner and the purchaser sued the exterminator in
Alabama state court, and the defendant sought a stay pursuant to the
FAA.79  Alabama had a state law that rendered predispute
arbitration agreements invalid. 0 The Supreme Court determined
that the transaction sufficiently involved commerce to trigger
application of the FAA, and it thus refused to give effect to
Alabama's anti-arbitration statute.8 '
One year later, in Doctor's Associates v. Casarotto,s the Court
held that a state law that required arbitration clauses to be
73. L at 493 n.9 (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16-17 n.11 (1984);
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,404 (1967)).
74. The Supreme Court created a narrow exception to the broad preemption of
Southland and Perry in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468
(1989). In Volt, the Court upheld the application of a state law that regulated the
procedure to be used in arbitration when the parties had included a choice-of-law clause in
their contract. See id. at 478-79. The Volt Court said that the FAA does not require
arbitration under any particular set of procedural rules. See id. at 476. Rather, parties
may specify the particular rules under which arbitration will be conducted. See id.
Subsequent cases distinguished Volt on the ground that the state law at issue in Volt
merely regulated the procedure of arbitration, but did not operate to defeat arbitration
altogether. See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996); Allied-Bruce
Terminex Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,281 (1995).
75. 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
76. See id. at 277; cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (restricting
congressional commerce power to regulations in three broad areas: (1) the use of
channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of commerce; and (3) those
activities having a substantial relation to commerce).
77. See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 268-69.
78. See id. at 268.
79. See id. at 269.
80. See ALA. CODE § 8-1-41(3) (1993).
81. See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 282.
82. 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
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conspicuously placed on the first page of a contract was preempted
by the FAA.s3 While noting that the Montana law was designed to
protect consumers from unwittingly agreeing to one-sided arbitration
agreements and to ensure that they had sufficient notice of an
arbitration clause, the Supreme Court decided that the state law
directly conflicted with the FAA because it was specifically directed
at arbitration rather than to all contracts generally.'
As a result of Southland and its progeny, the provisions of the
FAA apply not only to federal question and diversity suits in federal
courts, but also to all state court actions "involving commerce" as this
term has been broadly defined. State law contract defenses to
arbitration can only be raised if they are matters of general law, not if
they are provisions directed at arbitration.
The role of state law in regulating arbitration was further
diminished by the Supreme Court's adoption of the separability
doctrine in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co. 5 Before
1967, most courts held that if a party raised a contractual defense
grounded in state law that would render the entire contract
unenforceable or void, a court rather than an arbitrator must rule on
the defense. 6 These courts reasoned that if the contract is invalid,
then so too is any promise to arbitrate contained in the contract.Y In
Prima Paint, the Supreme Court rejected this approach, and instead
ruled that arbitration agreements are separable from the other terms
of a contract for purposes of contractual defenses.88 Thus, it ruled,
allegations of flaws in a contract such as fraud, illegality,
unconscionability, or lack of consent do not defeat a duty to
arbitrate. 9  Rather, such allegations must be heard by the
arbitrator.90 Only if it is shown that there is a contractual flaw in the
arbitration clause itself should a court refuse to compel parties to
arbitrate.91
83. See id at 686-88; MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1997).
84. See Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. at 686-88.
85. 388 U.S. 395,402-04 (1967).
86. See Hirschman, supra note 42, at 1330.
87. See, e.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 269
F.2d 811, 816-17 (6th Cir. 1959); Kulukundis Shipping, Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126
F.2d 978, 986 (2d Cir. 1942). But see Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271
F.2d 402, 409-10 (2d Cir. 1959) (adopting and explaining the separability doctrine).
88. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 402-04.
89. See id at 403-04.
90. See id. at 404.
91. See icL at 406. Justice Black, in a lengthy dissent, provided a succinct if
unflattering description of the separability doctrine:
The Court holds, what is to me fantastic, that the legal issue of a contract's
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The separability doctrine together with the rule of Perry v.
Thomas-that arbitration cannot be defeated by defenses based on
arbitration-specific law-means that there are few defenses available
to challenge an arbitration agreement. To succeed, a defense must be
based on general contract law, but it must be raised specifically in
relation to the arbitration clause. Such broad-based, but narrowly
honed contract-law defenses are rare.
B. The Presumption of Arbitrability and Its Ramifications
In addition to expanding the scope of the FAA to preempt state
law, in the 1980s the Supreme Court also expanded the types of
claims that are subject to arbitration promises and thereby
enforceable under the FAA. This expansion resulted from the
Court's reversal of Wilko v. Swan.' In 1953, in Wilko, the Court held
that a dispute between a customer and a brokerage firm that involved
alleged violations of the Securities Act of 193393 was not amenable to
arbitration. 4 Wilko stood for many years as a limit on the
enforceability of arbitration of statutory rights. But in the 1970s and
1980s, the Court began to cut back on Wilko,95 eventually overruling
it altogether.96 By so doing, the Court expanded the realm of
arbitration to embrace not only contractual disputes, but statutory
ones as well. The history of Wilko's demise is intertwined with the
rise of a bedrock principle of modem arbitration law-the
presumption of arbitrability.
In 1983, the Supreme Court announced in Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.97 that there was a
voidness because of fraud is to be decided by persons designed to arbitrate
factual controversies arising out of a valid contract between the parties. And the
arbitrators who the Court holds are to adjudicate the legal validity of the
contract need not even be lawyers, and in all probability will be nonlawyers,
wholly unqualified to decide legal issues, and even if qualified to apply the law,
not bound to do so.
Id. at 407 (Black, J., dissenting).
92. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
93. Act of May 27, 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa
(1994)).
94. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 428-29,439.
95. See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221-24 (1985) (holding
that when a dispute involves arbitrable state law claims and nonarbitrable Securities Act
claims, a court should compel arbitration of the pendent claims); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co., 417 U.S. 506, 517-18 (1974) (holding that Wilko does not apply to international
commercial transactions).
96. See Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 477 (overruling Wilko).
97. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
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"liberal federal policy favoring arbitration.""8 From this the Court
derived the principle that it should favor arbitration in determining
which disputes fall within a promise to arbitrate.99 It described this
presumption of arbitrability as follows:
[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a
healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration....
The [Federal] Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter
of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable
issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the
problem at hand is the construction of the contract language
itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to
arbitrability a00
In practice, the presumption means that courts will require parties to
arbitrate disputes if there is any possibility that the dispute is subject
to an arbitration agreement. Thus, parties are required to arbitrate
in situations in which it is debatable whether they meant to subject
the particular dispute to arbitration in the first place and when they
have not clearly waived their right to a judicial forum. 1°1
In 1985, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc.,"° the Supreme Court relied on the presumption of arbitrability
to hold that an ordinary arbitration clause will be interpreted to
apply not merely to contractual disputes, but also to statutory
claims.103 In Mitsubishi, the Court applied the FAA to claims arising
under the Sherman Antitrust Act.04 The underlying dispute arose
from a three-party franchise transaction between Chrysler
International, a Swiss subsidiary of the Chrysler Corporation,
Mitsubishi Motors, a Japanese automobile manufacturer, and Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, an automobile sales franchisee in Puerto Rico. 105
The Sales Contract by which Chrysler and Mitsubishi agreed to
provide Soler with vehicles contained a clause calling for arbitration
of certain disputes between Mitsubishi and Soler.106 After the
franchise was in effect for about two years, Soler did not meet its
98. Id- at 24.
99. See id.
100. Id. at 24-25.
101. See, e.g., R.J. O'Brien & Assoc. v. Pipkin, 64 F.3d 257, 260-61 (7th Cir. 1995);
Sweet Dreams Unlimited, Inc. v. Dial-A-Mattress Int'l, Ltd., 1 F.3d 639, 642-43 (7th Cir.
1993).
102. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
103. See id at 628-40.
104. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1994)); see Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 616.
105. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 616-17.
106. See id. at 617..
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sales quotas and Mitsubishi sought to arbitrate under the clause."°
Soler counterclaimed against both Mitsubishi and Chrysler, raising
numerous contract breaches and statutory claims, including a claim
that Mitsubishi and Chrysler had conspired to divide markets in
restraint of trade, in violation of the Sherman Act. 08 The arbitration
clause did not specifically commit the parties to arbitrate statutory
claims nor did it explicitly embrace claims between Soler and
Chrysler.09 Nonetheless, the Court held that in the face of an
arbitration clause, it would presume that this particular dispute was
within the promise to arbitrate."0 It stated, "[t]here is no reason to
depart from these guidelines where a party bound by an arbitration
agreement raises claims founded on statutory rights.""' The Court
conceded that not all statutory rights are appropriate for arbitration,
but it said, "[w]e must assume that if Congress intended the
substantive protection afforded by a given statute to include
protection against waiver of the right to a judicial forum, that
intention will be deducible from text or legislative history."" 2 It held
that there was no congressional intent to preclude arbitration of
claims arising under the antitrust acts."
Mitsubishi was an international case involving parties of three
different nationalities and a transaction that spanned several
continents. Arguably, its holding could be limited or explained on
the basis of the special jurisdictional issues posed by international
disputes."4 Since the Mitsubishi decision, however, the Supreme
Court has applied its reasoning to wholly domestic disputes."5
The first Supreme Court case to hold that statutory rights are
amenable to arbitration in a purely domestic context was
Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon,"6 decided in 1987.
107. See id. at 617-18.
108. See iL at 619-20.
109. See id. at 617.
110. See id- at 626.
111. Idt at 626.
112- Id at 628.
113. See iL at 627-28.
114. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 518-19 (1974) (determining that
courts are more supportive of arbitration in international commercial transactions than in
domestic ones because international transactions raise unique concerns).
115. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane, 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (holding that claims
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act are arbitrable); Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989) (holding that claims under the 1933
Securities Act are arbitrable); Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238-
42 (1987) (holding that claims alleging violations of RICO and the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act are arbitrable).
116. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
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This case involved a claim by a customer against a brokerage house,
alleging various state law fraud claims, violations of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,117 and violations of the civil provisions of
RICO."' The customers had signed an agreement when they opened
their accounts that contained a clause stating: "'Unless
unenforceable due to federal or state law, any controversy arising out
of or relating to my accounts ... shall be settled by arbitration in
accordance with the rules, then in effect, of the National Association
of Securities Dealers ..... "19 The Supreme Court invoked the
presumption of arbitrability to hold that all claims, including the
Securities Exchange Act and RICO claims, were amenable to
arbitration under this clause. 20 It rejected the plaintiff's argument
that the Securities Exchange Act should be read to preclude a waiver
of a judicial forum, and instead held that arbitration was a suitable
means to enforce it.'' The Court also held that disputes under the
RICO statute were suitable for arbitration. 2 Casting doubt on the
continuing viability of Wilko, the Court stated: "It is difficult to
reconcile Wilko's mistrust of the arbitral process with this Court's
subsequent decisions involving the Arbitration Act."' 2  Two years
later, in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,
another case between a customer and a brokerage house, the Court
expressly overturned Wilko by ordering arbitration in the dispute
concerning the Securities Act of 1933.12s
In 1991, the Supreme Court applied the reasoning of McMahon
to the employment setting. In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp.y,16 the Supreme Court held that an employee's claim of age
discrimination was subject to arbitration, so long as the prospective
arbitration proceeding was adequate to vindicate the employee's
statutory rights. 27 Gilmer, an employee of Interstate/Johnson Lane
stock brokerage firm, had been fired in 1987 at the age of sixty-two.
He brought suit against the firm, alleging that he had been fired in
117. Act of June 6, 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811
(1994)).
118. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964 (1984 & Supp. 1998).
119. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 223 (quoting the customer's agreement from
Shearson/American Express Inc.).
120. See id. at 238-42.
121. See id. at 227-38.
122- See id. at 238-42.
123. Id. at 231.
124. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
125. See id2 at 481.
126. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
127. See ihL at 28.
[Vol. 77
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
("ADEA"). 128 The defendant moved to compel arbitration under the
FAA, on the basis of an arbitration provision contained in the
standard securities industry registration form that Gilmer had signed
in 1981 when he registered with the stock exchange. 129 Gilmer had
executed the stock exchange registration form at the time of hire
because it was a requirement of the job.Y0 In response to defendant's
motion to compel arbitration, Gilmer argued that he should not be
required to arbitrate his ADEA claim because requiring him to do so
was inconsistent with the statutory framework of the ADEA.131 He
also argued that the ADEA embodied important social policies that
should not be determined in a private tribunal. The Court rejected
these arguments, stating that its decisions in Mitsubishi Motors and
McMahon established that "statutory claims may be the subject of an
arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the FAA.' ' 33 The
Gilmer Court stated that " 'so long as the prospective litigant
effectively may vindicate [her] statutory cause of action in the
arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and
deterrent function.' "I' While Congress could decide that certain
statutory rights were not amenable to arbitration, the Court said that
the burden to show such congressional intent is on the party seeking
to avoid arbitration.35
These decisions of the 1980s and early 1990s significantly
expanded the scope of the FAA. For example, on the basis of
Gilmer, lower federal courts have upheld arbitration for disputes
concerning all types of employment-related statutes, including Title
VII, the Whistleblower Protection Act, and the Federal Employee
Polygraph Protection Act. 6 The Gilmer decision thus opened the
door for extensive use of arbitration in nonunion employment
128. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634 (1999).
129. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
130. See id. at 23.
131. See id. at 26-27.
132. See id at 27. The ADEA lists as its purposes "to promote employment of older
persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in
employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising
from the impact of age on employment." 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1994).
133. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
134. IL at 28 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 637 (1985)).
135. See id. at 26.
136. See generally Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual
Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENv. U. L. REv. 1017,
1034 & nn.126-31 (1996) (citing cases).
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settings. Employers,' who previously had feared multiple liability
under expanding employment legislation designed to protect
individual employees, found they could design arbitration systems
that would consolidate the claims against them and stack the decks in
their favor.37
By means of the presumption of arbitrability and the expansion
of arbitration to statutory claims, the Supreme Court abandoned its
neutrality toward arbitration and moved to a decidedly pro-
arbitration position. While the Court often has declared that the
purpose of the FAA was to place arbitration "'upon the same
footing as other contracts,' "13s in fact it has placed arbitration clauses
in a privileged position-in both state and federal courts.
C. Narrowing the Standard of Review
Courts have also articulated a narrow standard of judicial review
of arbitral awards. The FAA delineates four grounds for vacating an
arbitration award, none of which concerns the legal or factual
"correctness" of the award on the merits.13 9 In addition, in 1953 the
Supreme Court added a nonstatutory basis for judicial review. In
Wilko v. Swan,'4° the Court said that awards can be vacated if the
arbitrator displayed "manifest disregard" for the law.141 Since then,
courts have applied the "manifest disregard" standard narrowly,
ruling that mere error in findings of fact, interpretations of contracts,
or rulings on legal issues are not grounds to overturn an award. 42
137. See id. at 1036-37; Barbara Presley Noble, Attacking Compulsory Arbitration, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15,1995, at F21.
138. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985) (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 68-96, at 2 (1924)); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974) (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 2 (1924)).
139. The four statutory grounds for vacating arbitral awards are as follows:
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators ....
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent
and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights
of any party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted
was not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994).
140. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
141. Id. at 436.
142. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 592 (1985); see also
Moncarsch v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899, 903-05 (Cal. 1992) (holding that an arbitral
award may not be vacated for and error of law on face of award).
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Moreover, manifest disregard does not mean inadvertent or negligent
error-it means knowing the law and refusing to apply it."
Further, courts have ruled that arbitrators have no obligation to
write opinions to accompany their awards."4 Without an opinion, it
is almost impossible for courts to know whether the arbitrator
manifestly disregarded the law or not.145 The manifest disregard
standard and the lack of an obligation for arbitrators to write
opinions have made arbitral awards virtually bulletproof.
D. The "New" Federal Arbitration Act
The combined effect of the broad scope of preemption in
Southland, the presumption of arbitrability, the application of
arbitration to statutory rights, the separability doctrine, and the
narrow standard of review is that parties are frequently required to
arbitrate disputes that they did not intend to submit to arbitration,
their common law and state statutory defenses are removed, and
their ability to secure judicial review for arbitral awards is effectively
143. See, e.g., Folkways Music Publishers, Inc. v. Weiss, 989 F.2d 108, 112 (2d Cir.
1993); Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1990); see also supra note 36
(citing cases). It is reported that in no commercial arbitration has an award has been
vacated on this ground. See Brad A. Galbraith, Note, Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration
Awards in Federal Court: Contemplating the Use and Utility of the "Manifest Disregard"
of the Law Standard, 27 IND. L. REv. 241, 252 (1993). The Fourth Circuit rejects the
judge-made "manifest disregard standard" and instead insists that the four grounds listed
in § 10 of the FAA are the exclusive grounds for judicial review of an arbitral award. See
Remmey v. Paine Webber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143,146 (4th Cir. 1994). Some circuits have added
another nonstatutory ground to the "manifest disregard" standard, hsserting that they will
overturn awards that do not meet a fundamental rationality test. For example, the
Eleventh Circuit upholds an arbitral award if it can discern or infer any rational ground for
it from the facts of the case. See Robbins v. Day, Payne Webber, Inc., 954 F.2d 679, 684
(11th Cir. 1992); see also Swift Indus. v. Botany Indus., 466 F.2d 1125, 1131 (3d Cir. 1972)
(refusing to enforce an arbitral award on the grounds, inter alia, that the award lacked
fundamental rationality). See generally Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial
Standards for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731, 785-98
(1996) (describing the recent development of 'arbitrary and capricious' and 'completely
irrational' tests).
144. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598
(1960); Robbins, 954 F.2d at 684; O.R. Sec., Inc. v. Professional Planning Assocs., Inc., 857
F.2d 742,746 (11th Cir. 1988).
145. The American Arbitration Association takes the position that for commercial
arbitrations, the arbitrator should avoid writing opinions and should only write one if both
parties request it:
Commercial arbitrators are not required to explain the reasons for their
decisions. As a general rule, the award consists of a brief direction to the parties
on a single sheet of paper. One reason for brevity is that written opinions might
open avenues for attack on the award by the losing party.
American Arbitration Association, A Guide for Commercial Arbitrators (visited Feb. 15,
1999) <http://www.adr.org.guides.comguide.html>.
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eliminated. As a result of these expansive legal doctrines, arbitration
clauses are ubiquitous in consumer transactions today. Arbitration
clauses are commonplace in construction contracts, residential and
commercial lease forms, health maintenance organization subscriber
agreements, informed consent forms for medical procedures, bank
and credit card applications, homeowner association charters,
employment contracts, brokerage contracts in the securities industry,
and in most other contracts in the commercial, corporate, and
international trade areas. 46 Thus disputes that arise in any of these
areas-whether they are of a contractual or a statutory nature-are
subject to the mandatory arbitration provisions of the FAA. To a
considerable extent, civil litigation in the federal and state courts is
being replaced by arbitration in privatized tribunals. Instead of a
system based on due process and a generally applicable rule of law,
we are developing a system that fits Justice Story's characterization
of arbitration, a regime of rusticum judicium47 or "rustic justice."
III. Two COMMON BUT INADEQUATE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE
COURTS' APPROACH TO ARBITRATION
There are two common explanations for the courts' dramatic
reinterpretation of the FAA and the corresponding transformation of
the civil justice system. First, it is sometimes said that the changes in
judicial treatment of arbitration are a judicial response to crowded
dockets and courthouse gridlock. Alternatively, it is sometimes said
that parties who have arbitration clauses in their contracts want to
have their disputes arbitrated rather than litigated, so that by
upholding and enforcing arbitration agreements, courts are
implementing the will of the parties. While both explanations may be
operative, neither is sufficient to explain current decisional trends,
for reasons that are developed below.
A. The Courthouse Gridlock Explanation
It has become common sport to rail against the civil justice
system for failing to provide prompt and accessible justice. The near-
universal disdain for civil litigation has fueled the modern ADR
146. See Meier, supra note 3, at Al (reporting the extensive use of arbitration in
consumer and medical transactions); see also Edward W. Morris, Jr. et al., Securities
Arbitration at Self-Regulatory Organizations, in 1 SECURITIEs ARBITRATION 1992, at 135,
144 (1992) (observing that securities industry arbitrations increased between 1985 and
1990 from 2796 a year to 5332 a year).
147. Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No.
14,065).
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movement. 48 People situated both inside and outside the legal
system see arbitration as a way to relieve the systemic problems with
the civil justice system. Arbitration is seen as quick, easy, fair, and
user-friendly, in contrast to the expensive, oppressive, ponderous,
time-consuming, and overly technical prospect of litigation in
courts. 149 From this perspective, channeling more disputes to private
arbitration is both efficient for society and advantageous for the
disputants.
The systemic argument in favor of arbitration has several
dimensions. First, it is sometimes said that because judicial dockets
are crowded, trivial litigation consumes limited judicial resources, so
that society is better off by compelling parties to arbitrate their
disputes.50 Second, it is claimed that arbitration is better for the
parties themselves. Arbitration offers speed, accessibility, economy,
and substantive justice.' Court congestion and expansive discovery
148. The modem ADR movement is often said to date from the National Conference
on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (the Pound
Conference), convened by the Judicial Conference of the United States, the Conference of
Chief Justices, and the American Bar Association in St. Paul, Minnesota, in 1976. See
generally Addresses Delivered at the National Conference on the Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 70 F.R.D. 79 (1976) (emphasizing the
importance of reform); Laura Nader, The ADR Explosion-The Implications of Rhetoric
in Legal Reform, 8 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST. 269, 273 (1988) (stating that the
Pound Conference sparked a shift towards procedural reform). The participants at the
Pound Revisited Conference criticized the civil justice system and urged procedural
reforms to reduce the amount and litigiousness of litigation. As part of their rhetoric, they
urged harmonious rather than adversarial methods of dispute-resolution. See id. at 275.
149. See, e.g., STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION 558 (1985); cf.
Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1118-19 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating that
many critics of the burdensome nature of appeals in civil litigation favor arbitration as an
alternative); C. Evan Stewart, Securities Arbitration Appea" An Oxymoron No Longer?,
79 KY. L.J. 347, 347 & n.3 (1990-1991) (citing critics who promote arbitration in favor of
the civil litigation system, which is seen as "too cumbersome, burdensome, time
consuming, formalistic, and expensive").
150. See Warren E. Burger, Isn't There A Better Way?, ANN. REP. ON THE STATE OF
THE JUDICIARY, Jan. 24, 1982, reprinted in LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E.
WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 13-15 (2d ed. 1997) (describing the
adversary process as expensive and time consuming, and concluding that "[w]e need to
consider moving some cases from the adversary system to administrative processes ...
especially arbitration"); cf Derek Bok, Law and Its Discontents: A Critical Look at Our
Legal System, 38 REC. ASS'N B. CITY N.Y. 12, 12-13 (1983), reprinted in LEO KANOWITZ,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON ALTERNATiVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 33-36 (1985) (noting
the rising costs of litigation and faulting legal education for emphasizing a combative
model).
151. See Jean E. Faure, The Arbitration Alternative: Its Time Has Come, 46 MONT. L.
REV. 199, 199 (1985); Stewart, supra note 149, at 347 & n.4 (citing critics of the court
system who hail the many virtues of arbitration); cf. Constance N. Katsoris, Securities
Arbitration After McMahon, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.. 361, 386-87 (1988) (stating that
arbitration will resolve conflicts swiftly and cheaply but noting the need for arbitration to
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rules make litigation too slow, arduous, and expensive for the parties.
Further, the excessive technicality of law relegates litigation to the
experts and makes it impossible for ordinary citizens to know their
rights or to conduct their affairs. In theory, disputants can control
and comprehend arbitration proceedings, and therefore they have
confidence in the process and respect for the outcome. Further, if
parties arbitrate instead of litigate, they will get decisions based on
common sense rather than on arcane legalisms.'12
In addition, it is often said that the excessive expense of
litigation, due to excessive technicality and high lawyer fees, makes
the judicial system inaccessible to ordinary folk. And some claim
there is systematic injustice in judicial outcomes because the law and
the legal process are tilted in favor of the wealthy and the powerful.153
Thus, the argument goes, arbitration serves redistributional goals-it
helps the poor.
Many inside and outside the legal profession have put forward
these pro-arbitration arguments in recent years, including such
distinguished members of the profession as former-Chief Justice
Burger, Judge Richard Posner, and the former President of Harvard
University, Derek Bok.154 Indeed, it is paradoxical that those situated
at the very top of the legal profession have been leading the crusade
for alternative dispute resolution and for the delegalization of many
aspects of life.
The movement for alternative dispute resolution has also had its
skeptics, who raise several questions. First, some question whether
there really has been a "litigation explosion" in the first place.155 For
example, Mark Galanter argues that the alleged litigation explosion
may not really exist.156 To the contrary, he claims that we may have
be freely chosen).
152. Cf. Thomas J. Stipanwich, Beyond Arbitration: Innovation and Evolution in the
United States Construction Industry, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 65, 67-68 (1996) (noting
the rise in alternative dispute resolution and relating it to the decline in overall feelings of
community and social connectedness).
153. See, e.g., Bok, supra note 150, at 34 (criticizing the cumbersome legal system for
offering little access to the poor and middle class, and concluding that "[t]here is far too
much law for those who can afford it and far too little for those who cannot").
154. See supra notes 150 & 153.
155. See Laura Nader, The Recurrent Dialectic Between Legality and Its Alternatives:
The Limitations of Binary Thinking, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 621, 633-37 (1984) (reviewing and
criticizing JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? (1983), for wrongly assuming
the existence of a litigation explosion and therefore failing to explain adequately why
there has been a shift from judicial to non-judicial settings for dispute resolution).
156. See Mark Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and
Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious
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too little litigation in relation to the number of serious disputes. 57
The Wisconsin Civil Litigation Research Project also found that few
disputes end up as lawsuits, and of those, even fewer are litigated. 5 '
Paul Weiler's study of medical malpractice similarly concluded that
far more medical malpractice occurs-malpractice as determined by
an examination of case files by an independent panel of doctors-
than malpractice lawsuits are filed. 5 9 Further, a recent study of
judicial docket-crowding by William Allen, a long-standing Director
of the American Judicature Society, found that federal courts have
no more cases on their dockets than they did twenty-five years ago,
and that the average caseload per judge has actually gone down. 60
These studies support Galanter's view that the so-called litigation
explosion is a myth which has little evidence to support it, but one
that nonetheless plays a powerful role in fueling moves to alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms.
Second, some skeptics have disputed the claim that alternative
dispute resolution provides cheaper, faster, and more accessible
justice. Here too empirical studies have found that at least some
forms of alternative dispute resolution take as long as litigation and
are as costly to the litigants. 6' Indeed, a recent study by the Rand
Institute on Civil Justice found that the alleged superiority of ADR
mechanisms over the courts is greatly exaggerated. 6 2
Third, some critics have also questioned whether alternative
dispute resolution provides better justice. Richard Abel and Martha
Fineman argue that informal procedures actually disempower people
Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4,69 (1983).
157. On the problematic nature of defining "disputes," see id. at 11.
158. See David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV.
72, 86-87 (1983).
159. See PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 12-13 (1991).
160. See H. William Allen, Remarks at the AALS Meeting, San Antonio, Tex. (Jan. 4,
1996), in Frank E. Sander et al., Judicial (Mis) Use of ADR? A Debate, 27 U. TOL. L.
REV. 885, 889 (1996).
161. See, e.g., Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 751 & n.12 (8th
Cir. 1986) (discussing how parties are discovering that arbitration is complex, expensive,
and time consuming); Jerome Reiss, Construction Industry Disputes, in ARBITRATION:
COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, INSURANCE, AND TORT CLAIMS 69, 73 (Alan I. Widiss ed.,
1979) (observing that construction arbitration hearings are lengthy and expensive, often
taking longer than comparable trials); Stewart, supra note 149, at 349 n.9 (arguing that the
increased formality of securities industry arbitration "significantly negate[s]-if not
eliminate[s]-the advantages of arbitration").
162. See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND EARLY
NEUTRAL EVALUATION UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 4 (1996) (finding that
neither time nor costs changed significantly as a result of court-ordered referral to ADR).
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by individualizing disputes and rendering the disputes invisible.163
Some feminist scholars have argued that informal mechanisms deny
litigants the due process protection of a court, protection that can
equalize power relations between wildly unequal parties. 164 Thus,
there is a powerful argument that the poor and disadvantaged sectors
of society lose in informal settings because such settings amplify their
disadvantage and exacerbate problems of inequality.16
Some critics of alternative dispute resolution have noted the
paradox that the elite members of the profession began calling for
increased alternative dispute resolution in the late 1960s and 1970s, at
the very time that the legal system was beginning to respond to
demands from blacks, women, and other disadvantaged groups for
equal rights and legal protection. These critics claim that the call for
informality was not a means to expand rights for the disadvantaged,
but a response to the expansion of rights for such groups-a way to
take back the hard-won gains of the civil rights movements, women's
movement, and other such forces for change.1 66 For example, Chief
Justice Burger said in 1982 that the time had come to move some
cases to alternative mechanisms such as mediation and arbitration
and that "divorce, child custody, adoptions, personal injury, landlord
and tenant cases, and probate of estates are prime candidates. '" 167
Statements like this support the view that he was advocating second-
class justice for the masses and reserving the judicial system for the
big-time corporate, antitrust, and patent cases.
Despite the critics of ADR, it is clear that many members of the
public, the courts, and the legal profession believe there is a serious
problem with our civil justice system, and widespread lack of
163. See Richard Abel, The Contradictions of Informal Justice, in 1 POLITICS OF
INFORMAL JUSTICE: Tim AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 267, 267-320 (Richard Abel ed.,
1982); Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change
in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727,760-68 (1988).
164. See, e.g., Penelope Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of
Power, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 441,449 (1992).
165. See Abel, supra note 163, at 267, 267-320. But see William H. Simon, Legal
Informality and Redistributive Politics, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 384, 388-90 (1985)
(criticizing anti-informalism for its incorrect assumption that procedural formality usually
benefits the disadvantaged and for assuming a view of the state that is either implausible
or tautological).
166. See, e.g., Nader, supra note 148, at 286-87; see also A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., The
Priority of Human Rights in Court Reform, 70 ER.D. 134, 156-57 (1976) (contending that
the rights of minorities and women must be protected in courts, not in alternative dispute
procedures).
167. Burger, supra note 150, at 11; see also Warren E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-
A Need for Systematic Anticipation, 70 F.R.D. 83, 94 (1976) (calling for the wider use of
the "well-developed forms of arbitration").
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confidence in the legal system is a serious problem in itself. Further,
many believe that arbitration offers a palliative, if not a cure, to the
problems with the system. Thus, we might be tempted to understand
the developing law of arbitration as a response to those beliefs.
While the prevention-of-gridlock explanation no doubt plays a
role in the courts' expansion of arbitration's domain, it is not
sufficient to explain the major doctrinal shifts of the 1980s. To accept
docket-control as a complete and sufficient explanation for this major
doctrinal shift would require that we make the excessively cynical
assumption that judges care more about their own personal
convenience than about fairness and the rule of law. While some
have leveled this charge at the federal judiciary, 68 it is more plausible
to surmise that there is something else at work that permits judges to
be comfortable with the extreme degree of delegation to arbitration
that is reflected in the recent FAA jurisprudence. That is, even if
judges were trying to reduce their dockets, it is likely that they have a
view about the value of arbitration that squares their pro-arbitration
jurisprudence with their commitment to fairness and to the rule of
law.
69
No simple account of ideology can explain the courts' expansive
approach to arbitration. Both liberal and conservative judges have
embraced the move to private arbitration, so the reason for the shift
can neither be to disempower the powerless nor to help the
disadvantaged. Thus, we must find some other rationale to support
the courts' expansive re-interpretation of the FAA.
B. The Enforcement of Contracts Explanation
One might surmise that judges find an adequate comfort-level
while granting extreme deference to arbitration by relying on
contractual consent. That is, we might ascribe the recent doctrinal
developments in the FAA to a belief that by liberally requiring
parties to arbitrate, courts are merely enforcing contracts, including
agreements to arbitrate. From this perspective, judges need not
choose between their own convenience in having short dockets and
their obligation to effectuate the rule of law-they can do both. By
liberally enforcing arbitration agreements, judges are effectuating the
parties' intent and thereby implementing, rather than negating,
168. See Cassaretto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 939-41 (Mont. 1994) (Trieweiler, J.,
specially concurring).
169. See DUNcAN KENNEDY, A CRrnQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SIkCLE 157-64
(1997) (describing how judges reconcile their personal and ideological preferences with
the rule of law).
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public policy and the rule of law. 70
1. Actual Consent
The problem with understanding the FAA cases as primarily
about enforcing private agreements to arbitrate is that, in many
recent cases, courts have applied attenuated notions of consent,
compelling arbitration when consent is thin, if not outright fictitious.
For example, courts routinely hold parties to arbitration agreements
that appear in a document incorporated into a contract by reference,
even when one party had no opportunity to see or no reason to
anticipate the incorporated term.17 ' Courts give effect to blank-check
arbitration clauses that are not even arguably within the realm of the
parties' reasonable expectations at the time of contracting, such as
clauses that are silent on arbitration but which incorporate certain
specified terms and procedures "as may be amended from time to
time."'7 This treatment of arbitration clauses stands in contrast to
judicial treatment of other contractual provisions that are inserted by
reference, which courts police for unfairness or undue surprise.173
Further, the timing of contracts in relation to their arbitration
clauses often belies the existence of actual consent. For example,
courts enforce arbitration clauses in cases in which the arbitration
term was inserted into the incorporated document after the initial
contract was made.74 In addition, courts hold that when arbitration
170. This rationale underlies the Supreme Court's decision in Dean Witter Reynolds v.
Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985), in which the Supreme Court ordered arbitration even though to
do so in that case entailed the creation of bifurcated proceedings and increased delay. See
id. at 217. The Court stated that the paramount goal of the FAA is to enforce voluntary
agreements to arbitrate, a goal that takes precedence over the goal of quick or efficient
disposition of claims. See id. at 219. The Court held that pendant state law claims were
arbitrable even though the 1934 Securities Exchange Act claim to which they were
appended was deemed not to be arbitrable under the FAA. See id. at 222.
171. See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co., 133 F.3d 225,231 (3d Cir. 1998); R.J. O'Brien &
Assoc. v. Pipkin, 64 F.3d 257, 260-63 (7th Cir. 1995); U.S. Fidelity Guar. v. West Point
Constr. Co., 837 F.2d 1507, 1508 (11th Cir. 1988); see also Pay Phone Concepts v. MCI
Telecomms. Corp., 904 F. Supp. 1202, 1209 (D. Kan. 1995) (citing cases). But see
Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 98-1246, 1998 WL 880910,
at *21 (1st Cir. Dec. 22, 1998) (refusing to enforce an arbitration agreement incorporated
by reference in a securities industry registration form because the employee was not given
the incorporated rules that defined the scope of required arbitration).
172. Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1998); see
also Pay Phone Concepts, 904 F. Supp. at 1209 (finding that subsequent amendments were
enforceable and incorporated by reference).
173. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237(3) (1981); CALAMARI &
PERILLO, supra note 22, § 9-44, at 418-24; infra notes 571-76 and accompanying text.
174. See R.J. O'Brien, 64 F.3d at 260 (holding that the parties' contract, made in 1985,
contained an arbitration clause adopted in 1992 in a referenced document); Geldermann v.
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procedures are revised, parties are bound by the procedure in effect
at the time the dispute reaches a court, not the one in effect at the
time a contract was signed or at the time that a dispute arose.175
Courts have also enforced arbitration promises in contracts when the
disputes arose after the underlying contract expired of its own
terms. 76 And in a further departure from ordinary notions of
consent, the Eighth Circuit recently enforced an arbitration clause to
compel a customer to arbitrate a dispute with a brokerage firm even
though the dispute arose several years before the parties had signed
the arbitration clause. 77
One example of the degree to which courts strain conventional
notions of consent in interpreting arbitration clauses is R.J. O'Brien
& Assoc. v. Pipkin 8 In this case, the Seventh Circuit applied an
arbitration clause to a commodities broker even though there was no
arbitration clause in the contract between the parties nor was
arbitration mentioned in any of the documents that were
incorporated by reference. 79 The court reasoned that because
arbitration was a common practice in that industry, the parties were
deemed to know of the industry practice and to have agreed to utilize
it.8
0
The recent use of "shrinkwrap" arbitration agreements creates
further departures from actual consent.' "Shrinkwrap agreements"
are agreements printed on the plastic shrinkwrap in which a product
is wrapped or agreements that are enclosed inside the box in which a
product is packaged. 1' Most of the cases involving such agreements
concern terms of licensing on boxes of computer software that
purport to restrict the purchaser's ability to use the software. Courts
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 836 F.2d 310, 318 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that a
party consented to arbitration where the party agreed to be bound by subsequent
regulation amendments); Illyes v. John Nuveen & Co., 949 F. Supp. 580, 582 (N.D. Ill.
1996) (finding that a party was bound to arbitrate an employment dispite under amended
arbitration procedures); Pay Phone Concepts, 904 F. Supp. at 1205, 1209 (finding that a
party was bound to arbitrate under an amended agreement).
175. See Kuehner v. Dickinson & Co., 84 F.3d 316, 320-21 (9th Cir. 1996); Pitter v.
Prudential Life Ins. Co., 906 F. Supp. 130,134-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
176. See, e.g., Sweet Dreams Unlimited, Inc. v. Dial-A-Mattress Int'l, Ltd., 1 F.3d 639,
643-44 (7th Cir. 1993).
177. See Houlihan v. Offerman & Co., 31 F.3d 692,695 (8th Cir. 1994).
178. 64 F.3d 257 (7th Cir. 1995).
179. See id. at 260-63.
180. See id. at 260.
181. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); Brower v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569,571-73 (App. Div. 1998).
182 See ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996) (explaining the term
"shrinkwrap license").
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and legal scholars have grappled with the question of whether and
under what circumstances courts should enforce terms that are
printed on the shrinkwrap or contained in a writing that is inside a
box.183 Some courts have held that by opening the shrinkwrap and
using the product, the purchaser displays the requisite elements of
contractual assent, at least when the shrinkwrap term in dispute is
reasonable and not oppressive.' 4  Other courts have refused to
enforce shrinkwrap terms on the grounds that they are either
proposals for an additional term under section 2-207 of the UCC
which, being material, are ineffective, or that they are proposals for a
modification under section 2-209 of the UCC, to which there was no
assent.'8
To date, only a few cases have arisen concerning shrinkwrap
arbitration clauses. In Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,86 referred to in the
introductory hypothetical, Judge Easterbrook enforced an arbitration
provision contained in the standard product information card inside
the box in which the product came.' 7 When parties are on notice
that there are additional terms inside, he said, "[a] contract need not
be read to be effective; people who accept take the risk that the
unread terms may in retrospect prove unwelcome."'8 The Hill case
went beyond the other shrinkwrap cases because it imposed the
challenged term without regard, or even discussion of, the term's
reasonableness. 89 The court's reasoning in Hill has opened the door
183. Compare iL at 1450-53 (enforcing a shrinkwrap license agreement), with Arizona
Retail Sys. Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 766 (D. Ariz. 1993) (refusing to
enforce a shrinkwrap license agreement). For a proposed amendment to deal with
standardized license terms contained in standardized and "shrinkwrap agreements," see
U.C.C. § 2B (Proposed Official Draft 1997).
184. See, e.g., ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452-53.
185. See Step Saver Data Sys. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 105 (3d Cir. 1991); Arizona
Retail Sys., 831 F. Supp. at 766.
186. 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
187. See id. at 1151.
18&. Id at 1148.
189. It could be argued that the Hill case is at odds with other shrinkwrap cases. The
Hill court relied on its previous decision in ProCD, in which it upheld a shrinkwrap license
agreement to limit the use of certain computer software. In recognizing a valid acceptance
by the purchaser's act of using the product, the ProCD court upheld the validity of the
contract. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452-53. But the court in ProCD also engaged in a
detailed discussion about the economic utility of the license term at issue in order to
demonstrate that the license term in dispute was a reasonable one. See id. at 1449-50.
Indeed, it added that "[o]urs is not a case in which a consumer opens a package to find an
insert saying 'you owe us an extra $10,000' and the seller files suit to collect." Id. at 1452.
Presumably the ProCD court would not enforce the $10,000 term even though it appeared
on the form inside the box. Thus one might argue that an arbitration clause, though not
possibly as confiscatory as the pay-us-$10,000 term, should have been scrutinized for
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to more extensive use of shrinkwrap arbitration agreements. 190 The
decision would seem to allow manufacturers of all types to insert
arbitration provisions in the boxes of their products, and thereby
avoid litigation for alleged product defects or other violations of law.
The separability doctrine of Prima Paint9' also permits courts to
depart from actual consent in cases involving arbitration clauses. The
doctrine says that parties must arbitrate any defenses they raise that
address the validity of a contract that contains an arbitration clause.
Courts have relied on the separability doctrine to enforce arbitration
provisions in contracts that are allegedly void as well as those that are
voidable. 92 Normally, if a contract is void or voidable due to fraud,
duress, or incapacity, then its terms have no legal effect because there
is not the requisite contractual intent.193 Further, if a contract is void
or voidable on such basis, then presumably the arbitration clause
contained in the contract is also void. 94 Yet the separability doctrine
compels courts to enforce a portion of the contract, notwithstanding
any flaws that would render the entire contract a nullity.9 5 Thus, the
effect of the separability doctrine is to restrict, if not eliminate,
contractual defenses based on lack of consent when arbitration
clauses are involved.
In addition, the presumption of arbitrability means that
arbitration clauses are applied to many disputes that the parties did
not believe were within the parties' arbitration clause at all. For
example, in Sweet Dreams Unlimited, Inc. v. Dial-A-Mattress
International, Ltd.,196 the Seventh Circuit relied on the presumption
reasonableness and to determine whether it was within the range of terms a reasonable
consumer would expect to find. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211
(1981).
190. In Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (App. Div. 1998), the New
York Appellate Division adopted the reasoning of the Hill court and held that the
plaintiffs were subject to an arbitration clause that was contained in the documents that
came with their computer system. See i&L at 572.
191. See supra notes 85-91 (discussing the adoption of the separability doctrine in
Prima Paint).
192. See, e.g., Sokaogon Gaming Enter. Corp. v. Tushie-Montgomery Assocs., Inc., 86
F.3d 656, 659 (7th Cir. 1996); Herwig v. Hahnaman-Albrecht, Inc., No. 96-C6107, 1997 WL
72079, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13,1997).
193. See, e.g., CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 22, § 9-2, at 337-39 (observing that
duress involves either absence of consent or coerced consent).
194. A void contract is one that "produces no legal obligation upon the part of a
promisor." Id. § 1-11, at 18.
195. See, e.g., Sokaogon Gaming Enter. Corp., 86 F.3d at 659; Sweet Dreams
Unlimited, Inc. v. Dial-A-Mattress Int'l, Ltd., 1 F.3d 639, 641 (7th Cir. 1993); Herwig, 1997
WL 72079, at *3.
196. 1 F.3d 639 (7th Cir. 1993).
1999]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
of arbitrability to enforce an arbitration clause to resolve a dispute
that arose after the contract containing the arbitration promise had
expired by its own terms."9 In Daisy Manufacturing Co. v. NCR
Corp.,19  the Eighth Circuit compelled arbitration under a
standardized contract in which the plaintiff, while signing the
contract, had deliberately refused to check off the box signifying
agreement to an optional arbitration term. 99
Thus, in many respects, courts have short-circuited the inquiry
into consent when they enforce arbitration clauses under the FAA.
For this reason, it cannot be maintained that when courts compel
parties to arbitrate or enforce the arbitral results, they are merely
implementing the parties' intent.
2. Imputed Consent
One might justify the recent arbitration jurisprudence by
recharacterizing it as resting not on actual consent, but on imputed
consent. After all, if an arbitration term has value to a seller, he
should be willing to offer a discount to those buyers who agree to
include it in their bargain.00 In that event, one might impute consent
to the buyer on the assumption that she received a net benefit from
having an arbitration clause even with the disadvantage such a
procedure might entail. For example, if someone were offered a
choice of two airline tickets-one at a given price and one at a
discounted price but subject to a broad arbitration clause-we might
presume the purchaser is able to make a choice about which terms
she prefers. While such choices are rarely posed to consumers
explicitly, we might further presume that the price of a ticket
containing the arbitration clause was already discounted to reflect
such an imputed bargain.0 1 On this basis, a court could find imputed
consent to arbitration even in the absence of actual consent.
197. See id. at 643; see also Riley Mfg. Co. v. Anchor Glass Container Corp., 157 F.3d
775, 781 (10th Cir. 1998) (explaining that "an arbitration provision in a contract is
presumed to survive the expiration of the contract unless there is some express or implied
evidence that the parties intended to override the presumption").
198. 29 F.3d 389 (8th Cir. 1994).
199. See id& at 393-95.
200. This reasoning was employed by the Supreme Court in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.
v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594 (1991). See also ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449-50
(7th Cir. 1996) (asserting that consumers benefit from the option to purchase products
subject to restrictions in exchange for a lower price).
201. Cf. Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 594 (speculating that cruise line passengers
might receive a monetary benefit in the form of a lower ticket price because the ticket
contained a choice-of-forum clause favorable to the cruise line).
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The problem with this analysis is that it-goes too far. The same
imputation of consent could be made in relation to any transaction,
thereby permitting after-the-fact imposition of any self-serving terms
a seller might want to impose. Sellers could claim that warranties
were disclaimed, or that products were subject to burdensome after-
arriving terms without any requirement of proving that the buyer
actually assented to them.2" To avoid this result, we should only
impute consent when there is some showing that the imputed consent
is based on some real or at least plausible aspect of the exchange.
There are types of contract clauses for which courts usually
refuse to impute consent and instead require actual knowledge.
Waiver and choice-of-forum clauses are two examples of clauses in
which courts require actual knowledge before they will hold a party
to the clause. 3 Arguably, both clauses are similar to arbitration
clauses in their effect,2°4 and it is therefore useful to compare
arbitration to waiver in order to illuminate the problem of imputing
consent to arbitration clauses in the absence of evidence of actual
consent.
Waiver is the "intentional relinquishment of a known right with
both knowledge of its existence and an intention to relinquish it."2 5
To waive a right, an individual must know of the right and choose to
forego it. Before a court can find that a waiver exists, courts require
actual knowledge of the legal right and a clear indication of intent to
waive it.2"6 For example, the UCC requires that a disclaimer of an
202. In ProCD, Judge Easterbrook suggested that if a consumer found an insert inside
a package saying " 'you owe us an extra $10,000,'" it would not be enforceable. ProCD,
86 F.3d at 1452 (quoting the hypothetical insert). Thus he acknowledged that it is not
always reasonable to impute consent to after-arriving terms.
203. The Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc. case can be distinguished from Carnival Cruise
Lines on this basis. In Carnival Cruise Lines, the Supreme Court gave effect to a choice-
of-forum clause that appeared on the back of a cruise ticket and thereby rejected the
plaintiff's attempt to litigate her tort claim in her home state. See Carnival Cruise Lines,
499 U.S. at 595-97. While acknowledging that the contractually specified forum imposed
an insurmountable hardship on the plaintiff, the Supreme Court enforced the choice-of-
forum clause nonetheless. See id. at 594. The Court noted, however, that the plaintiff had
acknowledged that she had received actual notification of the clause at the time the
contract was formed. See id. at 595.
204. See Lester Brickman, Attorney-Client Fee Arbitration: A Dissenting View, 2
UTAH L. REV. 277, 280 (1990) (arguing that arbitration is the functional equivalent of a
waiver of important rights).
205. 2 BOUVIER's LAW DICrIONARY 3417 (8th ed. 3d rev. 1914).
206. See County of Albermarle v. Massey, 32 S.E.2d 228,230 (Va. 1944). The court in
County of Albermarle stated: "'There can be no waiver unless the person against whom
the waiver is claimed had full knowledge of his rights and of facts which will enable him to
take effectual action for the enforcement of such rights.'" Id. (quoting 29 THE
AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 1093-94 (David S. Garland & Charles
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implied warranty must be "conspicuous" to be effective.2" There is a
powerful argument that courts should require an even higher showing
of actual knowledge and consent before enforcing an arbitration
clause than they would apply to a typical waiver clause."' With
arbitration, unlike waiver, there is no specific right being relinquished
ex ante. Parties to an arbitration agreement, even if they know the
arbitration term is present, do not know which, if any, of their
substantive or procedural rights they are relinquishing. Arbitration
merely involves a shift from a judicial forum to a private forum for
future disputes; its impact on substantive rights is unknowable ex
ante. Because an arbitration clause refers to no substantive right at
all, the individual signatory cannot know what right is subject to
prospective waiver.0 9
There is an additional difference between arbitration and waiver
that argues for differential treatment of the two clauses for purposes
of imputing consent. With arbitration, the question of whether the
shift of forum to arbitration will ultimately involve the loss of
substantive rights is altogether speculative at the time that the clause
is signed. Parties to arbitration clauses, like parties to contracts
generally, rarely contemplate the possibility of any dispute at all; they
contemplate that the contract will be performed, not breached.
2 10
Parties even less often contemplate that the forum selected for
resolving any potential disputes might prejudice them. Parties are
likely to assume that arbitration will provide a reasonable panoply of
due process protections and that any award will be subject to judicial
review. The consenting party, therefore, is likely to view the shift in
Parterfield eds., 2d ed. 1895)); May v. Martin, 137 S.E.2d 860, 865 (Va. 1964) ("Waiver is
the intentional relinquishment of a known right, with both knowledge of its existence and
an intention to relinquish it.").
207. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (incorporating U.C.C. § 1-201(10)).
208. Cf Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (explaining that before a party
can waive a right to counsel, the court must make the defendant "aware of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation, so that ... 'he knows what he is doing and his choice
is made with eyes open.'" (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269,
279 (1942))).
209. In a similar context, courts impose strict scrutiny on clauses that release or limit
liability and only enforce such limitations if the parties knew the precise rights being
waived. See, e.g., Yauger v. Skiing Enters., Inc., 557 N.W.2d 60, 62 (Wis. 1996) (noting
that courts will not enforce exculpatory clauses that "fail[_ to disclose to the signers
exactly what rights they were waiving"); Belger Cartage Serv., Inc. v. Holland Constr. Co.,
582 P.2d 1111, 1119 (Kan. 1978) (finding that courts will not enforce clauses limiting
liability "unless the limitation is fairly and honestly negotiated and understandingly
entered into").
210. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract,
47 STAN. L. REV. 211,227-28 (1995).
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forum as inconsequential in regard to whatever rights she might have
in whatever dispute might arise."' It is not until after an arbitration
is held and an award is rendered that a party can tell whether or not
her substantive rights were protected. Thus, a party who consents to
an arbitration clause has at best consented to a hypothetical event,
the likelihood and impact of which she is likely to discount.
For these reasons, it is unrealistic to believe that parties who
agree to arbitration clauses have agreed in any sense to a discounted
price in return for the arbitration term. Nor is it reasonable to
believe that consumers as a group may have so consented to their
use. Rather, the prevalence of arbitration clauses in consumer
transactions represents windfalls to the sellers, not cost-saving
devices for the buyers.
If courts are not merely enforcing contracts when they compel
parties to arbitrate, then their expansive approach to the FAA
remains unexplained. It is contended that judicial support for
arbitration is best understood by exploring the relationship between
arbitration and the ideal of self-regulation. An examination of the
history of the FAA reveals that the ideal of self-regulation has
shaped the FAA from its inception.
IV. THE HISTORY OF TBE FEDERAL ARBITRATION Acr
A. The Genesis of Arbitration
Private dispute resolution dates back hundreds of years in the
Western world.214 Arbitration originated in Roman and Canon law
and was revived in the Middle Ages in European civil law systems. i
In the common law, arbitration has been a feature of dispute
211. In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), the Supreme
Court emphasized that the shift of forum in arbitration agreements does not alter the
parties' substantive rights. See id. at 29. But see Paul D. Carrington, Regulating Dispute
Resolution Provisions in Adhesion Contracts, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 225, 225-30 (1998)
(criticizing that notion).
212. On the problem of choice in situations where parties are likely to unduly discount
risks, see Mark Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 WIS. L. REv. 769; Duncan Kennedy,
Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to
Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982).
213. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 597 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
214. See Cohen & Dayton, supra note 41, at 266 (referring to the long history of
arbitration to settle commercial disputes, going back to business disputes during the
medieval period).
215. See E.C. Weiss, Arbitration in Germany, 43 LAW Q. REV. 205,205-06 (1927).
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resolution since the fourteenth century, if not before.216 Early forms
of arbitration were dispute resolution procedures created and
administered by trade groups-merchant or producer communities.
2 17
These groups set norms of conduct and business standards for
members of a trade or a business community, and they established
procedures whereby respected members of the community resolved
disputes between members. 18 Disputes often blended allegations of
contractual breaches with allegations of breaches of customary
practices of the trade. 19 In the arbitration, community elders were
expected to resolve the dispute by drawing on the formal and
informal norms of the community2
0
The craft guilds in sixteenth-century Europe had a well-defined
role within the legal order. Nation-states delegated authority to the
guilds to set standards for labor productivity, work quality, and
norms of conduct for members of their crafts. 221 The national legal
systems also delegated to them the authority to resolve disputes
regarding enforcement of contracts and norms between members of
the community and to apply sanctions such as fines and exclusion
from the trade.'
In England from the seventeenth century onward, many
mercantile disputes were resolved by arbitration conducted by the
merchant and craft guilds.m The merchant guilds established
arbitration tribunals because they felt that the courts were not
sufficiently knowledgeable about commercial customs and were
216. See Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 120-25 (1924) (discussing
the history of arbitration); Harry Baum & Leon Pressman, The Enforcement of
Commercial Arbitration Agreements in the Federal Courts, 8 N.Y.U. L.Q. 238, 239 & n.3
(1930). Holdsworth reports evidence of arbitration practiced by merchants in England in
the medieval period. See 14 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
187 (1964).
217. See H.W. ARTHURS, "WITHOUT THE LAW": ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND
LEGAL PLURALISM IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 50-54 (1985).
218. See id. at 63-67.
219. See SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 92-96 (3d ed. 2d
prtg. 1966).
220. See ARTHURS, supra note 217, at 63-67.
221. See JAMES R. FARR, HANDS OF HONOR: ARTISANS AND THEIR WORLD IN
DIJON, 1550-1650, at 16-19 (1988).
222. For examples of the adjudicatory power of the English guilds, see Sabra A. Jones,
Historical Development of Commercial Arbitration in the United States, 12 MINN. L. REV.
240,243-45 (1928).
223. See 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 219, at 130; 6 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A




excessively slow and cumbersome.224 The arbitration tribunals were
composed of experts in the trade, who applied the usages and
practices of the trade as their source of law.' 2 Later, these informal
tribunals were reorganized by the trade associations, together with
the municipal authorities, and became the London Court of
Arbitration, which is jointly managed by the London Chamber of
Commerce and the City of London.26
In nineteenth-century Germany, courts of arbitration were
established by the stock exchanges of the city-states, the chambers of
commerce, and the local associations of dealers in coffee, colonial
products, and other items.227 These courts used panels of merchants
from the trade group to decide internal disputes on the basis of
norms of the trade and without regard to legal standards.M Often
the sanctions they imposed were also outside the law, such as the
sanction of blacklisting the disobedient party. 9
The use of private arbitration in the United States has a similar
history. In the colonial period, arbitration was used within a common
industry in a particular locality to settle internal disputes.230 For
example, the New York Chamber of Commerce set up an arbitration
system in 1768 in order to "settl[e] business disputes according to
trade practice rather than legal principles,"'231 and it is considered the
oldest surviving arbitration committee in the United States.232
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, arbitration in
the United States expanded along with the growth of trade
associations. In 1927, the American Arbitration Association's Year
Book on Commercial Arbitration in the United States listed over 1000
trade associations that had systems of arbitration for their
members.3 Most of the arbitration systems utilized a panel of
224. See 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 219, at 130.
225. See 5 id
226. See Cohen & Dayton, supra note 41, at 280.
227. See Weiss, supra note 215, at 206.
228. See id
229. See id at 206-07.
230. See Norman S. Poser, When ADR Eclipses Litigation: The Brave New World of
Securities Arbitration, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 1095, 1095 (1993).
231. LINDA R. SINGER, SETTLING DISPUTES: CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN BUSINESS,
FAMILIES, AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 5 (1990).
232. See Nathan Isaacs, Two Views of Commercial Arbitration, 40 HARV. L. REV. 929,
934-35 (1927); see also NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, TRADE
ASSOCIATIONS: THEIR ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE AND LEGAL STATUS 278 (1925)
(describing the influence of the New York Chamber of Commerce in encouraging the use
of arbitration procedures).
233. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, YEAR BOOK ON COMMERCIAL
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arbitrators drawn from the trade association's membership 4 and
counseled the arbitrators to apply their knowledge of the trade to
bring about an equitable resolution to the dispute. 5
One example of such an arbitration system is the New York City
Cotton Textile Merchants Association (the "Association"). In the
early twentieth century, the Association developed standardized
rules for its trade that were later codified as the Worth Street
Rules. z 6 The Rules set detailed product standards for the trade,
including standards for shrinkage, color-fastness, tensile strength,
identification of blended fabrics, and so forth. 7  In addition, the
rules set out detailed arbitration procedures. 83s The Association
urged all members to insert language in their contracts stating: "Any
controversy arising under, or in relation to, this contract shall be
settled by arbitration."' 39 The Worth Street Rules contemplated that
arbitrators would apply not merely contractual terms but industry
norms as defined by the Rules themselves.24 According to the
ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1927).
234. See, e.g., Arbitration Plan of the Food Trade, in SELECTED ARTICLES ON
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 115, 116 (Daniel Bloomfield ed., 1927) (directing that the
arbitration panel is to be two wholesale grocers and one broker or two brokers and one
wholesale grocer); National-American Wholesale Lumber Association Inc., in SELECTED
ARTICLES ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra, at 123, 126 (directing that arbitration
panels consist of three people selected from a list of six that contains at least three
members of the trade association).
235. For example, the National Dried Fruit Association Rules for Arbitration state:
"Arbitrators should proceed on the one great principle of exact equity as between the
parties. Technical breaches of the letter of an agreement where its spirit has been
observed and no resulting damage is shown, should be disregarded." Arbitration Plan of
the Food Trade, supra note 234, at 120.
236. See WORTH STREET RULES (rev. ed. 1964); Frederic P. Houston, Textile
Transactions, in ARBITRATION: COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, INSURANCE, AND TORT
CLAIMS, supra note 161, at 145,147-49.
237. WORTH STREET RULES, supra note 236, t 18-25, 99-128.
238. Under the Worth Street Rules, arbitrators are drawn from an "official panel of
arbitrators" compiled by the General Arbitration Council of the Textile Industry ("the
Council"). Id. at 38. This list includes, but is not limited to, "selected members of the
various divisions of the textile industry represented in the Council." Id. at 37. A single
arbitrator selected by the parties can hear disputes. See id. at 38. However, if the parties
cannot agree on an arbitrator, a dispute between two parties is heard by a panel of three
arbitrators, and a dispute among three parties is heard by a panel of five arbitrators. See
id.
The Rules provide for privacy of the proceeding, and for the exclusion of irrelevant
material. See id. at 34. The Rules also set out a standard form for the submission and for
the acknowledgment of the award. See id. at 35. In addition, the Rules provide that each
side shall be responsible for any expenses of its own witnesses. See id. at 40.
239. Id. at 3. For a description of the arbitration procedure, see id. at 32-42.
240. See id. at 42 ("Arbitrators shall apply these Rules in the manner best calculated to
obtain a just and speedy determination of the controversy.").
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drafters, the Rules "have come to be recognized as the standard code
of procedure and trade custom applicable to the purchase and sale of
cotton textiles and allied lines." 41
B. Arbitration Under the Common Law in the Nineteenth Century
Despite the proliferation of arbitration in commercial
communities in the United States in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century, arbitration remained outside of and in tension
with the legal system. Common law courts would not grant specific
performance on agreements to arbitrate because they said
agreements to arbitrate were revocable by either party until the
arbitral award was rendered.24 According to the "revocability
doctrine," the arbitrator was an agent of the parties acting jointly, so
that the agency agreement could be revoked by either party at any
time before an arbitral award. 43 Thus, if one party to an arbitration
agreement refused to arbitrate, the other party was powerless to
compel arbitration, or to obtain a stay of litigation if the other side
brought suit in court. In most states, the party seeking arbitration
could go to court for damages for breach of the promise to arbitrate,
but the courts awarded only nominal amounts-at most the cost of
preparing for the arbitration that never occurred.2 " Thus, a party
seeking to arbitrate had no effective remedy against a party who
refused to abide by an arbitration agreement.245
The American doctrine of revocability had its origins in English
arbitration law and is thought to have originated in a 1609 decision by
241. Id at 3. The arbitration provisions of the Worth Street Rules were published in
1921 under the title Commercial Arbitration as Conducted by the Committee on
Arbitration of the Association of Cotton Textile Merchants of New York. See AMERICAN
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, supra note 233, at 205-09.
242. See, e.g., In re Smith & Service, 25 L.R. 545, 547 (Q.B.D. 1890) ("A Court of
Equity had no power to decree specific performance of an agreement to refer to
arbitration .... ).
243. See 14 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 216, at 190.
244. See Baum & Pressman, supra note 216, at 242-43. The federal courts followed the
state common law rule. See Aktieselskabet Korn-Og Foderstof Kompagniet v.
Rederiaktiebolaget Atlanten, 250 F. 935, 937 (2d Cir. 1918); Baum & Pressman, supra note
216, at 244.
245. While common law courts would not grant specific enforcement to a promise to
arbitrate, once an arbitration was held and an award was rendered, most courts would
enforce it. See Brazill v. Isham, 12 N.Y. 9, 14 (1854) (dismissing the trial court judgment
in favor of a valid arbitral award); Reizenstein v. Hahn, 12 S.E. 43, 44 (N.C. 1890)
(affirming the lower court's enforcement of an arbitration award). At common law,
arbitral awards were binding, and in many jurisdictions they could be converted into a
judgment of the court. See Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 121-23
(1924).
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Lord Coke in Vynior's Case.46 This case involved the enforcement of
a bond to ensure compliance with arbitration procedures that the
parties had established. 47 The King's Bench enforced the bond, but
Lord Coke stated, in dicta, that the promise to arbitrate established a
revocable agency relationship with the arbitrator.248 This dicta
became the basis for the revocability doctrine.249
The revocability doctrine was not particularly problematic for
the early merchant craft guilds because they could, like the plaintiff
in Vynior's Case, include a hefty bond that would be forfeited by any
party resisting arbitration. In 1697, however, Parliament enacted the
Statute of Fines and Penalties, which forbade the use of penalty
bonds to remedy a breach of contract5 0 Thereafter, a party with an
arbitration clause could only sue for damages for its breach-
damages that were at best a nominal amount to compensate for the
expense of preparing for arbitration."' At that point, parties who
wanted to enforce arbitration agreements needed to obtain specific
performance, and for that the revocability doctrine was a serious
obstacle.
Gradually, with a series of enactments beginning at the end of
the eighteenth century and continuing throughout the nineteenth
century, the English Parliament abandoned the revocability
doctrine5 2 The earliest of these statutory measures enabled parties
to make arbitration submissions a Rule of Court, for which
noncompliance was punishable by contempt. The English arbitration
act of 1854,253 also known as the Common Law Procedure Act,
provided that parties were entitled to judicial review of arbitral
decisions on issues of law,254 and in 1889, Parliament enacted a statute
making all agreements to arbitrate future or present disputes
irrevocable, "except by leave of a court or judge." 5
246. 77 Eng. Rep. 595 (K.B. 1609).
247. The imprint of Vynior's Case on the revocability doctrine is widely acknowledged.
See, e.g., JULIUS HENRY COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 53-55
(1918).
248. See icL at 92-95.
249. For a detailed explication of Vynior's Case, see id. at 84-102.
250. See Statute of Fines and Penalties, 8 & 9 Will. 3, ch. 11, § 8 (1697) (Eng.); 12 SIR
WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OFENGLISH LAW 519-20 (2d prtg. 1966).
251. See COHEN, supra note 247, at 150-51.
252. For a concise history of the nineteenth century English statutes about arbitration,
see 14 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 216, at 196-98.
253. 17 & 18 Vict., ch. 125, § 5 (1854) (Eng.).
254. See Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 846, 855-56
(1961).
255. Arbitration Act, 1889, 52 & 53 Vict., ch. 49, § 1 (Eng.).
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In America, by contrast, the revocability doctrine held firm
throughout the nineteenth century. There were two quite different
justifications offered for it. The first was that parties are not
competent, by private contract, to "oust the court of jurisdiction."'"z6
The "ouster" rationale for the doctrine actually originated in
England, but quickly took firm hold in both federal and state courts
in the United States. 7 For example, the Supreme Court stated in
1874 in Insurance Co. v. Morse:55 "Agreements in advance to oust
the courts of the jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and void."'"2 9
It further stated that parties could neither create nor diminish the
jurisdiction of the courts by contract.2 60 The ouster rationale became
the primary explanation for U.S. courts' refusal to grant specific
performance to agreements to arbitrate. 6'
There was another rationale articulated for the courts' stance on
arbitration in the nineteenth century. In Tobey v. County of
Bristol,'6  Justice Story explained that while a court of equity had no
objections to arbitration tribunals, it would not compel parties to
participate in an arbitration because it could not ensure that the
process would be fair and equitable. He stated:
[W]hen [courts of equity] are asked to proceed farther and
to compel the parties to appoint arbitrators whose award
shall be final, they necessarily pause to consider, whether
such tribunals possess adequate means of giving redress,
and whether they have a right to compel a reluctant party to
submit to such a tribunal, and to close against him the doors
of the common courts of justice, provided by the
government to protect rights and to redress wrongs. One of
256. See, e.g., U.S. Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006, 1008
(S.D.N.Y. 1915) (discussing the "oust the jurisdiction" rationale for opposing private
arbitration agreements).
257. See COHEN, supra note 247, at 153-69 (tracing the history of the "oust the
jurisdiction" doctrine in England and America); see also 14 HOLDSWORTH, supra note
216, at 190 (describing the common law rule that a party to an arbitration can end the
arbitration before an award is given as a precursor to the "oust the jurisdiction" doctrine).
See generally Hirschman, supra note 42, at 1310 & n.27 (citing cases).
258. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1874).
259. IL at 451; see also Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d
978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942) (describing and criticizing the "oust the court of jurisdiction"
doctrine).
260. See Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 451.
261. See Hirschman, supra note 42, at 1310-11 & n.29 (noting tension between the
revocability doctrine and the ouster rationale but finding that the practical outcome was
the same-both meant that "one party to an arbitration agreement could not use the court
system to compel arbitration").
262. 23 F. Cas. 1313,1320-21 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 14,065).
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the established principles of courts of equity is not to
entertain. a bill for the specific performance of any
agreement where it is doubtful whether it may not thereby
become the instrument of injustice, or to deprive parties of
rights which they are otherwise fairly entitled to have
protected.263
Despite this alternate rationale, by the 1920s, the ouster-of-
jurisdiction explanation for the revocability doctrine became the
dominant, if not universal, understanding of arbitration law.26
Story's view-that the courts disapproved of executory promises to
arbitrate because they wanted to ensure a fair hearing-was almost
totally forgotten or ignored.265 Thus narrowed in its interpretation,
the revocability doctrine became a straw man that courts and
commentators set out to attack.
C. Arbitration and the Rise of Trade Associations
In the early twentieth century, the commercial bar in New York
initiated a campaign to overturn the common law rule of
revocability.2 6 Commercial lawyers saw arbitration as essential to
enable the business community to resolve disputes quickly, and they
wanted the courts to facilitate rather than thwart its use. As one
prominent commercial lawyer explained, businessmen have no
quarrel with the common law rules, but they want "speedy
determination of the facts and then a prompt determination of their
rights under the facts as found. '267 Businessmen also wanted their
disputes to be resolved by insiders to the trade. As one
contemporary lawyer said, arbitration offered "a proceeding which
would provide a decision by experts well versed in the facts of the
dispute. It was cheap; it was friendly; it was private; it was
263. la. at 1321. Story further enumerated the many due process failings of arbitration
in the passage quoted at the outset of this Article. He ended with the question: "Ought
then a court of equity to compel a resort to such a tribunal by which, however honest and
intelligent, it can in no case be clear that the real legal or equitable rights of the parties can
be fully ascertained or perfectly protected?" Id.
264. See, e.g., FRANKLIN D. JONES, TRADE AssOCIATION ACrIVITIES AND THE LAW
193-94 (1922); Baum & Pressman, supra note 216, at 240; Joseph Wheless, Arbitration as a
Judicial Process of Law, 30 W. VA. L.Q. 209,214-15 (1924).
265. See Paul L. Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration, 37 YALE L.J. 595, 609
(1927). One of the few commentators to note Story's view and to argue that it presented a
principled rationale for the revocability doctrine was Charles Newton Hulvey. See Charles
Newton Hulvey, Arbitration in Commercial Disputes, 15 VA. L. REV. 238, 242-43 (1928).
266. See Charles L. Bernheimer, Introduction to COHEN, supra note 247, at vii-xii.
267. COHEN, supra note 247, at 1, 3.
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businesslike; it was convenient. '268
The impetus for changing the law of arbitration in the early
twentieth century was closely connected with the rise of trade
associations.2 69 Trade associations had been a feature of American
life since the colonial era, but in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century new trade associations formed at unprecedented
rates.2 70  Bankers, hardware dealers, lumbermen, textile
manufacturers, canners, tobacco manufacturers, and the like came
together to form local, regional, and national associations. The
National Industrial Conference Board issued a report on trade
associations in 1925 that found there were between 800 and 1000
national trade organizations in the United States, most of which had
been formed since the 1890s.271  When local and state trade
associations were added, the Department of Commerce estimated
that there were some 2000 state and 7700 local associations.2  The
trade associations themselves combined to form state associations
and state chambers of commerce, and in 1914 they formed the United
States Chamber of Commerce 73
Trade associations set industry standards for production and
devised form contracts to standardize terms of dealings between
members of a trade.274 Such standardized practices were seen as a
way to minimize commercial disputes and achieve certainty and
order in the anarchic world of competitive trade.275 For the same
reasons, trade associations established their own internal arbitration
systems to resolve disputes between association members. 76
The growth of commercial arbitration went hand in hand with
268. Philip G. Phillips, The Paradox in Arbitration Law: Compulsion as Applied to a
Voluntary Proceeding, 46 HARV. L. REV. 1258, 1261 (1933); see also Wheless, supra note
264, at 210-11 (stating that arbitration is the "most effective mode yet devised" to avoid
the "law's delays"). It is interesting to note that these virtues-speed, expertise,
accessibility, affordability, and confidentiality-are the same that are touted today in
defense of expanding the domain of arbitration.
269. See, e.g., Martin Gang, Commercial Arbitration in California, 15 CAL. L. REV.
289, 292-99 (1927) (discussing trade associations and the movement to obtain judicial
support for arbitration in California).
270. See NATIONALINDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, supra note 232, at 11-13.
271. See id. app. at 326. All data on numbers of trade associations involve imprecise
estimates due to problems of definition and double-counting. See id. app. at 319-26.
272. See id app. at 325-26.
273. See ROBERT H. WIEBE, BUSINESSMEN AND REFORM: A STUDY OF THE
PROGRESSIVE MOvEMENT 18-25 (1962).
274. See NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, supra note 232, at 276.
275. See id. at 275-76.
276. See id at 276-77; see also JONES, supra note 264, at 194-95 & n.2 (listing some of
the national trade associations that had adopted arbitration systems as of 1922).
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the explosive growth of trade associations in the 1920s. By 1927, the
American Arbitration Association compiled information on over
1000 trade associations that had systems of arbitration for their
members.27 7 These internal arbitration systems were designed to
resolve disputes over contract interpretation and industry
standards. 78 They were means to achieve uniformity, articulate
ethics, and police malfeasance among trading partners. One
advocate noted that arbitration was integral to the mission of trade
associations because it facilitated uniform enforcement of industry
standards and at the same time dispersed knowledge of trade
standards and evolving trade customs to members of the trade.279
Arbitration was also praised for its ability to resolve disputes
between trade association members in a manner that preserved the
cohesiveness of the organization. 280 Arbitration, it was said, could
restore confidence, promote trust, and keep business running
smoothly.281 It created goodwill between members in an association
and between the industry and the rest of society3m Trade-association
arbitrations were touted as proceedings with fewer technicalities,
"much more with an aim to homespun justice, than ... actions in the
courts." 3 For these reasons, some contemporaries claimed that the
availability of arbitration was the most valuable feature of trade-
association membership2
4
Early twentieth century trade associations urged and even
sometimes required their members to use form contracts with a
standard arbitration clause for their business transactions.285 In these
standard clauses, parties agreed to use an industry-specific arbitration
system to adjudicate all disputes.U6  The characteristic trade-
association arbitration was an informal proceeding headed by a
respected member of the trade group in which the "elder" would
resolve disputes between group members on the basis of the norms,
277. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, supra note 233.
278. See Mentschikoff, supra note 254, at 852-53.
279. See JONES, supra note 264, at 196.
280. See id at 196-97.
281. See FRANCES KELLOR, ARBITRATION IN THE NEW INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 14
(1934).
282. See id. at 29-30; see also JONES, supra at 264, at 197 (stating that "arbitration [is] a
conserver of good will and preserver of prosperity").
283. Cohen & Dayton, supra note 41, at 279-80.
284. See JONES, supra note 264, at 197.
285. See Harlan F. Stone, The Scope and Limitation of Commercial Arbitration, PROC.
ACAD. POL. SCI. CITYN.Y., July 1923, at 195, 195-96.
286. See Mentschikoff, supra note 254, at 849; Philip G. Phillips, Commercial
Arbitration Under the N.R.A., 1 CHI. L. REV. 424,426-27 (1933).
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customary practices, and unstated understandings of the
community. 7
D. The New York City Chamber of Commerce's Campaign to
Overturn the Revocability Doctrine
As the trade association movement picked up momentum in the
early years of the twentieth century, business leaders and their
lawyers mounted pressure to eliminate the revocability doctrine and
make agreements to arbitrate enforceable by specific performance.
They were reinforced in their determination by a 1915 decision of
Judge Charles Hough in U.S. Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake
Petroleum Co.,' in which the court criticized the revocability
doctrine and stated that there was no reasoned basis for it other than
stare decisis.289 The U.S. Asphalt Refining decision emboldened the
New York Chamber of Commerce to initiate a concerted effort to
reverse the revocability doctrine.29 It commissioned a well-known
commercial lawyer, Julius Henry Cohen, to represent the Chamber as
amicus curiae in another pending case, Spiritusfabriek Astra v. Sugar
Products Co., in which the plaintiff was challenging the revocability
doctrine and seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement.291
Cohen's first-hand knowledge of arbitration dated back to 1910,
when he helped frame the Protocols of Peace for the New York City
ladies' garment industry that settled the 1910 city-wide strike.2"
Cohen was then counsel for the garment industry employers'
association. Together with Louis D. Brandeis, who was special
counsel for the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union,
Cohen helped design an arbitration system to resolve disputes in the
garment industry and to avoid industrial strife in the future. The
Protocols established a permanent Board of Arbitration, made up of
representatives of the union, employers, and the public, who were
empowered to settle grievances and disputes.29 3 Five years later,
Cohen wrote a book about the arbitration system of the Protocols,
crediting it with bringing labor peace, better working conditions, and
industrial democracy to American industry.2 94
287. See supra notes 234-35 and accompanying text.
288. 222 F. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
289. See id. at 1008.
290. See Bernheimer, supra note 266, at xi-xii.
291. See id at xi.
292 See JULiUS HENRY COHEN, LAW AND ORDER IN INDUSTRY at xii (1916).
293. See id. at 32-38.
294. See id. at 229-41.
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After 1910, Cohen moved into the field of commercial
arbitration with zeal. He was a member of the Committee on
Arbitration of the New York Chamber of Commerce, and he
frequently lectured on the subject to professional groups.2 5  He
expanded his 1916 brief in the Spiritusfabriek Astra case into a book-
length treatise called Commercial Arbitration and the Law, 296 that
advocated the repeal of the revocability doctrine.29
Cohen's book was a carefully crafted argument for making
commercial arbitration agreements specifically enforceable. It began
with a detailed history of the use of commercial arbitration in
England and the United States dating back to colonial times.298
Cohen quoted an editorial in the London Times from 1891 describing
the role of trade experts in deciding disputes:
"Long before 1883 there had grown up a class of
arbitrators who, with all their shortcomings, were
expeditious and acquainted first-hand with the subject-
matter of dispute. All their lives they had handled the
cotton, wool, or seeds over which the parties were
quarreling. They had written, made advances, bought and
sold upon the documents, the construction of which was in
question. They had obeyed, perhaps helped to form, the
trade customs to which the disputants appealed. That class
of experts has increased. Their skill has grown with
experience, and it is altogether too late to think of ousting
them. ,299
He then quoted a contemporary report of the American Judicature
Society prepared by Samuel Rosenbaum, who wrote: "'What was
true in 1891 is even more true in 1916, and every business has its
expert arbitrators, generally older and seasoned veterans who were in
the thick of the fight for years and retired to make way for the
younger men.' "0
Cohen then presented a detailed and careful discussion of the
twists and turns of the common law revocability rule, taking issue
295. See 1924 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS
PROCEEDINGS 82-83 (1924) [hereinafter 1924 PROCEEDINGS] (providing the address of
Julius Henry Cohen to the Conference regarding the proposed Uniform Arbitration Act).
296. See COHEN, supra note 247, at xv (explaining his decision to expand his brief into
a treatise).
297. See iL at xiii-xiv.
298. See id. at 1-9.
299. COHEN, supra note 247, at 8 (quoting Editorial, TIMES (London), May 8, 1891, at
9).
300. 1& at 8-9 (quoting SAMUEL ROSENBAUM, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOC'Y,
BULLETIN XI: COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN ENGLAND 53 (1917)).
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with Lord Coke's logic in Vynior's Case. 10' He argued that there
were errors in Lord Coke's reasoning and in the subsequent
treatment of Vynior's Case by later judges. After thoroughly
criticizing the errors of the revocability doctrine and extolling the
virtues of commercial arbitration, Cohen concluded by asking: "Why
should such a movement be hampered by the continuance of a rule
unsound in public policy, bad in legal theory, obsolete historically
and unsupported by sound legal precedent? ... [I]f repudiation of
one's promise to arbitrate is ... immoral, why continue to lend legal
sanction to it?"'
31
While Commercial Arbitration and the Law was a masterful
combination of ancient common law analysis and contemporary
policy argument, it was misleading in several respects. First, Cohen
described the courts' justification of the revocability rule as grounded
solely on the "oust the courts of jurisdiction" rationale.0 3 He argued
that the ouster rationale was altogether specious because there were
many instances in our legal system in which parties were permitted to
select the courts in which their cases were tried or even were
permitted to take their cases away from courts altogether, such as
choice-of-law clauses and parties' own pre-trial settlements.3 ° Cohen
also impugned the ouster doctrine by suggesting that it originated in
the days when judges relied on fees from the cases they decided.0 5
He thus explained the doctrine as a product of judicial self-interest
and turf protection, goals hardly worth preserving.3 6  Having
disposed of the ouster theory of the revocability doctrine, Cohen
rested his case.
Cohen's argument appeared stronger than it was because he
misstated Story's position on the revocability doctrine. Rather than
presenting Story's views fully, he utilized selective quotations from
the Tobey case to characterize Story's position as simply another
example of the ouster argument.3" Thus Cohen never tackled the
argument that common law courts have an obligation to ensure that
fair procedures are in place before ordering parties to submit to
them. One result of Cohen's work was that later writers proceeded
301. See supra notes 246-49 (discussing Vynior's Case).
302. COHEN, supra note 247, at 281.
303. See id. at 153.
304. See iL at 16-18.
305. See id at 254.
306. But see Hulvey, supra note 265, at 242 (arguing that attributing the revocability
doctrine to judges' fear that they would lose their fees is "unfair" and "not justified").
307. See COHEN, supra note 247, at 250-52.
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as Cohen did, merely attacking and debunking the "oust the
jurisdiction" argument and ignoring Story's fundamental fairness
argument altogether.0 8
Cohen's book became the manifesto of the commercial
community in its battle to reverse the revocability doctrine." 9 As one
contemporary said of it:
No fruitful union of legal finality and business practice in
this connection could be brought about here until it was
shown that Coke was wrong. Coke was finally unhorsed by
Julius Henry Cohen ... whose researches in black-letter
texts of Norman-French decisions proved that Coke did not
know his common law as well as modern lawyers.310
The book was followed by an avalanche of pleas from the commercial
law community urging courts and legislatures to change the law of
arbitration. In the following years, the New York Chamber of
Commerce joined with the New York Bar Association to propose a
statute to the New York legislature to change the common law rule.
The statute, which Cohen drafted, was patterned on the English
arbitration law of 1889,311 with one significant difference: the
proposed New York law did not contain a provision for de novo
judicial review of questions of law.312  This difference was not
accidental, for the New York Chamber of Commerce vehemently
opposed any judicial review of arbitral awards.313
In 1920, Cohen's bill passed the New York legislature and
became the New York Arbitration Act. 4  The New York statute
made arbitration agreements "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable
save on such grounds as exist at Law or in Equity for the revocation
of any contract. '315 The New York statute served as a template for
308. See Kulukundis Shipping v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 983 (2d Cir.
1942); see also Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 n.6 (quoting the
legislative history of the FAA to show that Congress wanted to repudiate the ouster
doctrine when it enacted the FAA in 1925).
309. See, e.g., Bernheimer, supra note 266, at xi-xii.
310. Business and Law Join in Arbitration, 115 INDEPENDENT 725, 725 (1925), quoted
in Phillips, supra note 268, at 1259 n.9.
311. Arbitration Act, 1889, 52 & 53 Vict., ch. 49, § 1 (Eng.); supra text accompanying
note 255.
312. The subsequent federal law also failed to provide for de novo review of questions
of law, as is found in the English law. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 437 (1953),
overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
313. See Isaacs, supra note 232, at 934-35.
314. 1920 N.Y. Laws ch. 275, § 2 (current version at N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7501-7514
(McKinney 1998 & Supp. 1999)).
315. N.Y. Civil Practice Act § 1448 (1920).
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the Federal Arbitration Act, enacted five years later.
In a 1921 article in the Yale Law Journal, Cohen responded to
critics who had expressed concern that the statute would permit
stronger parties to take advantage of weaker ones.3 16 In defense of
the statute, Cohen gave a misleading but telling description of its
provisions. He described the new statute as preserving a significant
role for the courts in policing arbitration.317 For example, he noted
that if the existence of a valid contract were in dispute, then under § 3
of the statute either party could request a jury trial on that issue.
318
While this result may have been his intent as drafter of the statute, it
has been interpreted differently.319 In addition, Cohen said that
under the New York statute, arbitral awards may be vacated for
"fraud, corruption, partiality, mistake, or similar misconduct, or if the
arbitrators have exceeded their jurisdiction or made an imperfect
award. ' 320  Today, neither mistake of fact nor mistake of law is a
ground to vacate an arbitral award,32' nor was it in Cohen's time.322
Rather, in 1930, one scholar wrote in the Harvard Law Review that
"it is universally true that the findings of the arbitrators with respect
to fact are final and will not be reviewed by the courts.
''323
Cohen also stated in his 1921 article that under the New York
statute, "[t]he award may then be enforced as a judgment, and as
such, an appeal may be taken from it. And, similarly, from an order
316. See Julius Henry Cohen, The Law of Commercial Arbitration and the New York
Statute, 31 YALE L.J. 147 (1921).
317. See id- at 149.
318. See iL
319. Under the contemporary legal framework of arbitration, issues of contract validity
are determined by the arbitrator, unless there is a challenge not to the validity of the
entire contract but merely to the validity of the arbitration clause. See Prima Paint Corp.
v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,401 (1967) (interpreting an equivalent clause in
the FAA). Even the early case, Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126
F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1942), made the question of the existence of a valid contract a matter for
a judge and not a jury question under the FAA. See id. at 985.
320. Cohen, supra note 316, at 149 (emphasis added).
321. See, e.g., Sims v. Siegelson, 668 N.Y.S.2d 20,22 (App. Div. 1998).
322. See, e.g., Cobb v. Dolphin Mfg. Co., 15 N.E. 438, 440-41 (N.Y. 1888) (refusing to
overturn an arbitrator's award so long as it was "just and equitable," as required by the
parties arbitration agreement); Hano v. Isaac H. Blanchard Co., 199 N.Y.S. 227, 230 (App.
Div. 1922) (holding that "a court of law possesses no supervisory jurisdiction" on issues
such as "the partiality, corruption, or misbehavior of the arbitrator, or fraud extraneous to
the award"); D. Goff & Sons v. Rheiauer, 192 N.Y.S. 92, 94 (App. Div. 1922) ("[I]n the
absence of fraud, corruption, or misconduct of the arbitraors .... their finding will not be
disturbed."); Itoh & Co. v. Boyer Oil Co., 191 N.Y.S. 290, 292 (App. Div. 1921) ("[A]ny
finding of fact or conclusion of law of an arbitrator will not be reviewed.").
323. Philip G. Phillips, Rules of Law or Laissez-Faire in Commercial Arbitration, 47
HARV. L. REV. 590, 598 (1930).
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vacating an award the right of appeal is preserved. '324 This statement
too is an incorrect description of the law of arbitration then and now.
Under both the New York and federal statutes, there is no appeal of
the merits of arbitral rulings to a court; there is only the possibility of
a motion to vacate based on the narrow statutory grounds or for
"manifest disregard of the law. '' 32
Cohen summed up his defense of the New York statute by
raising the specter of the discredited ouster argument. He stated that
under the statute, "supervision of arbitrations by the court is
preserved. Instead of being ousted of jurisdiction over arbitrations,
the courts are given jurisdiction over them, and where fraud, palpable
mistake, or failure to consider the evidence in the case is presented,
the party aggrieved has his ready recourse to the courts." '326 Cohen's
1921 account of the New York statute describes a more expansive
scope of judicial review of arbitral awards than has ever existed under
the FAA or under the New York statute. It was his attempt to
appease critics of the New York arbitration act who claimed that the
statute was an evasion of due process.32 7
The New York Court of Appeals upheld the 1920 Act against a
constitutional challenge in In re Hennan Berkovitz.3 2 Julius Cohen
and Kenneth Dayton served as Counsel for the New York Chamber
of Commerce, as amicus curiae. Judge Cardozo, writing for the
court, held that the statute did not abrogate the right to a jury trial,
did not subvert the "dignity and power" of the state court, nor did it
impair the obligation of contract.3 29  Comparing arbitration to a
release or covenant not to sue, Cardozo held that arbitration was
consistent with the public policy of the state.330
324. Cohen, supra note 316, at 149.
325. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 437-38 (1953), overruled on other grounds by
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
326. Cohen, supra note 316, at 150.
327. To this effect, Cohen wrote:
[Tjhe rights of both parties are reasonably safeguarded, and no common-law or
constitutional right to a jury trial or to the protection of the courts is taken from
them, except so far as by their express agreement they themselves have provided
that the arbitrators, instead of court and jury or court without jury, shall pass
upon certain questions of fact better suited for decision by them than by
strangers to the customs and practices of the trade.
IM at 149-50.
328. 130 N.E. 288 (N.Y. 1921).
329. Id. at 290.
330. See id. at 291.
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E. From the New York Statute to the Federal Arbitration Act
After the enactment of the New York arbitration statute, the
Arbitration Society of America was formed to promote the use of
arbitration in industry.3 31 By 1924, over 1000 leading businesses and
over sixty-five trade groups had joined, and the Society had decided
over 500 arbitration cases .33  This group, which later became the
American Arbitration Association ("AAA"), advocated that parties
include pre-dispute promises to arbitrate as standardized terms in
their business dealings.3 33 This simple device, they claimed, would
"compel the parties to arbitrate. '334 The AAA also drafted a model
arbitration act-the "Draft Act"-which, like the New York statute,
made agreements to arbitrate irrevocable and specifically
enforceable.335
Within three years of the enactment of the New York statute,
New Jersey and Massachusetts adopted similar measures. 6 By 1933,
twelve states, including New Jersey and Massachusetts, had enacted
the Draft Act. Some states, however, resisted the New York
approach on the ground that to enforce predispute arbitration
agreements would permit stronger parties to coerce weaker ones.
3 8
They were also critical of the New York approach for its failure to
provide judicial review on matters of law.339 Illinois rejected the New
York approach and enacted an arbitration law that permitted the
331. See Wheless, supra note 264, at 228-30. In 1922, Columbia Law School Dean
Harlan Stone reported:
Zeal for the arbitration principle which has hitherto been devoted to
securing the enactment of legislation is now being ... directed toward inducing
merchants to make the widest use of arbitration as the simplest, the least
expensive, the most expeditious and the most satisfactory method of disposing of
controversies between business men.
Stone, supra note 285, at 195-96.
332. See AMERICAN ARBrrRATION ASSOCIATION, supra note 233, at 1142-53 (listing
businesses and trade groups).
333. See Wheless, supra note 264, at 231. The AAA standard arbitration clause was
exceedingly broad, reading: "'Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this
contract or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration, in accordance with the rules
then obtaining, of the American Arbitration Association ....... Phillips, supra note 268,
at 1277 n.87 (quoting CODE OF ARBrrRATION: PRACICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE
AMERICAN ARBrRATION TRIBUNAL 205 (Frances Keller ed., 1931)).
334. Wheless, supra note 264, at 231.
335. See Phillips, supra note 268, at 1264-65.
336. See id at 1263.
337. See id at 1262-63.
338. See 1924 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 295, at 69-70 (statement of W.H.H. Piatt,
Commissioner from Missouri).
339. See id. at 63 (statement of Joseph F. O'Connell, Commissioner from
Massachusetts).
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enforcement of agreements to arbitrate that were made after the
dispute arose. 4 Further, Illinois adopted the English rule of
providing judicial review of arbitral awards on matters of law. 341 In
1924, after considerable internal debate between the two competing
approaches, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws rejected the
New York approach and adopted the Illinois approach? 2
Also in the early 1920s, the American Bar Association ("ABA")
debated which type of arbitration law to recommend to the states. In
1921, it delegated the task of drafting a model state arbitration act to
its Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law. 43 That
Committee drafted a model bill that tracked the language of the New
York statute. Despite the efforts of the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws to sway the ABA to the Illinois approach, the ABA opted
in 1922 for the approach of its own Committee.3"
In 1922, the ABA Committee on Commerce, Trade and
Commerical Law also drafted a federal statute, the Commercial
Arbitration Act, based on the New York statute, to submit to
Congress.' Julius Cohen served on this committee and was the
major drafter of both pieces of legislation.3" In 1923, Congress held
hearings on the proposed act. The ABA Committee revised the bill
in 1923 and 1924 to accommodate congressional criticisms.347 Then,
in 1925, five years after the enactment of the New York statute, the
United States Arbitration Act (later renamed the Federal
Arbitration Act) passed both Houses of Congress unanimously.34 8
340. See Act of June 11, 1917, 1917 Ill. Laws 202 (current version at 710 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/1-22 (West 1992); 1924 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 295, at 60 (statement of
Hollis R. Bailey, Commissioner from Massachusetts).
341. See 1924 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 295, at 63 (statement of Joseph F. O'Connell,
Commissioner from Massachusetts).
342. See id. at 163.
343. See Alfred N. Heuston, The Settlement of Disputes by Arbitration, 1 WASH. L.
REV. 243, 244 & n.8 (1925); Report of the Committee on Commerce, Trade and
Commercial Law, 46 REP. A.B.A. 309,355 (1921).
344. See Transactions of the Forty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the American Bar
Association, 47 REp. A.B.A. 19, 52-53 (1922); Report of the Committee on Commerce,
Trade and Commercial Law, 47 REP. A.B.A. 288,289,318-21 (1922).
345. See Report of the Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, supra
note 344, at 289, 315-18.
346. See iL at 295.
347. See Jones, supra note 222, 249-50; Committee on Commerce, Trade and
Commercial Law, The United States Arbitration Law and its Applications, 11 A.B.A. J. 153,
153 (1925).
348. See United States Arbitration Act of 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1994)); Moses H. Grossman, Trade Security Under
Arbitration Laws, 35 YALE L.J. 308,312-13 n.9 (1925).
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The United States Arbitration Act contained all the essential
features, and most of the wording, of the New York Arbitration Act.
Like the New York statute, the federal statute made agreements to
arbitrate present or future disputes "valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable"; 349 it provided that when there is a contract containing
an arbitration clause, a court must stay litigation and grant specific
performance of the promise to arbitrate;350 and it provided only four
narrow grounds for judicial review.3 1
F. The Federal Arbitration Act and Herbert Hoover's
Associationalism
The arbitration acts of the 1920s were not historical anomalies-
they were part of a larger social and political ethos in the United
States in the 1920s that is described as "associationalism. '352  This
new social philosophy had its origins in the trade association
movement of the early twentieth century and picked up momentum
during World War 1. 353 During the war, private associations were
given unprecedented governmental powers and authority.354 The
government turned to private sector associations, such as the
Chamber of Commerce and the American Federation of Labor, to
staff the war agencies and advisory boards. 55 The experience of "war
guildism" gave rise to a new regulatory philosophy. As one
contemporary scholar observed:
The unprecedented war demands changed entirely the
attitude of the government toward trade associations....
Continuous contact between the agencies of demand and of
supply was absolutely essential for the intelligent conduct of
the war. But with the exceedingly rapid increase in the war
349. United States Arbitration Act § 2.
350. See id § 3.
351. See id § 10; see also supra note 139 (listing the four grounds).
352. See, e.g., Ellis Hawley, Herbert Hoover, the Commerce Secretariat, and the Vision
of an "Associative State," 1921-1928, 61 J. AM. HIST. 116, 118 (1974) (describing the trend
towards associationalism and away from the old industrialism).
353. See RUDOLPH J.R. PERrrz, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA, 1888-1992:
HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAW 78 (1996); Ellis Hawley, Three Facets of Hooverian
Associationalism: Lumber, Aviation, and Movies, 1921-1930, in REGULATION IN
PERSPECTIVE 95, 97 (Thomas K. McGraw ed., 1981); see also Allen R. Kamp, Between-
the-Wars Social Thought: Karl Llewellyn, Legal Realism, and the Uniform Commercial
Code in Context, 59 ALB. L. REv. 325, 373-75 (1995) (describing the growth of trade
associations from the 19th century to the 1920s).
354. See, e.g., VALERIE JEAN CONNER, THE NATIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD 18
(1983).
355. See id. at 21,28.
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demands, the government soon found it more and more
difficult, if not impossible, to deal with individual units in
industry. Therefore, in order to carry out its production
program promptly and effectively, the government not only
encouraged the organization of trade associations, but set
up machinery for the control of industry, which necessitated
complete organization of each industry.
3 5 6
Herbert Hoover was a champion of trade associations and a
spokesman of the new associationalism.3 7 During World War I,
Hoover served as the Director of the Food Administration, where he
conducted a major study of waste in industry.358 From his experience
in the wartime agency, he concluded that efficiency and productivity
in industry could best be attained and waste could best be eliminated
by voluntary associations of businessmen that could share expertise,
engage in joint research, set uniform product standards, and
promulgate codes of conduct for the trade. 9 Hoover developed a
sophisticated philosophy about the relative roles of government and
industry in the economy in achieving efficiency. He advocated
government facilitation of business cooperation, and he believed that
regulatory power should be delegated to strong autonomous trade
associations. 36  He envisioned a government that operated not
through direct regulation, but through promotional conferences,
expert inquiries, and other forms of public-private cooperation.
361
According to Robert Rabin, "[a] strong case can be made that
Hoover espoused the single most influential and coherent regulatory
philosophy between the Progressive Era and the New Deal." 36
Hoover became Secretary of Commerce in 1922, and in that
capacity, he promoted collaboration between industry and
government in order to eliminate waste in industry, foster efficiency,
356. JOSEPH HENRY FOTH, TRADE ASSOCIATIONS: THEIR SERVICES TO INDUSTRY
21-22 (1930); see also NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, supra note 232, at
25-27 (discussing how the exigencies of World War I led the government to work with and
rely upon trade associations).
357. See Hawley, supra note 353, at 98-99.
358. See generally HERBERT HOOVER, THE MEMOIRS OF HERBERT HOOVER: YEARS
OF ADVENTURE, 1874-1920, at 239-80 (1951) (discussing Hoover's time at the Food
Administration).
359. See BENJAMIN S. KIRSH, TRADE ASSOCIATIONS: THE LEGAL ASPECTS 14 (1928)
(quoting Herbert Hoover from 1922 SECRETARY OF COM. ANN. REP. 30). See generally
Hawley, supra note 352, at 117-19 (describing Hoover's support of a synthesis between the
old and new systems).
360. See Hawley, supra note 353, at 99.
361. See id at 118-21.




and enhance productivity.36 He convened a Conference of Trade
Association Executives in 1922 and oversaw the publication of a
Department of Commerce report on trade associations in 1923.3' He
worked closely with trade associations throughout his tenure at the
Commerce Department, sponsoring over 3000 conferences with trade
groups to discuss the elimination of waste and the furtherance of
efficiency.365 He directed Commerce Department officials to work
with the trade associations to create codes of ethics-business
practices which were then promulgated by the Department as
standards of fair practices.3 6 He also requested the ABA Committee
on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law draft the federal
legislation that became the FAA.
367
Described as "the St. Paul of the Association Movement, 368
Hoover crusaded for his vision of associationalism amongst other
agencies and departments of government.3 69 He encouraged the
Federal Trade Commission to promote self-regulation in industry.
He contended that trade associations were beneficial rather than
predatory forms of business cooperation, and he urged then-Attorney
General Harry Daughterly to ease antitrust enforcement against
them.3 71 When Harlan Fiske Stone, Columbia Law School Dean and
an adherent to Hoover's associationalist philosophy, became
Attorney General under President Coolidge, Hoover worked with
Stone to bring a test case concerning the legality of information-
sharing activities of trade associations under the antitrust laws. 2 By
the time the lawsuit reached the Supreme Court, Stone had been
appointed to the Court and wrote the opinion in Maple Flooring
363. See JONES, supra note 264, at vii; Rabin, supra note 362, at 1241-42; see also LOUIS
GALAMBOS, COMPETITION AND COOPERATION: THE EMERGENCE OF A NATIONAL
TRADE ASSOCIATION 74-75 (1966) (describing Hoover's collaborative efforts with the
cotton textile industry). See generally Hawley, supra note 352, at 123-29 (describing
efforts to make government more efficient and less paralyzed).
364. See KIRSH, supra note 359, at 34.
365. See HERBERT HOOVER, THE MEMOIRS OF HERBERT HOOVER: THE CABINET
AND THE PRESIDENCY, 1920-1933, at 62 (1951).
366. See id. at 172-73; see also PERITz, supra note 353, at 86-87 (describing standard-
setting in the lumber industry).
367. See Report of the Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, supra
note 344, at 293-94.
368. GALAMBOS, supra note 363, at 74.
369. See Hawley, supra note 352, at 136-37.
370. See id. at 100; see also Rabin, supra note 362, at 1237-38 (discussing Hoover's
efforts at the Food Administration).
371. See Correspondence between Herbert Hoover, Secretary of Commerce, and
Harry Daughterly, Attorney General (1922), reprinted in JONES, supra note 264, at 324-35.
372. See PERITZ, supra note 353, at 87-88.
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Manufacturing v. United States,73 eliminating the prior restrictions on
trade associations and giving them wide latitude to share cost,
quantity, and price information without violating the antitrust laws.374
Hoover's model of regulation was neo-corporatist; it advocated
that public powers be delegated to private agents to engage in self-
regulation.375 He wanted to help businessmen in their quest to
transform the interventionist trends of the progressive era into
government-sanctioned self-regulation.3 76 As historian Ellis Hawley
has written:
[Hoover] envisioned both a new kind of societal
"regulation" and a new kind of government. Within society
a systematized network of cooperative associations and
councils would provide the ordered freedom needed for
continued economic and social progress; and government,
as Hoover proposed to use it, would function not as a
regulator but as an aide in developing and operating these
societal mechanisms.377
Hoover's associationalism was part of what has been termed the
"new capitalism" of the 1920s. New capitalists rejected progressive
models of government intervention in the economy, advocating
instead a vision of self-regulation of business through trade
associations.378  The new capitalists' utopia was one in which
"enlightened corporate stewards should be allowed greater freedom
to monitor industrial practices through collective private association
and consultation, with government serving but a modest role.
'379
A cornerstone of Hoover's self-regulatory vision was the
expansive use of commercial arbitration. He established an
information bureau within the Commerce Department to promote
and monitor the progress of commercial arbitration.30 He advocated
national and state legislation to facilitate and legalize arbitration, and
he worked closely with the ABA and the chambers of commerce on
the enactment of the New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Oregon
373. 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
374. See PERITz, supra note 353, at 87-88 (discussing Maple Flooring Mfg. v. United
States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925)).
375. See Gerald P. Berk, Approaches to the History of Regulation, in REGULATION IN
PERSPECrIvE, supra note 353, at 187, 197.
376. See PERITZ, supra note 353, at 86; WIEBE, supra note 273, at 222-23.
377. Hawley, supra note 353, at 99.
378. See ROBERT F. BURK, THE CORPORATE STATE AND THE BROKER STATE: THE
DUPONTs AND AMERICAN NATIONAL POLITICS 1925-1940, at 16-17 (1990).
379. Id. at 17.
380. See HOOVER, supra note 365, at 68-69.
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arbitration statutes l.38  He was a principal advocate of the FAA,
introducing bills on the subject in Congress in 1923, 1924, and 192582
In a report to Congress in 1926, Hoover claimed credit for these
legislative victories, bragging that the Commerce Department had
made substantial progress in promoting the use of commercial
arbitration within industry.3 3 He stated that commercial arbitration
"eliminates waste by removing ill will, by saving costs of litigation, by
preventing undue delays ... and by strengthening contractual
relations. ' ' 8
Hoover served as Honorary President of the AAA from its
inception in 1926.' s In 1927, Hoover wrote in a foreword to the
AAA's Year Book on Commercial Arbitration in the United States:
I have been for many years of the conviction that the
arbitration of commercial disputes in place of avoidable
litigation is an agency of the first rank in the promotion of
business efficiency....
The reason for the rapid rise of the commercial
arbitration movement from a dream and a theory to a
reality and practical adoption lies in the adaptability of
arbitration to the multiple problems that arise in dealings
between units of organized business. Within a chamber of
commerce or a trade association it is possible to standardize
many of the differences and conflicts which arise in the
performance of everyday contracts. Such inevitable
conflicts are often amenable to prompt settlement by those
who know the particular trade and enjoy the confidence of
the parties in dispute.8 6
He praised commercial arbitration for relieving the taxpayer of the
costs of litigation as well as for curbing waste, reducing costs, and
promoting industrial good-will.Y7 Echoing the optimistic blending of
private interest with public good that characterized the new
capitalism, Hoover wrote that with arbitration, "business taxes itself
to pay the cost of keeping commercial peace. 3 8
381. See id. at 69.
382. See id. at 68-69.
383. See id. at 62-63, 68-69.
384. Id. at 69.
385. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, supra note 233, at 1.
386. Herbert Hoover, Foreword to AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, supra
note 233, at vii.
387. See id. at vii-viii.
388. Id. at vii.
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G. The Problem of Insiders and Outsiders in the 1920s
In the 1920s, most supporters of the FAA and the state
arbitration laws intended the new statutes to apply to disputes
between members of the same trade association or between
participants in a common line of business.3 89 Even Julius Cohen, the
champion of arbitration within trade associations and drafter of the
FAA of 1925, cautioned about the limits of arbitration in other
contexts. In an article he co-authored in 1926, he wrote:
Not all questions arising out of contracts ought to be
arbitrated. It is a remedy peculiarly suited to the
disposition of the ordinary disputes between merchants as
to questions of fact-quantity, quality, time of delivery,
compliance with terms of payment, excuses for non-
performance, and the like. It has a place also in the
determination of the simpler questions of law-the
questions of law which arise out of these daily relations
between merchants as to the passage of title, the existence
of warranties, or the questions of law which are
complementary to the questions of fact which we have just
mentioned.Y9 0
Few scholars or lawyers considered problems that might be
posed if arbitration agreements were made binding upon persons
who were not engaged in a common trade or members of a common
trade association. There was a paradox, however: It was not
necessary to have laws to compel arbitration in disputes between
trade association members because membership in a common
organization created not only a spirit of cooperation but also the
availability of "extra-judicial methods" for enforcing arbitration
agreements.391 As one lawyer noted at the time, the by-laws of many
trade associations provided that members who refused to arbitrate
disputes would be expelled.39  Others authorized lesser penalties,
389. See, e.g., Comment, Arbitration and Award: Commercial Arbitration in
California, 17 CAL. L. REV. 643, 664 (1929) ("[A]rbitration may be successful only where
both parties are willing to arbitrate, or where the parties are members of trade or
industrial organizations in which there are common interests, conducive to co-
operation.").
390. Cohen & Dayton, supra note 41, at 281. Justice Black quoted this language in his
dissent in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 415 n.13 (1967)
(Black, J., dissenting).
391. Phillips, supra note 268, at 1261.
392. See Phillips, supra note 286, at 428; see also NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL
CONFERENCE BOARD, supra note 232, at 286-87 (giving the example of by-Laws of the
National-American Wholesale Lumber Association that authorized expulsion of any
member who refused to arbitrate).
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such as publishing in the industry trade journal the name of any
member who refused to arbitrate a dispute with another member.
393
For their part, the courts upheld such measures when they were
challenged.3 94  Thus, one is left to wonder why the commercial
community felt that making agreements to arbitrate legally
enforceable was such a high priority.
Despite this seeming paradox, the problem of arbitration
between insiders and outsiders received little attention in the 1920s.
One group that did consider the problem was the National Industrial
Conference Board ("NICB"). In 1925, the NICB addressed the
problem in a volume compiling data on trade associations of that
year, but it did so in a manner that revealed further how powerful
was their assumption that arbitration occurred only between parties
who were both insiders to a type of business or commercial
community.395  The NICB distinguished two types of trade
associations for purposes of designing arbitration systems. It said
when a trade association contains persons or enterprises active in
successive stages in the process of fabricating and distributing a single
product or product group, it is a "relatively simple matter" to
establish and operate an arbitration system because "[t]he members
of these associations ... habitually deal with one another, and the
disagreements and disputes which arise are confined, in large
measure, to parties within the immediate and direct jurisdiction of
the trade organization. 3 96 But for trade associations representing
just one stage in the production or marketing process, such as one
representing only buyers or only sellers, the NICB stated that
arbitration is more complicated .3 1 Members of these single-stage
trade associations, which comprise the vast majority of trade
associations, do not normally deal with each other in the course of
commerce. Rather, the members of such associations usually have
commercial controversies with outsiders, "and the problem arises of
inducing parties beyond the direct jurisdiction of the association to
submit their claims to the judgment of a tribunal which functions
under the auspices of an organization representing their opponents in
interest. '
391
To solve this problem, the NICB recommended that trade
393. See NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, supra note 232, at 284.
394. See Phillips, supra note 286, at 426-28.
395. See NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, supra note 232, at 275-87.
396. Id. at 280.
397. See id at 283-84.
39& 1d
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associations of the latter type join with their counterparts in related
trades to establish joint arbitration boards.399 The NICB stated:
"Through the joint sponsorship of arbitration rules and machinery by
several such associations, an entirely healthy pressure can be exerted
on both sides of regular commercial transactions to adopt and abide
by covenants to arbitrate disputes . . . ."0 Thus, the NICB's solution
to the insider-outsider problem in arbitration was to expand the
definition of insiders from the boundaries of the trade association
proper to members of related industries who engage in regularized
and repeat transactions with one another. Arbitration before a joint
board, it said, "corresponds very closely to that prevailing in the case
of a trade association which, by the very scope of its organization,
encompasses persons and concerns engaged in various stages of the
producing and marketing process." 0' This type of joint board
arbitration, then, is nonetheless between members of a shared
commercial community, a community defined functionally by repeat
business interactions in the normal course of commerce. The joint
board arbitration, while technically between insiders and outsiders to
a specific trade association, would resolve disputes between entities
in a shared normative community occupying relatively comparable
positions within it. The NICB's proposal further assumed that the
joint board's arbitration rules would be fashioned from the joint
participation of the organizations of each party to the dispute-
organizations in which each party has an opportunity to help frame
policies and principles.4°0
As will be shown below, the interpretative history of the FAA in
its first sixty-five years embodied the NICB's conception of
arbitration as an institution reflective of and embedded in
membership in a shared normative community.
V. ARBITRATION AS SELF-REGULATION WITHIN A NORMATIVE
COMMUNITY
Part IV described how the FAA was enacted in response to the
commercial community's desire to strengthen the internal arbitration
systems of trade associations.40 3  The historical assumption that
399. See id.
400. I& at 283-84. The Conference Board gave examples of existing joint arbitration
boards in the shoe and boot industry, the motion picture industry, and the grocery trade.
See id. at 284-86.
401. Id. at 284.
402. See id. at 283-86.
403. See supra Part IV.C; see also Phillips, supra note 268, at 1261-62 (describing the
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arbitration would be used to resolve disputes between persons that
shared customs, usages, and norms in their mutual dealings casts light
on the courts' current approach to arbitration. The courts' expansive
interpretation of the FAA and their willingness to delegate the
adjudication of statutory rights to private arbitration may be
reasonable in the context of early twentieth century trade
associations, but it is problematic when transposed to disputes
between wholly unrelated individuals or individuals whose business
dealings are on an ad hoc, one-shot basis.
The recent doctrines that have expanded the scope of the FAA
are based on the image of the early twentieth century trade
association and exemplify a misapplication of the ancient guild ideal.
The guild ideal has a descriptive dimension and a prescriptive
dimension: As description, it claims that there are self-regulating
normative subcommunities that exist within our larger body politic;
as prescription, it advocates that law should permit these
communities a significant measure of autonomy from the rest of
society. By treating arbitration as a creation of normative
subcommunities, courts grant them wide discretion so that they can
perform a self-regulatory function.
We can thus understand the courts' facilitation of expansive uses
of arbitration as not only docket-clearing, but also as reflecting their
predisposition to grant autonomy to self-regulating organizations and
normative subcommunities within the larger society. Courts can
justify delegation of judicial authority on the basis of an implicit
assumption that arbitration provides a means for the creation,
expression, and affirmation of shared norms within subcommunities.
On this basis they not only delegate authority to the subcommunities,
they also approve the substantive justice produced by the application
of their customary norms.
By affirming self-regulation, courts accomplish two important
goals with one wave of the judicial wand: By granting a petition to
compel arbitration or transforming an arbitral award into a judgment,
they both affirm autonomy for normative communities and, at the
same time, alleviate docket-crowding. They achieve a simultaneous
blending of private gain and public good that Professor Frederico
Cheever has termed, in a different context, "private magic."4"
legislative intent of arbitration law-to encourage settlement amongst business people).
404. Federico Cheever, Public Good and Private Magic in the Law of Land Trusts and
Conservation Easements: A Happy Present and a Troubled Future, 73 DENv. U. L. REv.
1077, 1078 (1996) (portraying land trusts as "private magic" in the double sense of "magic"
as the production of an illusion "by the use of sleight of hand," and as a technique that
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One sees the guild ideal operating sub silentio in many of the
leading cases that have established the modem law of arbitration.
Many decisions explicitly or implicitly rely on the rationale that they
must defer to arbitration in order to support a system of self-
regulation.405 Many of the pivotal cases in the interpretation of the
FAA arose in two fields-the securities industry and collective
bargaining-both contexts in which jurists and participants have
expressly embraced the concept of self-regulation as their central
regulatory ideal. Below is a discussion of the role of self-regulation
in the development of arbitration in the securities industry and
collective bargaining.
A. Self-Regulation and Arbitration in the Securities Industry
1. Self-Regulation Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Since the nineteenth century, the major stock exchanges have
tenaciously asserted and jealously guarded their self-regulating
autonomy. In the early decades of the twentieth century, the New
York and Chicago Stock Exchanges refused to incorporate on the
ground that as voluntary associations they were not creatures of the
State. Rather, they claimed that they were like private clubs, entitled
to set their own rules of conduct and to select and discipline their
own members.06
In the 1910s and 1920s, many states moved to regulate the sale of
securities and to require registration and licensing of brokers,
dealers, and securities offered for sale.407  The industry's trade
association, the International Bankers Association ("IBA"),
responded with a campaign to exempt the stock exchanges from any
such regulation. The IBA successfully campaigned for uniform state
securities laws that would deter fraudulent practices but that would
also contain an exemption for securities listed on the New York and
Chicago Stock Exchanges.4 8 It also succeeded in 1930 in convincing
the ABA to approve a model corporation act that called for
registration of brokers, dealers, and nonexempt securities, but
attempts to "assure human control over supernatural agencies").
405. See infra notes 466-80 and accompanying text.
406. See Richard W. Jennings, Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry: The Role of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 663, 663 n.2
(1964).
407. See MICHAEL E. PARRISH, SECuRITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 5-7
(1970).
408. See id. at 23-24.
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exempted securities listed on the New York, Chicago, or any other
" 'recognized and responsible stock exchange.' "409 The stock
exchanges thus escaped regulation at both the federal and state
levels-a victory for the industry in its pursuit of self-regulation.
According to historian Michael Parrish, the consequence of the
model act was to
delegate[] enormous power and responsibility to private
institutions and voluntary associations.... [T]he extent to
which states abandoned formal regulatory powers to private
organizations was one more indication of the extravagant
confidence displayed during the decade [of the 1920s] by all
levels of government in the ability of private decision
making and self regulation to manage effectively vast areas
of the American economy.4"'
In 1929, as the IBA was extolling the virtues of self-regulation,
the stock market crashed. State legislatures turned against the IBA's
approach and revised their statutes to impose more regulations on
the industry and remove the exemptions for the exchanges.4a
However, President Hoover retained his philosophical commitment
to associationalism, minimal governmental intervention, and trade
association voluntarism.1 2 As the stock market continued its
downward slide from 1929 to 1931, Hoover ignored calls for national
securities regulation and instead exhorted the business community to
maintain wages and employment levels voluntarily.4 13 Democrats in
Congress, on the other hand, pressed for federal regulation of the
securities markets as the Great Depression deepened.4 4
The stock exchanges retained their private club status and
immunity from formal legal supervision until 1934.4' s The desperate
409. Id. at 23-26 (quoting ABA NATIONAL CONFERENCE, HANDBOOK AND
PROCEEDINGS 235-66 (1930)).
410. I& at 27.
411. See id. at 30.
412. See supra notes 357-88 and accompanying text (discussing Hoover's role in the
"associationalism" movement).
413. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 5-6
(rev. ed. 1995).
414. See id
415. See Jennings, supra note 406, at 667-69. For example, in Weidenfeld v. Keppler, 82
N.Y.S. 634 (App. Div. 1903), the New York Appellate Division refused to issue a writ of
mandamus to reinstate a member who claimed he was wrongfully suspended from the
New York Stock Exchange. See id at 638. The court held that because the Exchange had
neither a charter nor a franchise from the State its decisions over membership were
beyond the scope of governmental supervisory power. See id. at 635-37. "[T]he privilege
of membership in a voluntary association is derived exclusively from the body that
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nature of the times, however, produced change. The Democrats
gained control of the House of Representatives in the 1930 election
for the first time in twelve years.416 Once seated, they joined with
progressive Republicans and set to work on enacting securities
regulation and reform.4' The Senate Banking Committee initiated
hearings on the stock exchanges in 1932.418 These congressional
efforts ultimately resulted in the Securities and Banking Acts of
1933,419 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,420 and the creation of
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC").
42 1
The issue of self-regulation of the exchanges was debated
extensively in the passage of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.
412
The original bill would have imposed substantial direct regulation on
the exchanges-it would have set limits on loans from brokers to
investors, abolished floor traders, proscribed several types of market
manipulation, and given the Federal Trade Commission the power to
approve or disapprove exchange rules and regulations.423  After
several revisions and heated debate,424 the bill that was finally
enacted established the SEC and contained registration and
disclosure requirements for stock exchanges and firms issuing
securities. 425 The 1934 Act also gave the SEC authority to approve or
disapprove internal stock exchange rules.426 But instead of imposing
extensive regulation, the 1934 Act gave the existing twenty-one
exchanges control over disciplinary action of their own memberships
and delegated to them primary responsibility for enforcing the
Securities Exchange Act and Commission ("SEC") regulations.42
bestows it and may be conferred or withheld at its pleasure." Id. at 637 (citation omitted).
On some occasions, equity courts intervened in cases in which unincorporated labor
unions expelled members for failing to utilize fair procedures. See, e.g., Fales v.
Musicians' Protective Union, Local 198, 99 A. 823 (R.I. 1917).
416. See SELIGMAN, supra note 413, at 8.
417. See id. at 8-9.
418. See id. at 13.
419. See Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-
77aa (1994)); Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 32, 48 Stat. 194 (current version at 12 U.S.C.
§ 78 (1994)).
420. Act of June 6, 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811
(1994)).
421. See SELIGMAN, supra note 413, at 13.
422. See PARRISH, supra note 407, at 113-44.
423. See SELIGMAN, supra note 413, at 85-87.
424. See id. at 89-100.
425. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 4, § 6, § 13, 48 Stat. at 885-86, 894-
95.
426. See § 23(a), 48 Stat. at 901; SELIGMAN, supra note 413, at 99-100.
427. See § 28(b), 48 Stat. at 903; PARRISH, supra note 407, at 210; SELIGMAN, supra
note 413, at 100; Jennings, supra note 406, at 676; Richard L. Stone & Michael A. Perino,
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Thus, the 1934 Act affirmed the self-regulator role of the exchanges
and limited the SEC to an oversight role in internal matters.
428
In the early years, the SEC's leaders were deeply imbued with
the self-regulatory philosophy.429 Faced with the job. of regulating a
skeptical, if not hostile, industry, the SEC relied on self-regulation
and voluntarism to implement its goals43 William 0. Douglas, the
then-third Chairman of the SEC, who served from 1937 to 1939,
articulated and implemented a coherent framework for the
interpretation of the new and as yet unformed law. Douglas believed
that the SEC should affirm the self-regulation of the industry and
impose minimal external regulation.4 ' In 1936, Douglas told a
congressional committee:
"My philosophy was and is that the national securities
exchanges should be so organized as to bb able to take on
the job of policing their members so that it would be
unnecessary for the Government to interfere with that
business,.... Government would keep the shotgun, so to
speak, behind the door, loaded, well oiled, cleaned, ready
for use but with the hope it would never have to be used.
'432
Douglas explained his belief in self-regulation two years later, on
January 7, 1938, in a speech to the Hartford Bond Club: "From the
broad public viewpoint, such [self-]regulation can be far more
effective [than direct regulation].... Self-regulation ... can be
pervasive and subtle in its conditioning influence over business
practices and business morality. '433  Douglas continued, "[b]y and
Not Just A Private Club: Self Regulatory Organizations as State Actors When Enforcing
Federal Law, 1995 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 453,456-57.
428. See Jennings, supra note 406, at 670.
429. See PARRISH, supra note 407, at 181; Jennings, supra note 406, at 677.
430. See PARRISH, supra note 407, at 209.
431. As Joel Seligman writes, "[Douglas's] bel ideal was industry self-regulation under
the close supervision of a government agency." SELIGMAN, supra note 413, at 158.
Douglas's predecessor, James Landis, also adopted a self-regulation approach to
accounting practices in the early years of the SEC. Because both the 1933 and 1934
Securities Acts use disclosure as their primary mechanism for policing the industry, the
issue of proper accounting requirements and techniques assumed central importance. In
1938, Landis announced that he would permit registrants to rely on standards developed
by the accounting profession rather than impose its own. See PARRISH, supra note 407, at
207. It was an approach that reflected delegation to the industry to establish its own
regulatory norms. See id. at 207-08. A minority of the SEC commissioners disagreed with
this startling approach. See id. at 207. Within a year even Landis questioned the wisdom
of permitting the accounting profession's own professional association to determine the
shape and parameters of required disclosure. See id. at 208.
432- WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 82 (James Allen ed., 1940)
(quoting Douglas's address to a congressional committee).
433. Id. at 678.
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large, government cat operate satisfactorily only by proscription.
That leaves untouched large areas of conduct and activity ... [with]
some of it lying beyond the periphery of the law in the realm of ethics
and morality."4"
Douglas's leadership of the SEC followed from these principles.
For example, after the stock market collapse of 1937, Douglas
decided that complete reorganization of the New York Stock
Exchange's internal governance structure was necessary. He publicly
threatened that if the exchange did not put its own house in order, he
would use the powers of the SEC to engage in more direct
regulation. 35 In response, the New York Exchange undertook a self-
study and recommended sweeping changes in its methods of
operation.4 6  In May of 1938, the SEC approved these
recommendations, deferring to exchange rule-making and declining
to impose standards of conduct directly.
43 7
In addition to promoting self-regulation in the governance of the
New York Exchange, Douglas encouraged self-regulation in the
over-the-counter ("OTC") market.43  Unlike the organized
exchanges, it was difficult to conceptualize self-regulation of the OTC
market because there were over 6000 OTC dealers and brokers in the
country but no unified organizational structure.439  Douglas
approached the challenge by convening a conference of leading
members of the investment banking community and asking them to
devise a plan to encourage the OTC dealers to form voluntary
organizations.440 Out of these efforts came the Maloney Act, a
statute that permits associations of brokers and dealers to register
under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.441 Registered associations
are granted the benefits of self-regulation available to the stock
exchanges.442 Under the auspices of the Maloney Act, the National
Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") was established in
434. Id.
435. See Richard W. Jennings, Mr. Justice Douglas: His Influence on Corporate and
Securities Regulation, 73 YALE L.J. 920, 945 (1964).
436. See id.
437. See SELIGMAN, supra note 413, at 166-67. Seligman is critical of this result,
terming the SEC's 1938 deference to Exchange rule-making a "highly expensive
compromise." Id at 167.
438. See id. at 185.
439. See id.
440. See id. at 185-86.
441. See Maloney Act, ch. 677,52 Stat. 1070 (1938) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-
3 (1994)).
442. See § 1, 52 Stat. at 1070-75.
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1939.443 Chairman Douglas thus established a pattern of securities
regulation whereby the SEC relied on self-regulation of the industry
by encouraging participants to form organizations and by delegating
to the organized exchanges a significant role in standard setting,
oversight, policing, and disciplining violators-a pattern that his
successors have followed.44
Courts often rely on the history of self-regulation of the stock
exchanges to justify the broad deference and minimal oversight they
accord to internal rules and disciplinary proceedings of the securities
industry.445 In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,446 the Supreme
Court stated that the 1934 Act created a "federally mandated duty of
self-policing by exchanges."" 7 One component of this duty was "the
obligation to formulate rules governing the conduct of exchange
members.""'  Lower federal courts have therefore made the self-
regulation principle operative. For example, in Walck v. American
Stock Exchange, Inc.,449 the Third Circuit refused to imply a private
right of action for a claim that the stock exchange failed to enforce its
own rules on the grounds that Congress deliberately created "a
system of exchange 'self-regulation' subject to limited governmental
oversight.""45 It was improbable, continued the court, that Congress
"authorized by implication authority in the federal courts to
intervene in the self-regulatory system at the instance of an injured
investor.""45 Rather, the court stated, Congress chose self-regulation
not only because widespread government regulation would be
expensive and ineffective, but also because "'self regulation has
significant advantages in its own right.' "452
443. See 6 LOuis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 2794-95 (3d ed.
1990).
444. See PARRISH, supra note 407, at 184,216; SELIGMAN, supra note 413, at 349, 439.
445. See infra note 466 and accompanying text (listing cases).
446. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
447. Id- at 352.
448. i& at 353.
449. 687 F.2d 778 (3d Cir. 1982).
450. Id. at 785 (citing SUBCOMMrrrEE ON SECURITIES OF THE COMM. ON BANKING,
HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 93D CONG., SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY 137-43
(Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter SENATE STUDY]).
451. 1& at 786.
452- Id. (quoting SENATE STUDY, supra note 450, at 149). The court quoted William
0. Douglas's statement that self-regulation can establish and enforce" ' "ethical standards
beyond those any law can establish."' " Id (quoting SENATE STUDY, supra note 450, at
149 (quoting S. REP. No. 73-792, at 13 (1934))).
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2. A Brief History of Arbitration in the Securities Industry
Self-regulation in the securities industry takes the form of
delegation of governmental authority both to the exchanges' own
rule-making capacity and to their internal dispute-resolution
processes. The securities industry has one of the oldest arbitration
systems in the country, long pre-dating the 1934 Act or the 1933 Act
("Securities Acts") or the FAA. The New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE") has provided a mechanism for voluntary arbitration to
resolve disputes between stock exchange members since at least
1845 .4s  The NYSE Constitution of 1869 expanded the voluntary
arbitration system to permit nonmembers to use the arbitration
mechanism in disputes with members so long as the nonmembers
agreed to abide by the NYSE arbitration rules.4
The NASD established a system of arbitration in 1968 that
permitted nonmembers to arbitrate disputes with members if all
parties agreed.455 At that time, nonmembers were not required to
arbitrate disputes with members-the procedure was available to
them if they chose it.456 Also, nonmembers were only permitted to
arbitrate existing disputes; they could not commit themselves in
advance to arbitrate all disputes.457 In 1972, the NASD changed its
rules to make arbitration mandatory for NASD members if
customers sought to require members or associated persons to
arbitrate disputes.458 Customers were not, however, required to
utilize the arbitration system.459
By 1972, then, both the NYSE and the NASD required members
to arbitrate disputes with customers if the customer so requested, but
the customer had the choice of arbitrating or litigating her dispute in
court.4 ° In the next decade, arbitration for customers ceased to be
optional. In the early 1980s, some large securities firms began to
require that all customers agree to arbitrate all disputes.461 It has
453. See Norman S. Poser, Making Securities Arbitration Work, 50 SMU L. REV. 277,
280 (1996).
454. See id. at 281. The NYSE arbitration rules were revised in 1925 to provide a
standardized submission agreement that nonmembers were required to sign if they chose
to utilize the arbitration system. See id.
455. See id
456. See Deborah Masucci, Securities Arbitration-A Success Story: What Does the
Future Hold?, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 183, 185 (1996).
457. See Poser, supra note 453, at 281-82.
458. See Masucci, supra note 456, at 185.
459. See Poser, supra note 453, at 281-82.
460. See id
461. See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 215 (1985) (describing
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been suggested that the securities industry may have been the first
industry to include mandatory arbitration clauses in the printed
forms they gave to customers. 62
Despite the expansion of arbitration pursuant to the stock
exchanges' internal rules, until 1987, arbitration played only a limited
role in the exchanges. Wilko v. Swan463 served as a barrier to the
arbitration of disputes that involved alleged violations of the
Securities Acts.46 Over time, however, courts found ways to limit the
reach of Wilko and subject more and more securities industry
disputes to arbitration. For example, some courts enforced
agreements to arbitrate securities law violations in disputes between
two members of an exchange by reasoning that § 28(b) of the 1934
Act, which made arbitration binding for disputes between an
exchange and its members, overrode the anti-waiver provision of the
1934 Act.465
In their quest to limit the effect of Wilko, courts often cited the
self-regulatory nature of the stock exchanges as justification for
expanding the scope of securities arbitration.466 For example, in
Axelrod & Co. v. Kordich, Victor & Neufeld,467 the Second Circuit
cited the industry's self-regulation as the rationale for holding that a
nonmember could compel a member of an exchange to arbitrate an
allegation of fraud in violation of the Securities Acts.468 In doing so,
the court distinguished Wilko on the grounds that the legislative
policy of protecting investors, which served as the basis of Wilko, was
the arbitration clause in the Customer's Agreement that the plaintiff signed when he first
invested his funds with Dean Witter in 1981).
462. See Poser, supra note 230, at 1097.
463. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
464. See Dean Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. at 215-16 n.1 (assuming that Wilko applied to
the 1934 Act); see also supra notes 92-96, 140-41 (discussing Wilko).
465. See, e.g., Tullis v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 551 F.2d 632, 635-36 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding
that Wilko does not bar arbitration of disputes between members of an exchange); see also
Axelrod & Co. v. Kordich, Victor & Neufeld, 451 F.2d 838, 841-42 (2d Cir. 1971) (limiting
Wilko to cases in which it is the customer, not the exchange member, resisting arbitration).
466. See, e.g., Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348, 359-60 (2d Cir. 1978); Tullis, 551 F.2d at
638; Muh v. Neuburger, Loeb & Co., 540 F.2d 970, 972-73 (9th Cir. 1976); Coenen v. R.W.
Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209, 1214 (2d Cir. 1972); Axelrod, 451 F.2d at 840-41; Lehman
Bros. v. Certified Reporting Co., 939 F. Supp. 1333, 1337 (N.D. Ill. 1996); S.G. Marx &
Assocs. v. Philadelphia Stock Exch., Civ. A. No. 92-620, 1992 WL 174701, at *4 (E.D. Pa.
July 20, 1992); Bender v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & -Co., 789 F. Supp. 155, 158
(D.N.J. 1992); N. Donald & Co. v. American United Energy Corp., 585 F. Supp. 533, 535-
36 (D. Colo. 1984); Pelzman v. Paine, Webber, Jackson, & Curtis, Inc., No. 82-1322, 1983
WL 1338, at *3 (D.D.C. July 12,1983).
467. 451 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1971).
468. See id. at 840-41.
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not operative in this case.469  Rather, the court said, when a
nonmember sought to compel arbitration and a member of the
exchange was seeking to avoid arbitration, there was no reason to
refuse to order arbitration.47
Similarly, in Tullis v. Kohlmeyer & Co.,471 the Fifth Circuit used
the self-regulatory nature of the industry to limit the reach of Wilko.
In holding that partners in a securities firm must arbitrate their
dispute with the firm, the court stated that Wilko only barred
mandatory arbitration of customer-exchange member disputes, not
disputes between exchange members.472 It explained its result as
follows: "Congress clearly intended to preserve for the stock
exchanges a major self-regulatory role. This policy ... would be
weakened significantly if the arbitration which the exchange deems
desirable could be avoided at the will of any party claiming a
securities law violation."473
In Muh v. Newburger, Loeb & Co., 474 the Ninth Circuit relied on
the self-regulatory nature of stock exchanges to hold that parties
were required to arbitrate a dispute that had arisen after both parties
had terminated their membership in the stock exchange.475 "It would
seem strange indeed," the court noted, "that with such a significant
integrated method of dispute settlement one party could frustrate the
purpose of the Exchange rules and the federal policy favoring
arbitration by the mere expediency of resignation from the
Exchange."476
In 1972, in Rust v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.,477 a banking firm
employee sought to avoid arbitrating his dispute over commissions
with his employer by contending that the stock exchange arbitration
provision was adhesive and that he had agreed to it under duress.
47 8
Judge Weinfeld dismissed these arguments without much discussion
because "the rule requiring employer and employee to submit their
differences to arbitration comes within the self-regulatory power
vested in the Exchange. '"479 In Rust, Weinfeld, offered a thoughtful
469. See id. at 842-43.
470. See idU
471. 551 F.2d 632 (5th Cir. 1977).
472. See id. at 638.
473. Id (citation omitted).
474. 540 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1976).
475. See id. at 972-73.
476. Id at 973.
477. 352 F. Supp. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
478. See id. at 716-17.
479. Id at 717.
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explanation of why courts grant broad discretion to securities
industry arbitration proceedings. Weinfeld wrote:
The Exchange, in its self-regulatory role has a legitimate
interest in deciding how disputes between its members and
their employees are to be resolved; it has a legitimate
interest in fostering harmonious relations among the varied
groups whose daily activities play a role in the complex
operations of the Exchange. Considering that interest, it is
not unreasonable to require those engaged in such
operations to resolve their disputes, which ofttimes may
center about practices peculiar to the Exchange, through
prompt and economic arbitration rather than by drawn out
litigation before judges of fact who may be without
experience in the trade practices and customs.480
3. Overcoming the Constraint of Wilko
Despite the courts' faith in the self-regulation of the securities
industry arbitration system, there was growing public criticism of the
industry in the 1960s and 1970s for its failure to enforce exchange
rules and its inadequate provisions for due process.48' In the 1970s,
the SEC published a series of studies that concluded that self-
regulation was not working.' In 1975, in response, Congress
amended the statute to impose additional procedural protections into
the self-regulating organization's ("SRO") arbitration procedures. 3
The 1975 amendments increased SEC authority over the SROs by
requiring SEC approval for all new SRO rules and giving the SEC
480. Id. at 718.
481. See, e.g., Lewis D. Lowenfels, A Lack of Fair Procedures in the Administrative
Process: Disciplinary Proceedings at the Stock Exchanges and the NASD, 64 CORNELL L.
REV. 375, 376-92 (1979) (criticizing securities industry arbitrations for numerous due
process inadequacies); Sam Scott Miller, Self-Regulation of the Securities Markets: A
Critical Examination, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 853, 884-87 (1985) (urging closer
governmental monitoring of self-regulating organizations (SROs)). But see Norman S.
Poser, Reply to Lowenfels, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 402, 414 (1979) (disputing Lowenfels's
critique of securities industry arbitrations). See generally Stone & Perino, supra note 427,
at 460-61 (claiming that by the mid-1980s it was clear that the self-regulatory framework of
the SROs was inadequate).
482. See Securities and Exch. Comm'n Report of Special Study of Securities Markets,
H.R. Doc. NO. 88-95, pt. 4, at 501-739 (1964); see also Susan K. Foster, Note, Financial
Planning: Is It Time for a Self-Regulatory Organization?, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 143, 176-79
(discussing criticisms of the operation of SROs). See generally SELIGMAN, supra note 413,
at 440 (stating that under "the Nixon-Ford presidential administration, deficiencies in
several aspects of industrial self-regulation had become glaringly apparent").
483. See Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 4, 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. (89 Stat.) 97, 108 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78f(d)(2) (1994)); Stone &
Perino, supra note 427, at 460-61.
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power to add to or delete existing SRO rules.4m Thus, the 1975
amendments to the statute threatened to impose greater
governmental controls on the industry's arbitration procedures. The
industry successfully resisted the trends toward greater regulation,
however, and in fact acquired greater self-regulatory power as a
result of the Supreme Court's rulings in the 1980s.
In 1987, in Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon,8 the
Supreme Court addressed the impact of the 1975 amendments on the
self-regulatory role of the exchanges.486 The Court held that a suit
brought by a customer against a broker alleging, inter alia, violations
of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act and civil RICO violations, was
subject to a mandatory predispute arbitration agreement.48  The
plaintiff argued that the legislative history of the 1975 amendments
demonstrated that Congress intended to retain the pre-existing legal
rulings, including the ruling in Wilko, which the Committee Reports
explicitly mentioned.48 Justice O'Connor responded by stating that
Congress must have meant to retain not only the Court's ruling in
Wilko, but also the cases that had limited Wilko's reach.489 In
justifying the holding that that disputes alleging violations of the 1934
Securities Exchange Act are arbitrable, Justice O'Connor stated that
when Congress enacted the 1934 Act, it wanted to support the self-
regulatory role of stock exchanges. 40 From this fact, she concluded
that it was appropriate to delegate to the exchanges authority to hear
and decide cases alleging statutory violations. 49 1  Thus, Justice
O'Connor interpreted the 1975 amendments to the 1934 Act, which
imposed additional oversight over the self-regulatory aspects of the
stock exchange, as evidence that Congress intended to strengthen the
autonomy of the exchanges as SROs.491 Two years later, in
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,4 the Court
explicitly overruled Wilko.
494
As a result of McMahon and Rodriguez de Quijas, securities
484. See § 16,1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. (89 Stat.) at 147-48, 150 (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78s(b)-(c) (1994)). See generally Stone & Perino, supra note 427, at 461-63 (discussing
the Securities Act Amendments of 1975).
485. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
486. See supra notes 116-23 (discussing McMahon).
487. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238,242.
488. See id. at 236-37.
489. See id. at 237.
490. See id. at 235.
491. See id. at 234-35.
492. See id. at 233-35.
493. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
494. See, e.g., id. at 485.
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firms now require customers, employees, and others with whom they
do business to use the industry's arbitration system for all types of
disputes, whether the dispute is between members or between
members and nonmembers, and whether the alleged wrongdoing was
a contractual issue or a statutory one. Although investors often
attempt to resist arbitration,495 courts routinely enforce. predispute
agreements to arbitrate.496 Thus, courts give securities industry
arbitrations autonomy and deference in furtherance of the ideal of
self-regulation.
The effects of McMahon and Rodriguez de Quijas have extended
far beyond the securities industry, establishing the arbitrability of
statutory disputes of all sorts. The subsequent cases of Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,497 holding that
antitrust act claims are amenable to arbitration,4 98 and Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,499 holding that claims under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act are arbitrable, 00 rely upon the
reasoning of these earlier securities industry cases. For example, the
Gilmer majority referred to its opinion in Mitsubishi to support its
conclusion that arbitration was adequate to protect the plaintiff's
substantive rights,5"' and it relied on the Rodriguez de Quijas and
McMahon opinions to reject the plaintiff's argument that the
arbitration agreement should not be enforced because of the unequal
bargaining power.5
2
One could distinguish securities industry arbitration cases from
other types of cases involving arbitration of statutory claims on the
ground that under the Securities Acts, there is a possibility of SEC
oversight of the SROs and their arbitration tribunals, a possibility
that does not exist when violations of other statutory rights are
alleged. Thus, one could argue, deference to arbitration is justifiable
in the securities context because there is governmental input into the
495. See, e.g., Deborah Lobse, NASD Rule for Damages Is Criticized, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 3, 1997, at Cl (describing the controversy over a proposal by the NASD to cap
arbitration awards for investors).
496. See supra notes 592.
497. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
498. See id at 640; see also supra notes 102-15 (discussing Mitsubishi).
499. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
500. See id. at 35; see also supra notes 126-35 (discussing Gilmer).
501. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628).
502. See id at 33. The Gilmer Court stated: "Relationships between securities dealers
and investors ... may involve unequal bargaining power, but we nevertheless held in
Rodriguez de Quijas and McMahon that agreements to arbitrate in that context are
enforceable." Id (citing Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,
484 (1989); Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,230 (1987)).
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arbitration procedures, whereas in the context of arbitrations wholly
within the private sector, such as employment discrimination
allegations or private antitrust allegations, less delegation is
appropriate and more judicial oversight is required. Until now,
courts have not made this distinction, but have instead readily
expanded the McMahon rationale to settings in which there is no
governmental oversight of the arbitration process. 03
B. Self-Regulation Under Collective Bargaining
The other area of law that has had a powerful influence on the
development of FAA doctrine is labor law and collective bargaining.
Labor cases are cited extensively in FAA cases as precedent for
delegating enforcement of legal rights to arbitration and restricting
the scope of judicial review.5 4 Indeed, many of the cases interpreting
the FAA in the 1980s and 1990s relied on cases interpreting the
National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") 5 5 in the 1960s.6
In labor law, as in securities regulation, self-regulation has been
a central theme in the interpretation and implementation of the
statutory scheme. In both areas, courts have relied on the capability
of the regulated entity to self-regulate to justify granting considerable
autonomy to private arbitration. Further, both the NLRA and the
Securities Exchange Act were enacted in the 1930s, and both rely on
governmental agencies for their implementation. In each case, the
agency has delegated its authority to pre-existing private
organizations that have long had internal governance structures,
including private dispute resolution mechanisms.
Self-regulation in labor relations is a particular conception of
collective bargaining. In the United States, formalized collective
bargaining between large powerful unions and large employer
associations dates back to the late nineteenth century.0 7 While
collective bargaining has often been described as industrial
democracy, it was not until the post World War II era that the
503. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 136, at 1033 n.120 (citing cases in which courts compel
parties to arbitrate employment-related claims).
504. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
626 (1985) (referring to the presumption of arbitrability in Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960)).
505. Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(1994)).
506. See infra notes 537-39 and accompanying text.
507. See John R. Commons, Industrial Relations, in TRADE UNIONISM AND LABOR




concept of collective bargaining as joint self-regulation by labor and
management developed. A key element in the move to
reconceptualize collective bargaining as labor-management self-
regulation was the rise of labor arbitration.0 8
1. A Brief History of Arbitration in Labor Relations
Today arbitration and collective bargaining are assumed to be
coterminous, if not synonymous, institutions. It is usually assumed
that all collective agreements contain arbitration procedures and that
all disputes arising under the agreements are subject to arbitration.
However, from the late nineteenth century until the 1930s, the
enforcement of collective bargaining agreements was a problematic
undertaking. Courts would not permit unions to sue to enforce them
because unions were unincorporated associations.50 9 An individual
worker could only enforce a collective bargaining agreement if the
worker could show that the union acted as his agent in negotiating
the contract, or if the contract represented a custom or usage that he
knew of and acceded to when he accepted employment.510 These
were difficult tests to satisfy, and as a result, enforcement of
collective bargaining agreements was generally left to the vicissitudes
of moral suasion and parties' economic power.' Beginning in the
1920s, a few state courts permitted workers or unions to enforce
collective bargaining agreements as ordinary contracts, and thus to
sue for their breach, but those states were in the minority.5 2
In light of the difficulties of enforcing collective agreements,
some unions turned to grievance arbitration-arbitration of disputes
concerning the interpretation and enforcement of a collective
bargaining agreement-as a means of enforcing collective
508. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension
Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59
U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 622-24 (1992) [hereinafter Stone, Industrial Pluralism]; Katherine
Van Wezel Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509,
1523-25 (1981) [hereinafter Stone, The Post-War Paradigm].
509. See Stone, The Post-War Paradigm, supra note 508, at 1518 & n.34.
510. See CHRISTOPHER L. ToMLINs, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR
RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960,
at 83 (1985).
511. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rethinking Voluntarism: Labor and the State in
the Progressive Era (unpublished manuscript, on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
512. See, e.g., Goldman v. Cohen, 227 N.Y.S. 311, 313-15 (App. Div. 1928); Schlesinger
v. Quinto, 194 N.Y.S. 401, 407-11 (App. Div. 1922). See generally Stone, The Post-War
Paradigm, supra note 508, at 1519-21 (discussing cases in which courts enforced rights in
collective bargaining agreements).
1999] 1009
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
agreements. Grievance arbitration was introduced into American
labor relations in the 1910s and 1920s in the garment industries," 3 but
it was slow to spread to other industries.14 In part this delay
occurred because arbitration did not guarantee unions a means to
enforce collective agreements or remedy employer breaches. As with
commercial arbitration, parties to labor management arbitration
agreements could easily avoid them, given the historical
disinclination of common law courts to enforce executory agreements
to arbitrate. 15 Moreover, unions were wary of empowering outsiders
to decide disputes about the meaning of their contracts. 6
During World War II, the attitude of courts and unions toward
grievance arbitration began to change. The War Labor Board
("WLB"), intent on maintaining labor peace to ensure stable wartime
production, saw arbitration as a method of resolving disputes without
strikes and thus made arbitration the preferred method for resolving
workplace disputes. The WLB encouraged parties to include
arbitration clauses in their collective bargaining agreements and
accorded arbitration awards substantial deference.518 After the war,
many of the same officials who had staffed the WLB became
professional labor arbitrators who encouraged widespread use of
arbitration- as the natural outgrowth of a collective bargaining
relationship. 1 9
In 1947, Congress enacted section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act ("LMRA"), 5 0 which stated: "Suits for violation of
contracts between an employer and a labor organization ... may be
brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction
of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or
without regard to the citizenship of the parties. ' 52 ' On its face, this
provision gave federal courts jurisdiction to hear and decide labor
513. See COHEN, supra note 292, at 61; Win. M. Leiserson, Constitutional Government
in American Industries, 12 AM. ECON. REV. 56,58 (Supp. 1922).
514. See Stone, The Post-War Paradigm, supra note 508, at 1514 n.24.
515. See Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982 (2d Cir.
1942); see also Cohen & Dayton, supra note 41, at 265 (noting that arbitration agreements
were historically "revocable at will").
516. See, e.g., SAMUEL GOMPERS, 2 SEVENTY YEARS OF LIFE AND LABOR 26 (1925)
(expressing his opposition to "submitting determination of industrial policies to courts").
517. See JAMES B. ATLESON, LABOR AND THE WARTIME STATE: LABOR RELATIONS
AND LAW DURING WORLD WAR 1160-65 (1998).
518. See id.
519. See id. at 56-58.
520. Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A.
§§ 141-187 (1998)).
521. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1994).
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disputes. But a number of labor law scholars and practitioners urged
the courts to interpret section 301 in a manner that respected the
emerging role of arbitration in resolving contractual disputes."n
In 1957, Justice Douglas declared the national labor policy to be
the promotion of private arbitration to resolve disputes concerning
the enforcement and interpretation of collective bargaining
agreements. In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,5 23 he
interpreted section 301 as a directive to the federal courts to develop
a federal common law of collective bargaining, the centerpiece of
which was support for and deference to private arbitration.52 4 Since
Lincoln Mills, courts have made private arbitration the central
feature of our collective bargaining system5
In 1960, in three cases known as the Steelworkers' Trilogy, the
Supreme Court adopted a set of legal doctrines that have created a
privileged role for arbitration within our collective bargaining system.
First, in United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing
Co. )526 the Court held that courts should grant specific enforcement of
promises to arbitrate without regard to the merits of the underlying
dispute.527  Thus it ruled that parties who agree to arbitration
provisions can be required to arbitrate meritless, even frivolous,
claims.52  Second, in United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co. ,29 the Court held that agreements to arbitrate were
not only judicially enforceable but were enforceable on the basis of a
presumption of arbitrability. 530 And finally, in United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,531 the Court held that courts should
enforce arbitral awards without reviewing the merits of the award. 32
It stated that an arbitral award should be enforced so long as "it
522- See, e.g., Archibald Cox, Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration,
30 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 247, 265 (1958); Archibald Cox, Reflections Upon Labor
Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1512 (1959); Archibald Cox, The Legal Nature of
Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 MICH. L. REv. 1, 36 (1958); Harry Shulman, Reason,
Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999, 1023-24 (1955).
523. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
524. See id. at 451.
525. See, e.g., United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29,36-37 (1987)
(noting the preference for private arbitration in labor disputes); Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 252 (1970) (noting the integral role arbitration
plays in collective bargaining).
526. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
527. See id. at 569.
528. See id. at 568.
529. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
530. See id. at 585.
531. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
532. See id. at 599.
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draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. ' 33
Furthermore, the Court stated that arbitrators have no obligation to
write opinions or to give reasons for their awards.5m Therefore, if an
award could plausibly have drawn its essence from the agreement, it
must be enforced. 35 The Enterprise Court's formulation of the
arbitrator's obligations creates what might be termed a "presumption
of arbitrator regularity"-a presumption that the arbitrator acted
within the scope of his authority and that the award drew its essence
from the collective agreement. The de facto presumption of
arbitrator regularity from the Enterprise case parallels the
presumption of arbitrability adopted in the Warrior & Gulf case. 36
Together, the two presumptions make labor arbitration almost
impossible to avoid and render arbitral awards practically immune
from attack.
At the same time that the courts expanded the scope and
autonomy of labor arbitration, the National Labor Relations Board
(the "Board") did so as well. It adopted a policy of deferring to
private arbitration to resolve disputes that implicated both statutory
and contractual issues. 37 In 1964, the Supreme Court upheld the
Board's deferral policies, holding that it was appropriate for the
Board to give deference to arbitration over judicial or administrative
mechanisms for resolving the disputes because arbitration had a
"pervasive, curative effect. ' 531
These cases established well-known doctrines in U.S. labor law.
Together, they make private arbitration the central and distinctive
feature of our collective bargaining system. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has since indicated on more than one occasion that arbitration
lies at the heart of the system of collective bargaining established by
the NLRA.
539
533. Id. at 597.
534. See idt at 598.
535. See idt at 599.
536. See United Steel Workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83
(1960).
537. See Collyer Insulated Wire Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 839 (1971); Dubo Mfg. Corp.,
142 N.L.R.B. 431, 433 (1963); Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955).
538. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261,272 (1964).
539. See, eg., Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 241
(1970); see also Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 204 (1991) (holding that
"'the arbitration duty is a creature of the collective-bargaining agreement'" (quoting
Nolde Bros. v. Bakery Workers, 430 U.S. 243, 250-51 (1977))); United Paperworkers Int'l
Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987) ("[I]t must be remembered that grievance and




2. Justice Douglas and Labor Arbitration as Self-Regulation
The Supreme Court decisions that established the central role of
arbitration in the labor context were, ironically, but coincidentally,
written by Justice William 0. Douglas. 40 Douglas wrote the opinions
in Lincoln Mills, the Steelworkers' Trilogy, and Carey v.
Westinghouse,54 which together mandated that the courts and the
NLRB defer to private arbitration and refrain from engaging in
judicial review of arbitral awards. Revisiting his views of the role of
self-regulation in the securities exchanges that he implemented when
he was chairman of the SEC in the 1930s, Justice Douglas justified
the deference to labor arbitration on the ground that the unionized
workplace was self-regulating. He described labor-management
relations in the workplace as a microcosmic democracy and collective
bargaining as an exercise in "industrial self-government."542 As he
noted: "The collective bargaining agreement ... is more than a
contract; it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which
the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate." 543  He continued, "[t]he
collective agreement covers the whole employment relationship. It
calls into being a new common law-the common law of a particular
industry or of a particular plant.... A collective bargaining
agreement is an effort to erect a system of industrial self-
government."'54
Douglas concluded that in the unionized workplace, as in the
securities exchanges, courts should support the self-regulatory
540. Douglas was not alone in characterizing the unionized workplace as industrial
self-government. In the years after World War II, a group of labor relations scholars,
including Dean Harry Shulman of Yale Law School and Archibald Cox of Harvard used
the same metaphor to argue for a particular interpretation of the labor laws. A central
aspect of the self-regulatory ideal, and the mini-democracy metaphor they employed, was
the central role of arbitration. See Archibald Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1 (1947); Harry Shulman, Reason,
Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999, 1002-03 (1955). See
generally Stone, The Post-War Paradigm, supra note 508, at 1514-15 (summarizing the
industrial pluralist view that the collective-bargaining process between labor and
management is seen as a mini-democracy).
541. 375 U.S. 261 (1964).
542. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960).
In this view, management and labor are like political parties in a representative
democracy-each represents its own constituency and, as in a legislature, engages in
debate and compromise. Thus, management and labor together determine wages and
working conditions through a legislative-type process. These rules are embodied in the
collective bargaining agreement, which the industrial pluralist metaphor calls a statute or a
constitution. See Cox, supra note 540, at 1.
543. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 578.
544. Id. at 578-80.
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aspects of the community and permit its internal arbitration system
to adjudicate disputes. As he commented: "[T]he grievance
machinery under a collective bargaining agreement is at the very
heart of the system of industrial self-government. Arbitration is the
means of solving the unforeseeable by molding a system of private
law for all the problems which may arise. ... "545
Douglas's reasoning in the labor decisions interpreting § 301 of
the LMRA has been used extensively as authority for expanding the
reach of arbitration under the FAA. For example, the presumption
of arbitrability that the Supreme Court announced for the FAA in
Moses Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Co.546 in
1983 is phrased in terms almost identical to the language the Court
used twenty years earlier in Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.
5 47
Similarly, courts have hoisted other arbitration doctrines from the
labor context and applied them to arbitration under the FAA. For
example, Nolde Bros. v. Local No. 358, Bakery Workers,548 a § 301
case in which the Court applied an arbitration clause to a dispute that
arose after the collective bargaining agreement containing the
arbitration clause had expired, has been used as authority to extend
arbitration clauses beyond their expiration dates in nonlabor
settings.5
49
545. Id. at 581.
546. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
547. See Jonathan R. Nelson, Judge-Made Law and the Presumption of Arbitrability:
David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 58 BROOK. L. REv. 279, 303 (1992)
(noting that the Court transplanted the presumption of arbitrablity from Warrior & Gulf
to Moses H. Cone and arguing that there was neither federal labor policy nor international
commercial considerations to justify such a fundamental transformation in arbitration
jurisprudence); see also Moses Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24-25 (holding that "any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues [under collective bargaining agreements]
should be resolved in favor of arbitration."); Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at
582-83 ("An order to arbitrate... should not be denied unless it may be said with positive
assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the
asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage." (emphasis added)).
548. 430 U.S. 243 (1977).
549. See, e.g., First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942-44 (1995)
(conflating § 301 cases and FAA cases concerning arbitration); Mastrobuono v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 56-58 (1995) (same); Sweet Dreams Unlimited, Inc. v.
Dial-A-Mattress Int'l, Ltd., 1 F.3d 639, 643 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying reasoning of Nolde
Bros., a § 301 case concerning the applicability of arbitration after a collective agreement
has expired, to an FAA case).
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VI. SELF-REGULATION AS A TEMPLATE FOR INTERPRETING THE
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
In the last ten years courts have extended their desire to
promote self-regulation to many areas of life, areas that go far
beyond securities regulation and labor law. Self-regulation has
formed a template that informs many of the courts' recent expansive
interpretations of the FAA. The template of self-regulation has led
courts to expand the scope of arbitration in contexts that bear little
resemblance to the self-regulating communities on which the
template is based. To illustrate, two controversial areas of arbitration
law-arbitral bias and consent to arbitrate contained in incorporated
terms-are discussed below.
A. Arbitral Bias
The self-regulation template has informed the development of
the law regarding when a court may vacate an arbitral award on the
basis of arbitral bias. One of the four statutory grounds for which a
court may vacate an arbitrator's decision under the FAA is "[w]here
there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators." 550 In
1968, in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty
Co. 551 Justice Hugo Black interpreted the "partiality or corruption"
provision to require that an arbitral award be vacated when a
member of an arbitration panel had previous business dealings with
one of the parties.552 While no actual bias or partiality was shown in
that case, Justice Black stated that there existed the possibility of bias
and that the possibility was sufficient to justify vacating the award. 53
He reasoned that it was more important for arbitrators than judges to
be impartial because arbitrators have free rein in deciding cases
without the prospect of judicial review.554
In the 1980s, Justice Black's approach to the issue of arbitral bias
in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. was eviscerated in the lower
550. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (1994); see also supra note 139 (listing the four statutory
grounds for vacating arbitral awards).
551. 393 U.S. 145 (1968) (plurality opinion).
552. See id. at 147-50 (plurality opinion).
553. See id at 147-49 (plurality opinion).
554. See id. at 148-50 (plurality opinion). Justice Byron White concurred, but did not
agree to the strict test that Black advocated. See id at 150 (White, J., concurring). Justice
Abe Fortas dissented, arguing that actual bias should be shown before an award is
vacated. See id at 153-54 (Fortas, J., dissenting). There is a tragic irony here, because
Fortas was forced to resign from the Court in 1969 in a controversy over the appearance of
a conflict of interest in prior business dealings. See LAURA.KALMAN, ABE FORTAs: A
BIOGRAPHY 359-78 (1990).
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courts.55  In 1983, Judge Posner held that a prior business
relationship was no reason to vacate an arbitral award. 6  He
explained, "[t]here is a tradeoff between impartiality and expertise.
The expert adjudicator is more likely than a judge or juror not only to
be precommitted to a particular substantive position but to know or
have heard of the parties." 557 Posner observed that parties select
arbitrators for their expertise, and thus that same expertise should
not be used to vacate an award.58 If parties want impartiality, they
can have an Article III judge;55 9 if they choose arbitration, it can be
assumed that they want expertise in the industry.
5 60
Posner's reasoning has carried the day.5 61 No longer are prior
business dealings considered a negative factor on an arbitral panel-
such professional relationships are now considered acceptable and
even desirable features of arbitration. For example, in Morris v.
Metriyakool,562 the Supreme Court of Michigan upheld an arbitral
award by a medical malpractice panel made up of a doctor, a
representative of a hospital, and a representative of an insurance
company.5 63 The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the
panel members' pecuniary interest in keeping malpractice rates low
would predispose them to oppose the plaintiff's claim."6 The court
stated that the panel members did not have a "direct pecuniary
interest" in the outcome of the case, so there were no grounds to
vacate the award. 65 Rather, it determined that physicians and
hospital administrators had shared interests with patients in the
555. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Murphy, Note, Standards of Arbitrator Impartiality: How
Impartial Must They Be? Lifecare International, Inc. v. CD Medical, Inc., 1996 J. DISp.
RESOL. 463, 470. Because Black's opinion was a plurality that required Justice White's
concurring vote to establish a majority, state and federal courts have followed White's
view that they should apply a lower standard of impartiality to arbitrators than they do to
judges. See, e.g., Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 681-82 (7th Cir. 1983)
(rejecting Justice Black's "potential bias" test); International Produce, Inc. v. A/S
Rosshavet, 638 F.2d 548, 551 (2d Cir. 1981) (same).
556. See Merit Ins. Co., 714 F.2d at 680.
557. Id. at 679.
558. See id.
559. See id
560. See id. ("The parties to an arbitration chose their method of dispute resolution,
and can ask no more impartiality than inheres in the method they have chosen." (citing
American Almond Prods. Co. v. Consolidated Pecan Sales Co., 144 F.2d 448, 451 (2d Cir.
1944))).
561. See Murphy, supra note 555, at 474 (observing that courts view impartiality issues
as choices parties make in a tradeoff between expertise and impartiality).
562. 344 N.W.2d 736 (Mich. 1984).
563. See id at 743.
564. See id. at 741.
565. Id. at 740.
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treating of illness. 66 It commented: "Neither physicians nor hospital
administrators have professional interests that are adverse to patients
or even malpractice claimants on a consistent, daily basis.
567
Courts have used similar reasoning to justify upholding the
arbitral awards of industry panels in a variety of contexts.5 68 Their
reasoning relies on the notion that arbitrations are a part of a
community in which the arbitrators, like the elders in the craft guilds
of old, embody and apply community norms that are shared by both
sides to the dispute. In this role, the arbitrators' prior dealings in the
trade and with the parties is a positive attribute-these dealings
establish their expertise as well as their stature in the field. Instead
of being a ground for disqualification, expertise is a sine qua non for
qualification as decision-maker. Under this view of arbitration,
Posner is clearly correct that expertise should not be a reason for
disqualifying or a reason to vacate an arbitral award.
Current uses of arbitration, however, are a far cry from the craft
guild model. For example, even though doctors, patients, and
hospital administrators all share a common involvement in health
care, it defies reason to view them as participating as co-equal
members in a shared community. If one sees arbitration not as a
feature of shared normative communities but rather as a proceeding
devised by insiders to be imposed on outsiders, the prospect of prior
business dealings causing arbitral bias is a real and troublesome
problem. If one abandons the guild model and begins with the
current contexts for arbitration, then Justice Black's position that
standards of arbitral impartiality must be more stringent than
standards imposed on judges is clearly correct.
B. Consent When Arbitration Is Incorporated by Reference
Another area of arbitration law in which courts are guided by a
desire to support self-regulating communities is when arbitration is
incorporated by reference rather than appearing among the contract
terms. Contracts frequently state that they incorporate the rules of a
given trade association without mentioning that an arbitration
procedure is one component of the rules. It is well established that
566. See id. at 741.
567. Id.
568. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Cargill, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 465, 473-74 (N.D. Iowa 1997)
(upholding arbitration in a dispute between a farmer and a grain mill distributor when the
arbitration panel was comprised of grain distribution executives); Sims v. Siegelson, 668
N.Y.S.2d 20,22-23 (App. Div. 1998) (upholding an award issued by the Diamond Dealers
Club arbitration panel making a father responsible for debts of his son).
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parties are responsible for the contracts they sign, even if they have
not read them.569 This "duty to read" means, inter alia, that courts
hold parties to terms that they have incorporated by reference into
their contracts, even if the party seeking to avoid the incorporated
term had no knowledge of these terms at the time the contract was
made.51 0
A competing principle of contract law exists, however, that says
that a party is not bound by a contractual term of which he was
unaware and which he had no reason to suspect was in the
agreement.571 For example, the Rhode Island Supreme Court stated:
"A person is not bound by the terms of a written agreement if he had
no knowledge of its terms because the manner in which they are
embodied in the instrument would not lead a reasonable person to
suspect that the terms are part of the contract."572 This principle is
also found in section 211 of the Second Restatement of Contracts,
which states:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (3), where a party to
an agreement signs or otherwise manifests assent to a
writing ... he adopts the writing as an integrated agreement
with respect to the terms included in the writing.
(3) Where the other party has reason to believe that
the party manifesting such assent would not do so if he
knew that the writing contained a particular term, the term
is not part of the agreement.573
One application of the no-enforcement-of-unexpected-terms
principle is that courts can scrutinize contracts and invalidate terms if
the terms are oppressive and not within a party's reasonable
expectation, that is, not within the range of terms the offeree could
reasonably expect to find in the contract.574 The same principle
569. See John D. Calamari, Duty to Read-A Changing Concept, 43 FORDHAM L. REV.
341,341 (1974).
570. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 22, § 9-42, at 410.
571. See id § 9-44; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1981)
(stating that one party cannot take advantage of another party's ignorance relating to a
term if the first party knows that the second party would not assent to the agreement if the
second party knew of the term's presence).
572. Drans v. Providence College, 383 A.2d 1033, 1037-38 (R.I. 1978) (relying on
Goldstein v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank, 296 A.2d 112, 116 (R.I. 1972));
see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 22, § 4.14, at 263-64 (noting that the trend is toward
relieving parties of contractual terms they have not read if the drafter used artifice to
prevent the recipient from reading it or if consumers are involved).
573. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1981).
574. See, e.g., Aviall, Inc. v. Ryder Sys., Inc., 913 F. Supp. 826, 831-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1996);
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applies to terms contained in standard form contracts but which are
either buried in a sea of fine print or otherwise not conspicuous to the
signing party.575
Courts also police contracts with incorporated terms by
interpreting the incorporated terms narrowly. They sometimes insist
that incorporated terms be designated with specificity in order to
prevent one party from taking advantage of the other by inserting a
reference to a broad and open-ended, self-serving term that the other
party had no reason to suspect was present.576  The strict scrutiny
courts impose on incorporated terms is a policing mechanism to
ensure consent and/or protect the weaker party in the face of
obscure, one-sided contractual terms.
Because courts exercise a policing role when confronted with
one-sided incorporated terms in contracts generally, one might
expect courts to police arbitration agreements that are incorporated
by reference for unfairness, oppression, or surprise. Until the late
1980s, courts did just that.577 They imposed heightened scrutiny of
arbitration clauses that were inserted by reference because they
believed that a contractual provision as important as an arbitration
clause-which is in effect a waiver of a right to sue-should be
express to be enforceable.5 8 For example, the New York courts
Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 145-47, 158-59 (Ct. App. 1997); Buraczynski
v. Eyring, 919 S.W.2d 314,320-21 (Tenn. 1996).
575. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.D.C.
1965); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 86 (N.J. 1960). See generally
CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 22, § 9-43, at 412-14 (stating that a term may not be
enforced when it is placed in such a way that it is unlikely to come to the attention of the
party signing the contract).
576. See, e.g., Chiacchia v. National Westminister Bank, 507 N.Y.S.2d 888, 889-90
(App. Div. 1986) (noting that a trial was required to determine whether a safe deposit
rental agreement that stated it incorporated "rules and regulations of the bank" contained
sufficient specificity to incorporate the bank's Rules for Safe Deposit Box Service). See
generally Robert Whitman, Incorporation by Reference in Commercial Contracts, 21 MD.
L. RaV. 1, 2-7 (1961) (citing cases).
577. See, e.g., C. Itoh & Co. v. Jordan Int'l Co., 552 F.2d 1228, 1234-35 (7th Cir. 1977);
Medical Dev. Corp. v. Industrial Molding Corp., 479 F.2d 345, 349 (10th Cir. 1973);
Amoco Oil Co. v. M.T. Mary Ellen, 529 F. Supp. 227, 229-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); see also
Riverdale Fabrics Corp. v. Tillinghast-Stiles Co., 118 N.E.2d 104, 106 (N.Y. 1954)
(invalidating a clause that attempted to incorporate an arbitration clause by reference to
the Cotton Yarn Rules of 1938); Weiner v. Mercury Artists Corp., 130 N.Y.S.2d 570, 571-
72 (App. Div. 1954) (invalidating a claim that attempted to incorporate an arbitration
clause by reference to the rules of the American Federation of Musicians). See generally
Whitman, supra note 576, at 16-17 (noting a trend in the courts towards requiring specific
mention of an arbitration clause in the body of a document in order to render it
enforceable).
578. See, e.g., Castagna & Son, Inc. v. Alan Michel Plumbing, Inc., 462 N.Y.S.2d 486,
487 (App. Div. 1983); Riverdale Fabrics Corp., 118 N.E.2d at 106. Similar reasoning has
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adopted a principle that "an agreement to arbitrate must be clear and
direct, and must not depend upon implication, inveiglement or
subtlety" to be enforceable.5 79 As the New York Court of Appeals
stated in 1954: "Parties are not to be led into arbitration unwittingly
through subtlety. ' 580  Requiring a clear and unequivocal waiver of
legal rights is not unique to arbitration. Courts have often held that
contractual provisions that involve disclaimers of warranties,
confessions of judgment, or other waivers of legal rights must be
explicit and clear to be enforced.581
Until the 1980s, courts were particularly skeptical of arbitration
clauses in contracts in which the drafter was a member of the trade
association and the party seeking to avoid arbitration was not.5 2 The
New York Court of Appeals noted that such contracts appear to have
been drafted with a deliberate intent of avoiding the mention of
arbitration, leaving "unwary trader[s]" to learn of the arbitration
provision only when a dispute arose.5  The court stated that "the
form of words favored by these trade associations appears to have
been designed to avoid any resistance that might arise if arbitration
were brought to the attention of the contracting parties as the
exclusive remedy in case of disputes."5" But in the late 1980s, state
courts abandoned their policing approach to arbitration clauses
been used by courts to hold that a counteroffer containing an arbitration clause was a
material modification under U.C.C. § 2-207, and thus required an affirmative acceptance
by the offeror to be effective. See, e.g., In re Doughboy Indus., 233 N.Y.S.2d 488, 494-95
(App. Div. 1962).
579. In re Doughboy Indus., 233 N.Y.S.2d at 493; see also Waldron v. Goddess, 461
N.E.2d 273, 274 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that an arbitration provision in an expired
employment contract would not be extended by implication but only by express means);
EIS Group/Cornwall Hill Dev. Corp. v. Renaldi Constr., Inc., 546 N.Y.S.2d 105, 106 (App.
Div. 1989) (holding that because the contract between a developer and a contractor did
not contain a clear and unequivocal arbitration agreement, arbitration would not be
compelled).
580. Riverdale Fabrics Corp., 118 N.E.2d at 106.
581. See, e.g., Petersen v. Hubschman Constr. Co., 389 N.E.2d 1154, 1159 (Ill. 1979)
(holding that a disclaimer of warranty of habitability must be explicit to be enforced);
Tassan v. United Dev. Co., 410 N.E.2d 902, 909 (Ill. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that a
disclaimer of warranty of habitability clause that appeared in the same size type as other
clauses was not effective because it was not sufficiently conspicuous nor explained); Cutler
Corp. v. Latshaw, 97 A.2d 234, 236-37 (Pa. 1953) (holding that a confession of judgment
and warrant of attorney clause appearing in fine type on the back of a contract, although
referenced on the front, is ineffective).
582. See, e.g., Riverdale Fabrics, 118 N.E.2d at 106. See generally Whitman, supra note
576, at 17-18 & n.87 (citing cases in which courts were hesitant to force nonmembers to
arbitrate).




incorporated by reference. Instead, they began to enforce arbitration
clauses that were incorporated by reference even when the contract
was silent on the existence of the arbitration clause.
58 5
One reason for the change was the 1987 Supreme Court decision
in Perry v. Thomas.586 In Perry, the Court stated that under the FAA
the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate must be determined by
reference to state law, but any state law or legal doctrine that is
specific to arbitration is preempted by the FAA.5 1 Thus, only state
laws governing the enforceability of contracts generally can be used
as a defense to arbitration under the FAA."8 The Perry Court's
admonition that courts may not rely on arbitration-specific doctrines
to invalidate arbitration agreements led courts to hold that state law
doctrines requiring strict scrutiny of arbitration clauses that were
incorporated by reference were no longer valid.589 Similarly, state
contract law doctrines that required an explicit and unequivocal
waiver of a right to sue before finding that parties had agreed to
binding arbitration were held to be preempted.59 The result was that
whereas general contract law provides latitude for courts to protect
consumers in their dealings with large organized interests by relieving
them of oppressive and unexpected contractual terms, courts
interpreted Perry to deny courts that latitude when they were dealing
with arbitration clauses.
Courts need not have interpreted Perry in that way. They could
have characterized the judicial treatment of arbitration clauses
incorporated by reference as an application of the more general
doctrine that courts can refuse to enforce unexpected and oppressive
incorporated terms and terms that waive legal rights, rather than as
an application of a special rule for arbitration clauses.591 If the
585. See infra notes 594-610 and accompanying text.
586. 482 U.S. 483 (1987); see also supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text (discussing
Perry).
587. See Perry, 482 U.S. at 489-91.
588. See id. at 492-93 & n.9.
589. See, e.g., Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. C.A. Reaseguradora Nacional de Venez., 991
F.2d 42, 46 (2d Cir. 1993); Cook Chocolate Co. v. Salomon, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 1177, 1182
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
590. See Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 991 F.2d at 45-46.
591. See U.C.C. § 2-302 & cmt. 1 ("The principle is one of the prevention of oppression
and unfair surprise, and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior
bargaining power." (citation omitted)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACrS § 208 cmt. b (1981) (characterizing unconscionable contract terms to be such
"as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no
honest and fair man would accept on the other" (quoting Hume v. United States, 132 U.S.
406, 411 (1889))).
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practice of strictly scrutinizing arbitration clauses incorporated by
reference was characterized as an application of these more general
contract law principles, then it would not contravene Perry to
continue to apply them.
The retreat from heightened scrutiny and the substitution of an
"anything goes" approach to arbitration clauses that are incorporated
by reference began, not surprisingly, in securities cases. In the mid-
1980s, the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits independently held
that a broker who was a member of a stock or commodity exchange
was required to arbitrate his dispute with a customer even though the
broker had not consented to do so.59 These cases relied on the fact
that the broker, by becoming a member of the exchange, had agreed
to abide by its rules, including any subsequent amendments thereto.
The courts held that membership in the exchange was sufficient to
constitute consent to arbitration, whether or not there was
contractual assent.5 93
One example of this new trend was Geldermann v. Commodity
Futures Trading Commission,94 in which the Seventh Circuit
compelled parties to arbitrate a dispute between a member of a
commodities exchange and a customer. 95 The broker, who resisted
arbitration, had previously applied to join the Chicago Board of
Trade ("CBOT"), where he promised to "'observe and be bound by
the Charter, Rules, and Regulations of the Association, and all
amendments subsequently made thereto.' "596 At that time, the
CBOT had no mandatory arbitration provision for customer-initiated
claims, but it later amended its regulations to add such a provision.5 9
Geldermann claimed that he never consented to be bound by the
arbitration rule.598  The court rejected his claim, ruling that
Geldermann, by becoming a member of the Association and by
agreeing to be bound by its rules, had waived his right to a judicial
forum and had consented to be bound by arbitration procedures later
592. See Geldermann v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 836 F.2d 310, 319 (7th
Cir. 1987); Patten Sec. Corp. v. Diamond Greyhound & Genetics, Inc., 819 F.2d 400, 406
(3d Cir. 1987); Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 728 F.2d
577,580 (2d Cir. 1984).
593. See, e.g., Geldermann, 836 F.2d at 318; Patten Sec. Corp., 819 F.2d at 406.
594. 836 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1987).
595. See id at 323-24.
596. LI at 318 (quoting Regulation 205.00, Rules and Regulations of the Board of





adopted by the Association.5 99
Similarly, in Cook Chocolate Co. v. Salomon Inc.,6°° the District
Court for the Southern District of New York required the plaintiff
cocoa bean buyer to arbitrate his claims against a trading firm
because his contract incorporated "'[a]ll relevant terms and
conditions of the Cocoa Merchants' Association of America.' ,601
The court stated that the plaintiff, who belonged both to the cocoa
merchants' trade association and the relevant commodities exchange,
both of which required the use of arbitration, could not claim that the
obligation to arbitrate was not within his expectations.6°
The result in each of these cases was derived from the fact that
both parties were members of the trade association or stock
exchange, not from a specific arbitration provision that was express
or incorporated by reference into a contract. The courts used the fact
of membership of both contracting parties to overcome any claims
one party might make that it was being compelled to arbitrate
unwittingly. Reliance on the fact of shared membership in a common
endeavor has also led courts to impose arbitration when there was
not only no express arbitration agreement between them, but also no
mention of arbitration in documents that they had incorporated by
reference.603
In a setting of joint membership, both parties can not only be
presumed to know of and have shared in making the arbitration
rules, they also can be presumed to share in the normative principles
and precepts that an arbitrator will bring to bear in deciding the
dispute. In this sense, the disputing parties and the arbitrators are all
members of a shared normative community. The template of
arbitration as a creation and reflection of shared values within a
normative community makes sense in such a setting and leads to
justifiable results.
The security industry cases turn on membership in a shared
trade association or stock exchange, but they have also been used as
599. See id. at 318-19. But see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts,
Administrative Agencies, and Article 111, 101 HARv. L. REv. 916, 991-92 & n.414 (1988)
(criticizing Geldermann and arguing that "conditioning the practice of a lawful trade on
the 'waiver' of a constitutional right is coercive in every practical sense; to call this a
'waiver' is to render the concept meaningless").
600. 684 F. Supp. 1177 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
601. 1d at 1180 (quoting the contract at issue).
602. See id at 1183.
603. See R.J. O'Brien & Assoc. v. Pipkin, 64 F.3d 257, 259, 261 (7th Cir. 1995)
(compelling parties who were both registered with the National Futures Association to
arbitrate).
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authority for compelling arbitration of disputes between members
and nonmembers when there was a contract that incorporated the
rules of a trade association or exchange "'as they may be amended
from time to time.' "I One particularly troubling case in which a
court extended the incorporation by reference approach beyond the
member-member situation was Pay Phone Concepts, Inc. v. MCI
Telecommunications Corp.,605 in which the district court held that the
plaintiff, a pay phone owner, was required to arbitrate his dispute
with MC. 6° 6 The plaintiff's contract with MCI made no mention of
arbitration, but some time after the contract was made, MCI
amended its Tariff on file with the Federal Communications
Commission to provide for binding arbitration of all disputes.60 The
court held that the plaintiff, who was unaware of the Tariff
amendment and had never consented to arbitrate disputes with MCI,
was nonetheless bound to do so because its contract with MCI
contained a vague reference to the MCI Tariff.65 The court stated
that the plaintiff was presumed to know not only the terms of the
Tariff at the time the contract was made, but also that the carrier
might change the Tariff from time to time.609 Further, the plaintiff
was expected to know that the Tariff, which normally pertains to
rates to be charged, might also be amended to add an arbitration
provision.610 This case illustrates the absurd results that occur when
courts extend the reasoning of cases involving joint membership to
member-nonmember situations.
VII. REASSESSING THE COURTS' APPROACH TO SELF-REGULATION
A. A Distinction Between Insiders and Outsiders
Once we understand the courts' expansive interpretation of the
FAA as a form of delegation of judicial and legislative authority to
604. Illyes v. John Nuveen, 949 F. Supp. 580, 582 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (quoting NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, UNIFORM APPLICATION FOR SECURITIES
INDUSTRY REGISTRATION OR TRANSFER (FORM U-4) (1979)). The llyes court required
a bond analyst to arbitrate a dispute with a former employer on the basis of an initial U-4
application even though NASD procedure was amended after the employee's hiring to
require employment disputes be arbitrated. See id. at 583; see also Hodge Bros. v. Delong
Co., 942 F. Supp. 412, 419 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (holding that a nonmember was bound to
arbitrate under the rules of trade association).
605. 904 F. Supp. 1202 (D. Kan. 1995).
606. See id. at 1204, 1209.
607. See iL at 1204.





self-regulating communities, we can critically assess the virtues and
limitations of such an approach. It becomes immediately clear that
arbitration has very different virtues and limitations depending upon
whether it used to resolve disputes between two members of a
normative community such as a trade association or a stock
exchange, or whether it is used in disputes between insiders to a
community and others who remain outside. Today many arbitration
clauses are found not in contracts between equals in a shared
community, but rather in contracts of adhesion between insiders and
outsiders, such as between a powerful association and a nonmember
or between a big corporation and a consumer. Therefore, while
substantial deference to arbitration may be appropriate in a dispute
between equally situated members of the medical community, for
example, it is not appropriate to require patients alleging malpractice
to take their cases to a panel of medical community insiders who are
likely to be more sympathetic to the medical professional than to the
patient.
The use of arbitration in disputes between insiders and outsiders
raises problems not merely of overt arbitrator bias; it also poses
problems of more subtle bias that exists when the arbitrator has
fundamentally different perspectives than one of the parties.
Outsiders are disadvantaged in such settings because insiders know
the norms, share the norms with the arbitrators, and expect the
norms to govern resolution of their disputes. Moreover, the fact that
most association arbitration procedures are informal often works to
the disadvantage of the outsider. Outsiders do not have ready access
to relevant information, knowledge of the historical background and
precedents, or ability to garner potentially helpful witnesses, making
it ever more difficult to prove their case.6 '
The differences between insider-outsider arbitrations and
insider-insider arbitrations justify differential levels of judicial
deference. While to date, courts have not made such a distinction,
such a distinction could protect outsiders in cases where blanket
application of pro-arbitration policies leads to injustice. There are
several doctrinal mechanisms courts could use to protect outsiders
from the potentially oppressive arbitration systems designed and
maintained by insiders. For example, courts could use the
611. From a practical perspective, the information the outsider requires to meet its
burden of proof is often in the insider's possession. See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Enforcing
Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of
Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 33, 46-49 (discussing a case in which the lack of
discovery hindered the plaintiff in employment discrimination arbitration).
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unconscionability doctrine to impose greater scrutiny on arbitration
agreements between insiders and outsiders where there is a danger
that the outsider has been compelled to waive statutory rights, agree
to one-sided arbitral procedures, or submit to a biased forum. Some
courts are beginning to adopt this approach in the area of
employment arbitration between employers and nonunion workers.612
Alternatively, courts could require that minimal due process be
provided before enforcing an arbitral award in a dispute between an
insider and an outsider.6 13 Such an approach would find support in
the dicta in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,614 which
suggested that to be enforceable, an arbitration procedure must
provide minimal standards of due process.61 5
Courts could also protect outsiders in insider-outsider
arbitrations by changing the standard of review of arbitral outcomes.
They could abandon the judge-made "manifest disregard" and
612. See Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1479-83 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating
that minimal due process protections must be present to avoid such arbitrations being held
unconscionable); Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 158-59 (Ct. App. 1997)
(holding that an arbitration agreement which significantly limited employees' remedies,
shortened the statute of limitations, eliminated employees' rights to recover for many
statutory and common law actions, and did not similarly apply to the employer was so one-
sided as to be unconscionable); see also Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitration and the U.S.
Supreme Court: A Plea for Statutory Reform, 5 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 231, 272-73
(1990) (proposing amendments to the FAA to ensure consent and due process in
arbitration).
While the separability doctrine prevents courts from using the unconscionability
doctrine to invalidate an arbitration clause when an entire agreement is alleged to be
unconscionable, courts could scrutinize arbitration clauses contained within an agreement
for substantively unconscionable features. See Doctor's Assocs. v. Casaratto, 517 U.S.
681, 687 (1995); see also Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 574-75 (App.
Div. 1998) (holding that excessive costs involved in arbitration under the International
Chamber of Commerce rules rendered that portion of the arbitration award
unconscionable).
613. Some recent cases have suggested that arbitration awards must result from a
fundamentally fair procedure to be enforceable. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 190, 201-10 (D. Mass.), affd on other grounds,
163 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 1998); Hoffman v. Cargill, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 465, 474-76 (N.D. Iowa
1997).
614. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
615. See id. at 31 (suggesting in dicta that minimal procedural protections, such as
limited opportunities for discovery, are required for affirmation of an arbitral award).
There is also some authority for a minimal due process test for arbitration under the
antitrust laws. See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 361 (1963) (suggesting
that a trade association's arbitration agreement would be a per se violation of the antitrust
laws unless it contained minimal procedural protections). The interpretation by the court
in Silver was narrowed in Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationary & Printing
Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985). See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 291-93 (limiting
Silver to a group boycott case).
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instead impose de novo review for questions of law decided in
arbitration. Recently some scholars have suggested that courts
review arbitral awards de novo for questions of law in the areas of
attorney-client arbitration and employment arbitration.6 16  A more
general use of judicial review for questions of law would assure that
arbitration complies with external law while preserving the fact-
finding role of the arbitrator.
Another approach courts could take to police the fairness of
arbitration in insider-outsider cases is to rule that arbitration under
the FAA is state action and so constitutional Due Process Clause
protections apply.61 To date, a few courts have held that the Due
Process Clause applies to disciplinary and arbitration proceedings in
the securities industry,68 but most other courts have rejected this
reasoning.619 Applying the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause to
arbitration would convert arbitration under the FAA from a forum
for private justice to an adjunct to the legal system.
A different approach to policing arbitration in disputes between
insiders and outsiders is to reconsider the revocability doctrine. As
Robert Ellickson has demonstrated, some self-governing
communities have powerful enforcement means outside the law to
police and sanction members who violate their norms.62 Indeed, he
616. See Brickman, supra note 204, at 307 (proposing courts review attorney fee
arbitral awards to "ensure that ethical and fiduciary standards have been properly
applied"); Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice. A Jurisprudential
Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to
Gilmer, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1240 (1993) (proposing "de novo judicial review of
arbitral interpretations of law" in employment arbitration); see also Jean R. Sternlight,
Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding
Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637,710-11 (1996) (advocating that courts overturn arbitral
awards that are "clearly unfounded and inconsistent with applicable law").
617. Recently, some scholars have argued that arbitration was state action and should
be subject to Fifth Amendment standards. See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice:
Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577, 609-
41 (1997); Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's
Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of
Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 40-47 (1997).
618. See, e.g., R.J. O'Brien v. Pipkin, 64 F.3d 257, 262 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that
because individuals registering with a commodity exchange are required, by the
Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1994), to agree to the exchange's own rules,
the exchange is exercising a governmental function and.must therefore accord registrants
due process in the registration process); see also Stone & Perino, supra note 427, at 486
(finding that "no federal court cases have held that any constitutional rights other than
due process rights apply in connection with enforcement actions instituted by SROs").
619. At present there is a split in the circuits on the issue of the application of the Fifth
Amendment to securities industry disciplinary arbitrations. See Stone & Perino, supra
note 427, at 486-92.
620. See ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 56-64 (1994). Ellickson refers
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argues that norms are self-enforcing within self-governing
communities. Ellickson's study of cattle farmers in Shasta County,
California vividly illustrates how insiders tend to abide by their
community's dispute resolution systems even in the absence of a
statute to compel them to do so.621 It is therefore reasonable to
assume that insiders to trade associations or other such self-
regulating and norm-generating communities will tend to abide by
their arbitration agreements with or without the FAA to compel
them to do so.
If it is true that self-regulating communities generate self-
enforcing norms, then little would be lost by amending the FAA to
reinstate the revocability doctrine. Such an amendment would
operationalize a distinction between insiders and outsiders without
requiring courts to make that classification. It would give outsiders
the option to decline to use the community's own arbitration system
and utilize the civil litigation system instead, while at the same time -it
would permit insiders, who are subject to the informal sanctions of a
self-regulating community, to do so. Reviving the revocability
doctrine therefore has the potential of retaining use of arbitration
where it is appropriate without imposing it where it does not belong.
B. Defining a Self-Regulating Community
Most of the foregoing proposals for policing arbitration between
insiders and outsiders assume that courts are able to tell the
difference between arbitration in "insider-outsider" disputes and
"insider-insider" disputes. Other than the proposal to resurrect the
revocability doctrine, the proposals require courts to have a robust
definition of a normative self-regulating community and a way to
determine membership thereto. While full development of such a
definition is another project for another day, the relevant features of
self-regulating communities can be briefly described.
Membership in a normative community must involve, at the very
least, two features: (1) common experiences; and (2) the opportunity
to normative self-regulating communities as "close-knit groups, which he defines as a
group where "informal power is distributed amongst group members and the information
pertinent to informal control circulates easily among them." Id. at 177-78; see also Lisa
Bernstein, Merchant Law in Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent
Business Norms; 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1771-82 (1996) (discussing the arbitration
structure of the National Grain and Feed Association, which uses a more formalistic
system of rules, as compared to the course of dealing and course of performance rules by
which courts assess disputes under the UCC).
621. See ELLICKSON, supra note 620, at 55-64, 79-81.
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to participate in framing the shared institutions, values, and rules that
grow out of that common experience. The requirement of common
experiences provides the necessary basis for a normative community,
but it is not sufficient. The role of participation becomes clear when
we consider two settings in which arbitration is frequently utilized
and much criticized-franchise relationships and employment
relationships.
Many of the most controversial cases decided under the FAA
involve franchise or employment situations. Southland Corp. v.
Keatingje involved a dispute between a franchisee and a franchisor
about alleged acts of fraud and breach of contract.' Mitsibushi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.624 involved a franchise
relationship between Chrysler and Soler in which the franchisee
accused the franchisor of violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act.6-
Doctor's Associates v. Casaretto626 involved an attempt by a
franchisee to arbitrate fraud and breach of good faith claims.627 In
each case, the franchisor gave the franchisee an arbitration
agreement at the outset of the relationship, and when the franchisee
later attempted to assert legal rights against the franchisor, the latter
successfully raised the arbitration clause as a bar to the action.
Employment cases are a close analog to franchise cases. In
employment cases, the employer typically requires the employee to
agree to an arbitration provision at the outset of the relationship as a
condition of entry. When the employee subsequently attempts to
bring a legal claim against the employer, the latter raises the
arbitration clause as a bar.
628
Franchise and employment cases look like insider-insider cases
because in both situations the parties to the dispute-franchisee and
franchisor or employee and employer-share an economic interest in
the well-being of a common enterprise. In both settings, the
disputants are likely to wear the same company insignia and attend
622. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
623. See id. at 3-4, 17.
624. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
625. See id at 619, 620.
626. 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
627. See id at 682-83.
628. For example, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), an
employer successfully compelled an employee to utilize an arbitration system, to which the
employee was forced to consent in order to obtain employment, for adjudicating the
employee's age discrimination claim. See id. at 23. Since Gilmer, many lower courts have
likewise required employees to arbitrate employment-related claims that employees
sought to litigate. See Stone, supra note 136, at 1023 (citing cases).
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the same company picnics. The franchise and employment
relationships, however, are different from stock exchange or trade
association cases in one important respect: Arbitration does not
emerge from participation in a shared normative community in which
both parties participate. In the franchise and employment cases, the
party seeking to avoid arbitration-the franchisee or employee-did
not play a participatory role in framing the rules, norms, and customs
of the community. Rather, the arbitration agreement was the ticket
of entrance into the community. The arbitration clause is typically
contained in the franchise agreement or the employer handbook, and
the applicant franchisee/employee is told they cannot enter the
"community" if they decline it. At the moment that the arbitration
procedures are proposed, the individual employee or franchisee is an
outsider who has played no role in shaping the procedures or the
norms which it embodies. Therefore the arbitration process does not
reflect the existence of a shared community and norms. For this
reason, franchise-franchisor and employee-employer relationships
are insider-outsider pairings, similar to customer-stockbroker or
patient-doctor relationships. While they involve shared experiences
and economic interdependency, there is no shared participation in
defining the norms of the community.629
VIII. THE SccrE OF SELF-REGULATION WITHIN THE BROADER
COMMUNITY
This Article has advocated a two-tiered approach to
arbitration-a deferential approach to arbitration for insider-insider
disputes and a restrictive approach for insider-outsider disputes.
Such an approach would cure some of the present abuses in the use
of arbitration, but it raises two further issues. First, while the case
has been made for policing the use of arbitration between insiders
and outsiders, it remains to consider whether there should also be
some level of policing for arbitrations between insiders to self-
regulating communities. Within such communities we do not want
considerations of law and public policy to be excluded altogether.60
As presently interpreted, the FAA permits self-regulating
629. See Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential
Associations and Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 44-47 (1989) (arguing that
homeowner associations lack genuine participatory self-governance and thus do not foster
civic participation or small-scale democracy).
630. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) (arguing
that courts play a constructive role by "explicat[ing] and giv[ing] force to the values
embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and statutes").
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communities to opt out of many publicly enacted obligations. 631 We
need to question the degree to which such groups should be able to
do this. After all, laws are enacted for the community at large, and
there is a larger public interest in having others obey them.
Furthermore, even within self-regulating communities, there are
often power imbalances, coercive practices, and opportunism that
should be amenable to judicial redress.
A. Voluntary Associations and the Limits of Autonomy
The question of whether to permit collective waiver of public
norms, and which public norms should be amenable to collective
waiver, implicates the larger question of the role of voluntary
associations in society. Voluntary associations have always been an
important aspect of American democracy, 632 but at the same time
courts have long imposed limits on the claims of group autonomy.633
The question of which groups should be able to self-regulate, and on
which issues, is a subject of ongoing and intense debate.634 These
issues are both complicated and simplified by the fact that most
members of our society participate in overlapping and changing self-
regulating communities.635 For example, many Americans are
631. The combination of the "manifest disregard" standard of review of arbitral awards
and the presumption of arbitrability has this effect. See supra notes 146-47 and
accompanying text.
632. See ALEXIs DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 319-32 (Henry Steele
Commager ed. & Henry Reeve trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1947) (1840).
633. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (affirming a state's
prohibition on the use of peyote by religious group); Lyng v. International Union, 485 U.S.
360, 368 (1988) (upholding the Amendment to Food Stamp Act precluding payment of
food stamps to families of striking workers); Board of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club,
481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987) (determining that requiring Rotary Clubs to admit women "does
not require the clubs to abandon or alter" any of their activities or basic goals and
therefore did not abridge the members' associational rights); Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628-29 (1984) (affirming state ruling requiring Jaycees to admit
women as members); Marchioro v. Chaney, 442 U.S. 191, 199 (1979) (upholding state law
requiring each major political party to have a State Committee made up of two persons
from each county).
634. Compare Mark D. Rosen, The Outer Limits of Community Self-Governance in
Residential Associations, Municipalities, and Indian Country: A Liberal Theory, 84 VA. L.
REV. 1053, 1140-44 (1998) (arguing that communities that are "political perfectionists"
should be able to establish "sub-federal sovereigns"), with Christopher L. Eisgruber, The
Constitutional Value of Assimilation, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 87, 102-03 (1996) (arguing that it
is unconstitutional to grant religious communities such as Kiryas Joel substantial degrees
of autonomy). See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Defining Democracy Down, AM.
PROSPECT, Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 91 (critiquing NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND
MORALS (1998)).
635. See ROSENBLUM, supra note 634; Stewart Macaulay, Private Government, in LAW
AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 445 (Leon Lipson & Stanton Wheeler eds., 1986); John Rawls,
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members of homeowners associations, attend church, belong to a
rotary club or similar civic association, and are members of a political
party, all at the same time. The fact of overlapping associative ties
makes the inquiry more complicated because it exponentially
increases the number of instances in which conflicting claims to self-
governance arise; yet the same fact simplifies the task of delineating
competing claims to self-governance because the multiplicity of
associative claims makes it clear that what is required is not an
absolute approach but rather one that permits the application of
overlapping norms.636
Not only do most people participate in multiple associations,
associations also differ markedly in their demands for allegiance and
their role in their members' lives. At one end of a spectrum lies
associations such as video clubs or the American Express Company,
which call its patrons "members" but involve only minimal contact
between members and the organization. At the other end lie
"totalistic" religious communities such as the Rajneesh, the Church
of Scientology, or the Satmar Chasidim. 37 These communities,
sometimes termed "political perfectionists," require members to live
together under a governance structure that embodies and imposes
the group's values on all aspects of the members' lives. 3 Between
these extremes lie the great multitude of organizations which assert
claims of membership and invoke affective ties-trade unions,
political parties, sports clubs, trade associations, and the like. Some
are more and some are less encompassing with respect to members'
lives, but unlike political perfectionist organizations, participation in
one mid-level voluntary association does not preclude members from
participating in others.
The question of how much deference to afford arbitration by
each of these types of associations is one aspect of the larger question
of how much autonomy to give them. Arbitration between members
and minimalist associations like video clubs are like insider-outsider
cases, where the individual stands in the position of a consumer
confronting a large corporation. There it is appropriate to apply the
low standard of deference advocated for insider-outsider cases. On
The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1987).
636. See ROSENBLUM, supra note 634, at 50-65 (arguing that multiple allegiances and
overlapping values are a necessary prerequisite to public morality).
637. See Rosen, supra note 634, at 1082-86 (describing practices of Rajneesh, the
Church of Scientology, and Kiryas Joel as "politicial perfectionists"); ROSENBLUM, supra
note 634, at 98-103 (discussing "totalistic" associations).
638. See Rosen, supra note 634, at 1064-71 (defining "political perfectionists").
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the other hand, in totalistic associations, the problem of determining
how much deference to give to the group's own dispute resolution
processes is unlikely to arise because any attempt by an insider to
utilize an outside court to resolve a dispute rather than to utilize the
group's own processes will transform the insider into an outsider.
That is, part of the definition of membership involves a commitment
to utilize the group's own processes to resolve internal disputes.639
Mid-level associations, then, are the ones that require us to
consider what degree of deference or autonomy is appropriate in
insider-insider cases. To resolve this question, we can draw upon the
growing body of law about associational rights to determine which
issues should be amenable to a group's own internal adjudicatory
machinery and which should not. Already courts are engaged in
mapping the boundaries of associational autonomy in cases involving
claims of First Amendment religion, speech, and associational rights.
Courts have developed a series of doctrines to determine when
groups are subjected to external regulation and when they are not.
Courts have held, for example, that religious groups are subject to
generally applicable criminal law so long as the law is not targeted at
religion nor unduly burdensome on religious practices."0 Courts
have also held that private clubs are subject to § 1983 claims of equal
protection so long as doing so "does not require the clubs to abandon
or alter" any of their activities or basic goals and therefore does not
abridge the members' associational rights."41
While the issue of when to permit groups to substitute
arbitration procedures for courts is not the same as when to permit
groups to escape regulation altogether, a similar methodology could
be employed. If judges reviewed the results of arbitration on
questions of law, as proposed above, they would begin to map the
interface between private justice and public norms. A court
confronted with a challenge to an arbitral award on the grounds that
the award violated an external law would be forced to consider
whether and to what extent the publicly promulgated values
embodied in the particular external law should be able to trump the
internal law of the self-regulating community. In their opinions,
courts would be forced to define the scope of associational rights and
the distinctive virtues of self-regulation as they articulate reasons for
locating the interface between private and public norms where they
639. See id at 1089-1106.
640. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 US. 872,878-80 (1990).
641. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 630 (1984) (affirming the state
ruling requiring Jaycees to admit women as members).
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do. Thus, the proposal to redefine the standard of judicial review for
arbitration and to permit judicial review of arbitral awards on
questions of law would initiate reasoned discussion of the issue. The
current judicial approach of blind deference to arbitral fora and
rubber-stamp enforcement of arbitral awards enables courts to duck
the hard issues of self-regulation and associational autonomy in a
democratic society.
B. Allocative Efficiency
A second issue that arises from any proposals to modify the law
of arbitration is the extent to which the present arbitration law is
efficient. One might argue that even if arbitration does not always
accurately reflect the parties' consent and despite occasional unfair
results in particular cases, arbitration is efficient for society as a
whole. Lawsuits are time-consuming and entail tremendous
transaction costs, so any device that reduces those inefficient
expenditures is desirable. The courts have so overburdened society
with excessive due process, discovery, and delay that any expedited
process should be preferred.
While this argument has some merit, it proves too much. Under
this reasoning, any expedited judicial system would be preferable to
the current system. Any alternative to full-blown litigation, such as
small claims courts, specialty courts, or special masters, would
provide the same efficiencies claimed for arbitration. Yet small
claims courts, specialty courts, or special masters differ from
arbitration in that they preserve and reinforce, rather than evade and
expunge, the norms of our larger society. These alternative forms of
expediting dispute-resolution address the perceived crisis in our civil
justice system while maintaining the virtues of a public tribunal for
providing justice. Thus, the efficiency argument makes a case for
meaningful court reform, not necessarily for substituting courts with
arbitration.
The efficiency argument for arbitration also ignores the role of
enforcement of substantive rights for our society as a whole. Many
economists and legal scholars understand the primary role of tort
litigation not as compensation to the individual plaintiff but
deterrence to others.'4 While large damage judgments in tort cases
642. See, e.g., WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF TORT LAW 9-12 (1987); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW
247 (1987); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic
Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 870,954-55 (1998).
[Vol. 771034
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
may actually compensate some victims for their losses, the system is
far too unpredictable and random to be truly compensatory in all
cases. 3 If the primary goal of the legal system is deterrence rather
than compensation, then the efficiency value of arbitration must be
questioned. That is, while the civil justice system may be erratic and
time-consuming from the vantage point of the individual litigant, it
could well be efficient for society as a whole. Legal awards play a
significant role in the enforcement of laws and the deterrence of
violations.644 Arbitration, with its tendency to eliminate or reduce
corporate liability and its de facto limit on damages, undermines
these goals.
To the extent that our legislators enact laws because the public
wants them, then we have a public interest in having those laws
enforced. A fortiori, dispute resolution methods that dilute
enforcement and permit violators to escape liability are 'contrary to
the public good. From this perspective, compelling consumers to
arbitrate statutory claims in tribunals that are biased against them is
highly inefficient for society as a whole.
C. Conclusion
This Article has argued that we must rethink the trend toward
increased deference to private judicial systems. Arbitration is
quickly becoming the primary forum for determining consumer
claims, and it is likely that arbitration will soon be used not merely to
determine claims of defective product performance, but also claims
of injury from dangerous products. For example, to return to the
introductory hypothetical, if the computer that the Harpers
purchased had exploded in Mr. Harper's face when he turned it on
and blinded him, the arbitration clause that came in the box with the
product would have required that his tort claim be heard by the
643. See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition
and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2075-76 (1998).
644. There is presently a heated debate about whether punitive damages are properly
included in tort remedies, and if so, under what circumstances they should issue. Compare
Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 642, at 962 (proposing a formula for assessing punitive
damages), with Sunstein et al., supra note 643, at 2109-30 (proposing an alternative
approach to awarding punitive damages). Without taking a position on whether or in what
manner punitive damages should be assessed, it is sufficient to note that whether damages
are punitive or compensatory, or something in between (as in the Polinsky/Shavell model),
they can only deter wrongful conduct if they are in fact assessed. Further, damages are
more potent as deterrents if they are assessed in a public arena. Arbitration clauses that
permit injurers to evade liability, and to evade liability in secret, do not serve deterrence
goals.
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industry-run arbitration panel. Such a result is troubling for anyone
who believes that the enforcement of law is necessary to deter anti-
social conduct.
I have proposed that courts reconsider their expansive approach
to arbitration and exercise oversight over the invisible world of
private associations. In particular, I suggest they distinguish between
insiders and outsiders to a self-regulating community when deciding
which arbitral awards to enforce. When arbitration is used between
persons who are differentially situated in relationship to a self-
regulating community, courts should not automatically compel
parties to arbitrate and then rubber stamp the resulting awards.
Rather, they should police agreements to arbitrate for
unconscionability, impose minimal standards of fairness on the
arbitral process, and engage in judicial review of questions of law.
Legitimate concerns about court congestion and excessive litigation
can be addressed through alternative dispute resolution methods
without blind deference to a wholly privatized form of arbitration.
The present regime of rustic justice embodies a vision of society
as a collection of legally autonomous and morally disconnected
subcommunities. While there is some truth to this description of our
associational life, it does not capture the many ideals, values, and
sensibilities that bind us together.64s The varied, overlapping, and
shifting associational ties in American society constitute an
experience of pluralism that promotes certain moral and political
values and permits what Nancy Rosenblum calls a "democracy of
everyday life" to flourish. 6 In addition to, or perhaps because of,
our robust associational life, we participate in a common culture and
thus we all benefit from a public intellectual space in which general
norms are debated, determined, and enforced.647 Thus, we need to
question whether the fractionated and privatized world of rustic
justice is a world we want to embrace.
648
645. See generally ALAN WOLFE, ONE NATION, AFrER ALL (1998) (documenting the
deep degree of consensus about fundamental values in American society).
646. ROSENBLUM, supra note 634, at 349-63.
647. See Fiss, supra note 630, at 1085-87.
648. See Alexander, supra note 629, at 1-7; Margaret Jane Radin, Property and
Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 978-91 (1982).
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